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I.

Introduction

A set of rules and constraints that shape human action through
inducing a particular pattern of human behavior. . . .

1

Why “a criminal law for cyberspace”? should cyberspace have its own criminal
law? What is it about cyberspace that requires the articulation of a set of distinctive
principles governing the imposition of criminal liability?

The simple answer is that cybercrime2 creates challenges for the extant model of
law enforcement3 that are already of a severity sufficient to require the development of a
new model, one that can address these challenges.4 The model that is currently in use,5
like all models of law enforcement, combines a set of legal principles (“the criminal law”)
with a repertoire of operational procedures (“police practices”) to create the device, the
architecture, a society uses in an effort to maintain “order,” a concept which is discussed
below.6

Because the extant model of law enforcement evolved within a specific historical
context, it incorporates certain assumptions about the modes and methods of criminal
behavior law enforcement agents will encounter in a given society.7 Because these
assumptions are historically derived, they can become at odds with the social realities
law enforcement officers actually encounter at a particular moment in time; as the
disconnect between one or more of these basic assumptions and experiential reality
becomes increasingly apparent, law enforcement personnel will endeavor to have their
model updated by incorporating new or revised assumptions, but this can be a slow
process.8 Consequently, the deviation between embedded assumptions and empirical
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reality is particularly profound when a society is undergoing rapid, pronounced social
and cultural changes.9

The rise and proliferation of cybercrime is revealing a profound, irreparable
deviation between fundamental assumptions that configured the current model of law
enforcement and the emerging texture of social reality in the twenty-first century.10 The
deviation is profound because several already-apparent characteristics of cybercrime
are inconsistent with assumptions that shaped the model’s basic operating premises; 11 it
is irreparable because these premises cannot be modified to adapt the current model so
that it can deal effectively with these aspects of cybercrime.12 What is needed is a new
model of law enforcement, one that is specifically designed to address the challenges of
cybercrime.13

This is where a “criminal law for cyberspace” comes in. Given the nature of the
challenges cybercrime poses for the traditional model of law enforcement, developing a
new, cybercrime-adequate model is not simply a matter of devising new police practices.
As noted earlier, a model, any model, of law enforcement is based on an array of police
practices and a set of legal principles.14 Devising new police practices is therefore part of
the calculus involved in creating a new model, but the model must also be supported by
legal principles which reinforce and implement the approach it takes to wrongdoing.15

Articulating the precise contours of this new, cybercrime-specific model of law
enforcement is an undertaking that is quite beyond the scope or ambitions of this article.
It has two goals: One is to explain how the current model of law enforcement evolved
and why a new model is needed; the other is to outline this new model and explain how
criminal law doctrines can be used to implement it. Sections II and III trace the evolution
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of the current model and describe its limitations as to cybercrime; section IV sketches
the contours of the new model and explains the role “a criminal law for cyberspace”
plays in its implementation. Finally, section IV presents a brief conclusion.

II.

Evolution of the Current Model

[W]here . . . men live without other security than what their own
strength . . . shall furnish them. . . . there is no place for industry, . . . no
culture of the earth, . . . no arts, no letters, no society. . . .

16

The current model of law enforcement, like all the antecedent models, is intended
to provide a baseline of security in a society, a framework within which human activities,
especially those that are essential to the survival and perpetuation of the species, can be
conducted confidently and predictably. A law enforcement model is an extrapolation, an
operationalization, of a criminal law. The function of criminal law is to maintain an
acceptable level of ”order” within a society;17 it does this by defining certain types of
behavior, behaviors which threaten essential interests, as intolerable.18 Merely defining
behaviors as intolerable is not, however, sufficient to eliminate them; there must also be
processes in place that discourage individuals from engaging in these outlawed
behaviors.19 The sections below consider these two aspects of a law enforcement
model -- “rules” and “process” -- in more detail.

A.

Rules
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[C]riminal law defines the boundaries of permissible and impermissible
conduct for all members of a society governed by the law’s geographic
jurisdiction. . . .

20

Criminal law, like all law, is a set of rules.21 A rule is a compulsory principle that
governs action and inaction; 22 a rule specifies which actions are allowable and which are
not.23 All natural systems – social, biological, physical – operate according a discrete set
of rules;24 and rules are also a constitutive element of artificial systems such as software
programs and games.25 Legal rules differ from other rules found in the natural world in
certain respects, one of which is that they have been consciously established according
to some process in place in a human society; they are therefore calculated and
mutable.26 Functionally, however, legal rules are analogous to the rules that are the
basic component of order in all self-organizing collective systems, whether populated by
insects, animals, humans or artificial entities (such as software routines).27

1.

Order

“Order” is the state for which all such systems strive, because without it they do
not (and cannot) exist. Order is the subjugation of chaos; it means that a sufficient
measure of control has been established over the environment within which a system
operates and the individual entities who comprise it so that the latter can successfully
discharge the tasks necessary for the perpetuation of the system.28 If a self-organizing
collective system is to survive, it must, at a minimum, ensure the continuity of a populace
of the entities of which it is comprised. For biological systems, this means ensuring (a)
that its constituent entities have the necessities (e.g., food, water, shelter) they need to
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survive and to reproduce themselves; (b) that their offspring achieve adulthood and are
successfully incorporated into the system; and (c) that these discrete entities and the
system itself are protected from the depredations of competitors and predators.29

Order therefore has both an internal and an external component: Internal order
governs the constituent entities’ activities and relationships with each other and their
relationships with the system as a whole; to define and maintain internal order, systems
must therefore implement rules which define these activities and relationships so that,
for instance, an ant knows whether it is a worker or a soldier, whether its default function
is to gather food or wage war. 30 External order governs a system’s relationship with its
environment; “environment” includes both the physical context within which a system
functions and biological agents who can threaten its survival by directly attacking its
constituent entities or by competing with them for food.31 Every system will therefore
also implement rules that structure its interactions with the environment; ant colonies, for
example, have rules governing the conduct of war with other colonies and the process of
relocating colonies and founding new colonies.32 The rules that structure internal and
external order do not operate independently; instead, they interact and evolve, allowing
the system to adapt to changes in its environment.33

Rules are an absolute necessity for the emergence of self-organizing collective
systems.34 Without rules to order activities and relationships, there is no “system”; there
is, at best, a shifting congeries of entities, an assemblage totally lacking coherence and
function.35 But while rules are a constant, the ways they manifest themselves are not.
As the section below explains, intelligence very much influences the types of rules that
emerge and the ways in which they are implemented.
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2.

Intelligence

The most direct control on the behavior of a biological system is
the knowledge stored in its genes.36

As explained above, rules are an essential aspect of all self-organizing collective
systems, whether they are populated by biological or artificial life-forms.37 At a very
basic, constitutive level, rules operate equivalently in all such systems, regardless of the
characteristics of the entities that comprise them; rules establish the baseline of order
without which no system can come into existence and survive.38 At a higher level of
organizational extrapolation, rules function differently in various systems; and the critical
factor in differentiating the functioning of rules in self-organizing collective systems is the
intelligence of the entities that populate the system.39

“Intelligence” is difficult to define; it is an elusive concept, one that has spawned
many definitions.40 Certain elements, though, are consistent: One that is common to all
definitions of intelligence is the ability to make decisions, i.e., to consider two (or more)
alternatives and deliberately elect to pursue one of them.41 Definitions of intelligence
also emphasize that an entity’s decision to choose a particular alternative is the result of
reasoning, i.e., the cognitive application of knowledge which the entity has acquired by
learning from previous experience.42 An intelligent entity,43 therefore, is one that can act
on its own – one that can make decisions and manifest autonomous behavior on some
level.44 This definition implies the existence of a residual category – i.e., a non-intelligent
entity – insofar as it assumes intelligence is a zero sum commodity. This assumption is
at once valid and not-valid.
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At one level, biological and artificial entities can be divided into “intelligent” and
“non-intelligent” species. Slime mold cells and other microorganisms, for example, are
not “intelligent” under the definition given above, nor are the routines that populate most
software programs.45 While they exhibit self-organizing behavior, slime mold cells and
other microorganisms are not “intelligent” under this definition because their behavior is
driven by instinct,46 not by individual choice based on reasoning and learning. Similarly,
most artificial entities are not “intelligent” because their actions are driven by code that
programs their behavior.47 Humans and higher primates, on the other hand, are clearly
“intelligent” under this standard48 (which is not surprising, since it is a human definition
and a human concept).49 But as we move beyond simple dichotomies and consider the
gradations of behavior found in more complex species, it becomes more difficult to parse
“intelligent” and “non-intelligent” entities; ants and reptiles are, for instance, capable of
learning and of decision-making.50 Does this mean they are “intelligent” in the same way
humans are “intelligent?” Obviously, it does not; ants and reptiles may be able to learn
to make simple choices and elect simple behaviors, but their intelligence is clearly not of
the same type or of the same magnitude as that of humans and the higher primates.51

At this level, therefore, it is necessary to move beyond the notion of “intelligence”
as a zero-sum commodity and approach it as a graduated concept -- as a phenomenon
that manifests itself in various ways.52 Professor Edward O. Wilson divides organisms
into three categories: the complete instinct-reflex machine (lowest); the directed learner
(middle) and the generalized learner (highest).53 The behavior of organisms in the first
category is completely programmed by instinct or reflexive responses to environmental
stimuli.54 Much of the behavior of organisms in the second category is also driven by
instinct-reflex; they are capable of some learning, but their learned behavior “is as
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stereotyped as the most neurally programmed `instinct.’” 55 The organisms in the third
category have brains

large enough to carry a wide range of memories, some of which possess
only a low probability of ever proving useful. Insight learning may be
performed, yielding the capacity to generalize from one pattern to another
and to juxtapose patterns in ways that are adaptively useful. Few if any
complex behaviors are wholly programmed morphogenetically at the
neural level. The process of socialization . . . is prolonged and complex. .
. . The key social feature of the grade, which is represented by man, the
chimpanzee, baboons, macaques, and . . . other . . primates . . . , is a
perception of history. The organism’s knowledge is not limited to
particular individuals and places with attractive or aversive associations.
It also remembers relationships and incidents . . . and it can engineer
improvements in its social status by relatively sophisticated choices of
threat, conciliation, and formations of alliances. . . . 56

These hierarchical categories are based on the capacities of individual members
of a biological species; individual intelligence conforms to the definition provided earlier,
i.e., it is an entity’s capacity to engage in autonomous action based upon a process of
decision making which, in turn, is predicated upon reasoning and learning.57 For many
species, certainly for mammals, “intelligence” is properly analyzed as an individual
phenomenon because the members of these species are functionally discrete entities -“individuals” -- who engage in self-directed behavior.58 For other species, particularly the
social insects, “intelligence” is a collective, not an individual, phenomenon; discrete ants
are not “intelligent,”59 but a swarm intelligence emerges from the interactions of the ants
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in a colony.60 The swarm intelligence probably qualifies as “intelligence” under the
definition given earlier: It engages in decision making (which is predicated on reaction,
not reasoning); it has at least some capacity to learn from experience; and the swarm
(but not the constituent entities, i.e., the ants) engages in autonomous behavior.61 The
swarm intelligence differs, though, from the individual “intelligence” found in many of the
mammals, especially the primates; this mammalian “intelligence” possesses all the
characteristics found in swarm intelligence, but it adds others, including capacities for
self-awareness, for invention and innovation, and for planning and strategizing.62

This brings us back to the proposition advanced earlier, namely, that while basic
rules operate equivalently in self-organizing collective systems, rules that emerge at a
higher level of organizational extrapolation operate idiosyncratically, the differentiating
factor being the intelligence of the entities that populate the system.63 To understand
why this is true, it is necessary to consider three systems, each populated by agents
possessing varying types of “intelligence.”64

a) Ants

The first system is an ant colony. This colony, like all self-organizing collective
systems, must implement rules that establish internal and external order. 65 Establishing
internal order requires (a) allocating the ants who inhabit the colony to certain essential
tasks (e.g., nest building, food collection, reproduction and nurturance the offspring to
maturity) and (b) ensuring that they perform these tasks properly, in a consistent,
predictable manner.66 The colony uses two types of rule-sets to establish internal order:
role-allocation and task-performance.67 Role-allocation rules tell an ant what its function
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is, i.e., whether it is a soldier, a worker or a queen;68 task-performance rules give an ant
the repertoire of behaviors it needs to carry out its assigned function, such as foraging
for food.69 Task-performance rules also allow ants to shift between functions so that, for
example, a worker ant who has been foraging for food may move to nest-building.70
Ensuring external order involves a similar process.71 In an effort to protect itself from
predators and competing ant colonies, the colony implements (a) role-allocation rules
that assign members of the colony to function as soldiers and (b) task-performance rules
that prescribe the behaviors soldiers employ in fending off aggressors and/or attacking
encroaching colonies.72

The ants in the colony do not formulate the rules that govern role-allocation and
task-performance; ants are incapable of such a task.73 To some extent, the basic rules
governing both endeavors are genetically pre-coded;74 more accurately, the capacity to
engage in these behaviors is genetically pre-coded, because the behaviors themselves
are triggered by forces external to the ants.75 Among ants and other social insects, the
rules that govern the allocation of functions and the performance of tasks are chemically
and environmentally controlled. Environmental conditions affect role allocation and task
performance (a) by determining the number of entities a colony can support and (b) by
influencing nutrition within the colony.76 Nutrition affects role-allocation in various ways,
not the least of which is the incidence of cannibalism.77 Chemical signals, though, are
primarily responsible for the orchestration of behavior among social insects; ants (like
termites, bees, wasps and other social insects) communicate almost exclusively through
pheromonal signals.78 Some of these signals are simple binary codes, indicating, for
example, whether another ant is friend or foe, but “ants can also detect gradients in
pheromones”, which is “essential for forming food delivery lines”.79 Pheromonal signals
also convey information about tasks, such as whether an ant is foraging for food (and
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has found a large quantity food which needs to be collected by other ants) or disposing
of dead nest-mates.80

The basic constitutive rules that govern role-allocation and task-performance do
a marvelous job of establishing order, especially internal order, in ant colonies and other
aggregations of social insects. They do this laterally; no one is in charge of formulating
or implementing the rules or otherwise seeing to the creation and continuance of order in
colonies populated by ants or other social insects.81 Order is an emergent phenomenon:
It emerges from the basic repertoire of rules available to members of the colony; these
rules shape the behavior of all members of the collectivity. 82 The rules are for the most
part fixed and pre-given; they define the limited universe of behaviors that are available
to colony members.83 It is true that individual ants have the apparent ability to, in effect,
make “choices”; it seems that foraging ants who are not following a pre-established
pheromone trail “choose” the paths down which they proceed in search of food. But what
looks like “choice” to a human being is not; an ant’s taking a particular path is not the
product of decision making as defined above.84 The ant does not formulate alternatives
and use a process of reasoning, which is based upon a learned store of knowledge and
inferences from that knowledge, to select the path that rationally seems the most likely to
offer the opportunity to find food; an ant cannot do this because individual ants are not
“intelligent.”85 And while this approach might well prove unsuccessful if only one or two
ants were searching for food, with hundreds or thousands of ants foraging, some of them
are very likely to happen upon food. When this occurs, the lucky forager returns to the
colony with the food it can carry; if the site contains more food than it can carry, the
forager uses use chemical signals to direct other ants to the food source.86
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In a sense, an ant colony is like a board game: chess with thousands of players.
Each ant (each “player”) has its defined set of behaviors (“moves”), which vary with the
ant’s role in the system (e.g., worker, queen, solder). The collaborative activities of the
players produce a self-organized collective system which is directed toward achieving
certain ends. In a chess game, the ends are the players’ amusement and the resolution
of a competitive endeavor; in an ant colony, the ends are the survival and perpetuation
of the colony and its inhabitants through a collaborative endeavor.

An ant colony and a chess game are functionally analogous in certain respects,
one of which is particularly relevant to the issues addressed in this article: The rules of
both systems are entirely constitutive; they define what the members of that system can
and must do.87 Chess players must move when it is their turn, utilizing a circumscribed
range of alternatives in doing so; the alternatives are prescribed by the rules of the game
and depend upon which piece (queen, pawn, rook) a player uses.88 Ants must perform
the tasks attendant upon their role (worker, queen, soldier), utilizing a circumscribed set
of biologically-defined behaviors in doing so.

How is any of this relevant to the issues under consideration in this article? It is
relevant because this functional analogy between chess and an ant colony illustrates
what is missing in systems that are organized laterally, according to the principles that
structure ant colonies (and chess). What is missing is the capacity for deviant behavior;
“deviant behavior” is, essentially, an entity’s deliberate failure to follow applicable rules.89
The behavior of the ants, like that of the pieces in a chess game, is pre-defined. A white
Rook cannot capture a white Pawn; an ant cannot steal food from the colony stores and
flee, attack another ant from its own colony or take a day off from work.90 Ant rules, like
chess rules, are simple and straightforward; they leave no capacity for deviance. Since
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there is no capacity for deviance, there is no need for an enforcement mechanism; ants
have war but not crime, soldiers but not police.

Systems populated by non-intelligent entities do not confront the risk of chaos
arising from internal forces, i.e., from deviant behavior.91 The absence of individual
intelligence means there are no “wild cards” in the deck -- no potential for antisocial
behavior.92 That, in turn, means they have no need to devise special rules – “criminal
rules” – to deal with deviance.93 As is explained below, 94 “criminal rules” deal with the
potential for deviance in a system by defining the behaviors that are prohibited; systems
populated by intelligent agents find it necessary to define behaviors they will not tolerate
because the constituent entities can innovate, i.e., indulge in behaviors other than those
that are socially prescribed.95 Systems populated by intelligent agents will therefore
have two sets of rules in place that govern the behavior of their constituents: a set of
constitutive rules that establish the rights and obligations of the constituent entities; and
a set of proscriptive rules that outlaw certain types of behaviors.96 Systems populated
by non-intelligent entities, however, have no need for proscriptive rules because there is
no capacity for behavioral innovation and, consequently, no potential for deviance.

The sections immediately below examine two systems that are populated by
entities of varying degrees of intelligence; the entities that populate both systems are
sufficiently intelligent to engage in deviant behavior. The sections below, therefore,
analyze how systems deal with a constituent entity’s failure to follow governing rules.

b)

Wolves
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Individual intelligence is found in many species, but it is most highly evolved in
mammals.97 Notwithstanding their intelligence, many mammals are not suitable for the
present analysis because they live “solitary” lives.98 Since our focus is on ensuring order
in collective systems, we must consider how order is established and maintained among
mammalian species that are both “intelligent” and “social.”99

Wolves are clearly intelligent under the definition given above; indeed, they are
one of the most intelligent non-primate mammalian species.100 Wolves are also social
creatures:101 Among mammals, “the carnivores are surpassed only by the primates in
the intricacy and variety of their social behavior”, and at “what might be called the
summit of carnivore social evolution,” wolves display a level of social organization that is
otherwise found nowhere except among “a few of the Old World monkeys and apes.” 102

Wolves, like ants, must establish and maintain internal and external order if their
social groupings are to survive.103 Wolves live in packs that contain as many as twenty
individuals.104 As with ants, establishing internal order means the pack must ensure that
its members carry out essential tasks (creating and maintaining a den,105 hunting food,
reproducing and nurturing offspring to maturity) in a consistent, predictable manner.106
Individual wolves, unlike individual ants, are intelligent;107 intelligence confers the ability
for independent decision making and autonomous action upon members of a species.108
This means that wolves cannot rely on the strategies ants use to maintain order in their
colonies.109 Unlike ants, wolves have to deal with the potential for deviant behavior, i.e.,
with the possibility that a pack member will deliberately steal food, attack other members
of the pack or otherwise disrupt the internal order that is necessary for the survival of the
pack and of its members.110 Wolves deal with this potential, and with the processes of
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establishing and maintaining internal order, by implementing a dynamic hierarchical rank
order among pack members.

Many species use rank order to structure their social systems.111 Known as a
“dominance hierarchy,” this strategy consists of a set of

sustained aggressive-submissive relations. . . . The simplest . . . version
of a hierarchy is . . . the rule of one individual over all other members of
the group, with no rank distinctions being made among the subordinates.
. . . More commonly, hierarchies contain multiple ranks in a more or less
linear sequence: an alpha individual dominates all others, a beta
individual dominates all but the alpha, and so on down to the omega
individual at the bottom, whose existence may depend simply on staying
out of the way of its superiors.112

Dominance hierarchies are formed during “encounters between animals by means of
repeated threats and fighting.”113 After these encounters resolve the issue of rank,
subordinates give way to their superiors “with a minimum of hostile exchange.”114 Once
a dominance hierarchy has been established, it is often maintained

by `status’ signs. The identity of the leading male in a wolf pack is
unmistakable from the way he holds his head, ears, and tail, and the
confident, face-forward manner in which he approaches other members
of his group. He controls his subordinates in the great majority of
encounters without any display of overt hostility.115

17

Brenner – Distributed Security
Once established, a dominance hierarchy is far from permanent, especially among some
species: “The behavioral ontogenies of species seem designed to give each loser a
second chance, and in some of the more social forms the subordinate need only wait its
turn to rise in the hierarchy.”116 Among some species, this is simply a matter of waiting
until the dominant animal “weakens or expires from age or injury”.117 Another alternative
is for defeated challenger(s) to leave the initial social grouping to form another group.118

Wolf packs conform almost exactly to this description of a dominance hierarchy:
A pack “is a well-ordered society” in which “each member is expected to learn, observe,
and obey the laws. . . . The elder pack members teach the cubs about pack etiquette.”119
Pack etiquette revolves around “linear dominance orders” that form among the members
of a pack. 120 Wolf packs have rank orders for each sex:

[T]he dominant, or alpha, male lords it over all the other males, and a
dominant, or alpha, female asserts her will over the other females. There
may be a beta and a gamma, second- and third-ranked wolves of each
sex, each imposing some will on the lesser-ranking wolves down through
the Greek alphabet to omega. . . .

The dominance rank order of a pack changes as wolves age or
get injured and younger wolves mature and gain strength, confidence,
and understanding. . . . Old dominants may be chased out of the pack or
beaten and brought down to submissive roles. Younger challengers may
arise, assert themselves, be beaten and sink back into submission.121
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A wolf’s rank “begins to be established early in life, when puppies play-fight.” 122 Once
established, rank is “reinforced . . . by repeated exchanges of hostile and submissive
displays.” 123 Wolves have a “complex language of gesture and posture for dominance
behavior. Dominant wolves may need only to stare at a subordinate to freeze it in its
tracks.”124

The alpha male is the dominant member of a wolf pack; he holds it together as a
society.125 He tends to be the center of attention, and is treated with great deference by
the others.126 When a pack travels, any of the higher-ranked pack members can take
the lead, but the alpha male takes command when the pack hunts or battles enemies.127

When they hunt, pack members pack display “elaborate cooperative behavior.”128
They coordinate their actions; this can extend to splitting pack members up so they can
encircle or otherwise entrap their prey.129 Pack members play different roles in hunting,
depending upon their strengths and aptitudes.130 Packs also employ a basic division of
labor in caring for their offspring: Initially, the mother stays in the den and cares for the
cubs when they are small. “[O]ther wolves bring both her and the cubs food when they
return from a hunt. As they mature other members of the pack take turns baby-sitting so
that the mother can join the pack in a hunt.”131

Like ants, wolf packs must maintain external order. This requires that they do
two things: (a) preserve the integrity of their territory against predation by other packs;
and (b) fend off attacks from other packs. Here, too, wolf packs display an essential
characteristic of dominance hierarchies: a “violent united front against strangers.”132
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Given their size and specialized predatory habits, wolves must maintain “low
population densities and occupy relatively immense home ranges.”133 Each pack
occupies a distinct territory, which it defends from other wolves.134

Territories change size and shape from year to year. Resident wolves
scent-mark heavily at the boundaries of their territories, and trespassing
wolves mark assiduously when they stray inside another pack’s domain.
It is as if a wolf thus leaves a string of boasts and threats . . . to taunt and
intimidate other packs and keep them out of its larder. Wolves . . . have
been known to kill neighboring wolves that strayed into their territories.135

In addition to defending their territory, wolves engage in “a primitive form of warfare.”136
One expert has described how they leave their territory to raid “neighboring territories, to
all appearances bent on murdering their neighbors. . . . If . . . one pack senses a strong
advantage, it will attack the other.”137

As a self-organizing collective system, a wolf pack is an interesting intermediate
analytical step between an ant colony and human society (which is the last system to be
considered).138 Like ants, a wolf pack relies on laterally-structured behavior, at least for
basic interactions: No one, for instance, not even the alpha male, articulates rules that
“tell” wolf pups to play-fight and thereby begin the process of achieving pack rank;139 and
no rule “tells” adult wolves to play and thereby hone their skills for hunting.140 Wolves do
not need formal, articulated rules to structure basic behaviors such as these because a
wolf is essentially a small extended family the members of which collectively carry out
the activities needed to ensure the survival of the pack and its constituent members.141
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Except for the care of cubs, there is no division of labor in a wolf pack; the adults join
together to hunt and to defend themselves from competing packs and enemies.142

Unlike the ants, wolves cannot rely exclusively on laterally-structured behavior
because they are intelligent creatures who use their intelligence to survive.143 A wolf’s
life is not like a chess game;144 while some general rules of conduct exist,145 individual
wolves survive because they successfully establish and maintain their rank in a wolf
pack and because they work cooperatively with other members of the pack.146 Much of
the behavior within a pack is unorchestrated, but the overall activities of the pack and its
essential cohesion reflect an underlying order that derives from the dominance hierarchy
described above. As noted earlier, the dominance hierarchy holds a pack together;147 in
so doing, it controls the limited capacity for deviant behavior that exists in a wolf pack.
As explained earlier, “deviant behavior” is an entity’s deliberate failure to follow rules that
govern behavior in a social system.148 For various reasons, this capacity is not nearly as
evolved among wolves as it is in human beings,149 but it is an aspect of wolf sociality.

In an ant colony, each ant’s function and behaviors are prescribed by external
factors; an ant has no ability to elect not to perform her assigned function by engaging in
the prescribed behaviors.150 This is to some extent true of wolves; they must hunt to
survive and their chances of hunting successfully, and surviving, are much greater if they
belong to a pack.151 Unlike ants, however, wolves are not inevitably tied to their original
pack; they can leave to strike out on their own or join another pack.152 Wolves can also
shift position within their original pack.153 As noted above, wolf packs are hierarchical,154
and higher rank brings certain advantages; only alpha wolves breed, alphas feed first,
and alphas bully and dominate subordinates.155 These and other advantages create
incentives for subordinate wolves to try to move up in a pack hierarchy; their efforts to do
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so create a potential for disorder within a pack.156 But wolf hierarchies also establish
other ranks and ordered priorities within a pack and thereby reduce the potential for
disorder that is an inevitable aspect of a system populated by highly intelligent, highly
aggressive predators. In one sense, therefore, wolf hierarchy creates the potential for
disorder, in another sense, it produces order and stability.

How do wolf hierarchies control deviance and promote order? As noted earlier,
the ranks establish priorities that serve to channel behavior in predictable ways, thereby
minimizing casual, individual conflict between wolves. The ranks ensure, for instance,
that a gamma or even lower-ranked wolf will not take food from a beta wolf, at least not
unless and until the lower-ranked wolf is ready to mount a full-blown challenge to the
beta’s authority.157 The ranks create a fluid system of rules that predictably order the
interactions – and some of the essential functions – of a wolf pack.

But what about a subordinate’s challenging a higher-ranked wolf’s authority?
Dominance hierarchies are based on personal characteristics; an alpha male’s rank is
based on his ability to subordinate other wolves through physical aggression and/or
psychological influence.158 Since an alpha male’s position at the top of the hierarchy is
based on his ability to impose his will upon the other members of the pack, it is transient,
subject to divestment. Challenges occur almost constantly, at all levels of the hierarchy
in a pack.159 If a challenge succeeds, the challenger becomes the new ranking wolf and
the defeated wolf becomes a subordinate or leaves the pack;160 if a challenge fails, the
challenger sinks back into subordination or leaves the pack. 161Is this dynamic another
type of deviant behavior threatening order within a pack?
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One could argue that challenges to a higher-ranked wolf’s authority represent
deviant behavior insofar as they constitute a failure to abide by the rules that constitute
the pack at a given time. That is, if Wolf Y is the alpha male of Pack Dakota, one of the
rules of the pack is that other wolves defer to Wolf Y; by failing to defer to Wolf Y, Wolf Z
violates the rules of the pack as they exist at the time he challenges Wolf Y’s authority.
In that sense, Wolf Z’s challenge represents deviant behavior. That characterization of
Wolf Z’s behavior is inaccurate, however, because it ignores the fact that challenges to
the authority of higher-ranked wolves is an intrinsic component of wolf social life. No
rule of pack or species behavior prohibits such challenges; indeed, as noted above, Wolf
Y’s claim to dominance rests upon his ability to withstand such challenges. Challenges
by lower-ranked wolves are therefore the legitimate process that is used to determine
leadership; 162 as such, they cannot be considered deviant behavior.

Notwithstanding that, wolf packs do conform to the proposition advanced above,
namely, that systems populated by intelligent agents find it necessary to define certain
behaviors as prohibited because the constituent entities can engage in behaviors other
than those prescribed by the system.163 Unlike human societies, wolf packs accomplish
this by using relational instead of structural rules. That is, the definition of behavior as
prohibited derives from the status relationship which exists between the specific wolves
who are involved in an encounter. It is therefore prohibited behavior for a lower-ranked
wolf to feed contemporaneously with an alpha wolf because such conduct violates the
essential constitutive rules that sustain order in the social system.164 In modern human
societies, on the other hand, the definition of behavior as prohibited derives from formal,
institutionalized rules which apply without regard to the identities and/or relative status
positions of the individuals who are involved in an encounter.165 It is therefore prohibited
behavior for, say, an American citizen to attack any other American citizen regardless of
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their social, economic or other positions in society; unlike the relational rules that govern
wolf behavior, this prohibition is structural and therefore categorical in nature.166

Wolf packs also conform to the secondary proposition advanced above, i.e., that
systems populated by intelligent agents will have one set of rules that prescribes rights
and obligations and another that proscribes certain types of behavior.167 Here, too, wolf
packs use relational rules instead of structural rules. The rules that prescribe rights and
obligations are embedded in the web of relationships that exist among the wolves in a
pack. In wolf society, the two types of rules essentially operate as mirror images of each
other: The rights and privileges an alpha male enjoys are defined by his status as alpha
male; his status as alpha male also defines the respective behaviors that are proscribed
for specific members of the pack.168 Fewer behaviors will, for example, be proscribed for
the alpha female than for a beta female, for a beta male than for a gamma male, and so
on.169 Unlike the categorical rights and obligations that are structurally conferred upon
members of a modern human society,170 the rights and privileges a member of a wolf
pack enjoys are dynamic, changing if and when the wolf’s status changes.171

c)

Humans

A being, independent of any other, he has no rule to pursue, but
such as he prescribes to himself. . . . 172

Humans, like wolves and ants, are social creatures.173 Humans, like wolves but
unlike ants, are intelligent creatures under the definition given above.174 Humans are so
far the most intelligent species to inhabit the Earth; human intelligence not only exceeds
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that of all other species, it is far more complex.175 Since humans are social, they live in
self-organizing collective systems;176 and since humans are far more intelligent than any
other earthly creature, the social systems they create are far more complex than those
found among any other terrestrial species.177 The social systems humans create are
also much more flexible than those found among other species.178

Why are human social systems much more complex and yet much more flexible
than those of other species? One reason is the complexity of human beings, who vary
greatly in behavior, intelligence and achievement:

Even in the simplest societies individuals differ greatly. . . . Human
societies are organized by high intelligence, and each member is faced
by a mixture of social challenges that taxes all of his ingenuity. This
baseline variation is amplified at the group level by other qualities
exceptionally pronounced in human societies: the long, close period of
socialization; the loose connectedness of the communication networks;
the multiplicity of bonds; the capacity, especially within literate cultures, to
communicate over long distances and periods of history; and from all
these traits, the capacity to dissemble, to manipulate and to exploit.179

Another reason is the relative rigidity of the processes that maintain order in
social systems populated by other species, including the social insects:

In honeybees and in ants of the genera Formica and Pogonomyrmex. . . .
[s]ome. . . . specialization . . . occurs. Certain individuals remain with the
brood as nurses far longer than the average, while others concentrate on
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nest building or foraging. Yet . . . [w]hen one colony . . . is compared
with another of the same species, the statistical patterns of activity are
about the same. . . . . [S]ome of this consistency is due to negative
feedback. As one requirement such as brood care . . . intensifies,
workers shift their activities to compensate until the need is met, then
change back again. Experiments have shown that disruption of the
feedback loops, and thence deviation by the colony from the statistical
norms, can be disastrous.180

Human societies do not operate within such a narrow range of behavioral possibilities.
Indeed, as one scholar noted, “anthropological literature abounds with examples of
[human] societies that contain obvious inefficiencies and even pathological flaws—yet
endure.” 181

It is the “lack of competition from other species” that frees human societies from
the constraints that channel other animal social systems into rigid patterns:

[M]an . . . has been so successful in dominating his environment that
almost any kind of culture can succeed for a while, so long as it has a
modest degree of internal consistency and does not shut off reproduction
altogether. No species of ant or termite enjoys this freedom. The
slightest inefficiency in constructing nests, in establishing odor trails, or in
conducting nuptial flights could result in the quick extinction of the species
by predation and competition from other social insects. To a scarcely
lesser extent the same is true for social carnivores and primates.182
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As a sociologist noted, humans are unique in the animal kingdom in that they have “no
species-specific environment.”183 A wolf, for instance, “has a largely fixed relationship
with its environment, which it shares with all other members of its respective species.”184
This relationship, which is common to all non-human species, is “biologically fixed”, so
that “all non-human animals, as species and as individuals, live in closed worlds whose
structures are predetermined by the biological equipment of the . . . species.” 185

Humans, on the other hand, create their environment; unlike the biologically
determined environments in which non-human animals live, human environments are “a
social enterprise” -- the collective product of collaborative human activity.186 The creation
of such environments is a matter of necessity, since humans lack the “biological means
to provide stability for human conduct. Human existence, if it were thrown back on its
organismic resources . . . would be existence in . . . chaos.”187 The question is how
humans successfully create and maintain social order; as explained earlier, every social
system, whether populated by biological or artificial entities, must establish and maintain
order – both internal and external – if it is to survive.188 The answer is that social order is

a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human production. . . .
Social order is not biologically given. . . . Social order . . . is also not given
man’s natural environment, though particular features . . . may be factors
in determining certain features of a social order. . . . Social order exists
only as a product of human activity. . . . Both in its genesis (social order is
the result of past human activity) and its existence in any instant of time
(social order exists . . . insofar as human activity continues to produce it)
it is a human product.189
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Human social order is, therefore, an artifice, a construct; since order is an artifice,
it can assume various forms in different social systems, but it is a necessary constant in
every such system. 190 The question is: How is this artifice produced? Since humans -unlike ants, wolves and other non-human species -- are not constrained by biologicallydriven behavioral parameters, it is at least conceptually possible that the tactics humans
use to produce social order across their social systems are idiosyncratic; that is, it is
conceivable that while social order is a constant, the devices humans use to achieve it
are not. It may seem, though, that this conceptual possibility is inconsistent with the
postulates advanced earlier, namely, that systems populated by intelligent agents (a) will
find it necessary to define behaviors they cannot tolerate and (b) will therefore rely upon
two types of rules -- constitutive rules and proscriptive rules -- to establish and maintain
order within the system.191

In point of fact, human systems – like the wolf packs discussed in the previous
section and other systems populated by intelligent agents – do construct social order in
accordance with these postulates. But because human beings are very intelligent and
do not operate within a limited range of biologically-driven behavioral possibilities, the
ways in which they accomplish this can and do vary somewhat from system to system.
There is, in essence, a macro-consistency in the way social order is constructed across
human societies, but there has historically been a level of idiosyncrasy in the discrete
manifestations of social order in particular societies.

To understand why this is true, it is necessary to consider how humans construct
social order. Unlike other self-organizing collective systems, systems that are populated
by intelligent entities (such as humans and wolves) do confront the risk of chaos arising
from deviant behavior, which is an entity’s deliberate failure to follow governing rules.192
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As was noted earlier, all systems – social, biological, physical and artificial – operate
according to a set of rules.193 In many systems, these rules are pre-given: The rules that
govern physics, for instance, are fixed and predetermined; the laws of thermodynamics
are subject neither to dispute nor modification.194 The same can be said of the rules that
govern many biological systems; a particular colony of ants does not hold a referendum
to decide how it will establish order.195 The rules that maintain order among the ants and
other social insects are for the most part biologically determined;196 since ants are not
intelligent, they do not have the capacity to alter these rules or to contumaciously refuse
to comply with them.197

Intelligent entities can do either or both. The specific ability to do this varies with
the degree of intelligence possessed by the individual members of the species and the
extent to which they are subject to biological constraints that limit their capacity to realize
the potential their intelligence gives them.198 Because humans are highly intelligent and
essentially free from biological constraints, the ability to create, alter and ignore rules is
most pronounced in mankind.199 Consequently, the most elaborate rule systems have
grown up among humans.

In human social systems, as in all self-organizing collective systems, rules are
used to establish and maintain order both internally and externally.200 Internal order is
the highest priority, and the first task undertaken, because without it a system cannot
exist and cannot, therefore, resist external threats. Consequently, the first type of rules
to emerge in human society are the constitutive rules noted earlier.201 These rules
establish order by specifying and limiting the choices individual constituents can make.
In human societies, the complexity of these constitutive rules evolved as human social
groupings increased in size and complexity.

29

Brenner – Distributed Security

Initially, human systems were organized around the nuclear family; until about
10,000 years ago humans were hunter-gatherers who lived in “multi-family . . . bands of
a few tens of people.”202 The constitutive rules that established order in these systems
were simple. The purpose of these rules was ensuring that each social system – each
band – met the conditions needed for it to survive and continue. This requires ensuring
that the members of the system survive and reproduce; that their offspring mature and
are incorporated into the system; and that the members of the system are protected from
predators and human competitors. 203 The constitutive rules that governed the bands
which were the first form of human social organization channeled the activities of their
members toward the achievement of these ends by establishing a basic command
structure and a general division of labor.204 The command structure was analogous to
that found in a wolf pack;205 it consisted, minimally, of a male who had gained authority
over the others by birthright or physical prowess.206 The dominant male directed the
basic activities of the band: summoning the other men for hunting or defense, leading
them in these and other essential activities, directing the movements of the band as it
migrated from place to place, and orchestrating its relations with other, non-hostile
bands.207 The division of labor was gender-based; men hunted while women remained
in the band’s camp to raise children and gather food.208 While conflict was certainly not
absent from these bands, this minimal set of rules sufficed to maintain the level of
internal order needed for the bands and their constituent entities to survive. It did this by
channeling the efforts of the members of the band in productive directions; this at once
ensured that the tasks needed to sustain the band would be performed and limited the
behavioral options open to the band members. 209
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Once agriculture was invented, “populations increased enormously in density,
and the primitive hunter-gatherer bands gave way . . . to the relentless growth of tribes,
chiefdoms, and states.”210 As human social systems grew in size, they also grew in
complexity; this complexity extended to the constitutive rules that set the baseline for
social order in a system.211 The constitutive rules still specified the contours and staffing
of system authority (i.e., government) and the division of labor, both of which became
more complex; they also expanded into other areas. Constitutive rules came, for
example, to govern such matters as: (a) the categories, identities and number of
individuals one can marry; (b) the ages and conditions under which one can marry; (c)
the conditions and constraints, if any, placed upon reproduction; (d) the endeavors one
can/must engage in to “earn a living” ( i.e., to obtain the resources needed to survive and
reproduce); (d) the duties and practices involved in religious observances; (e) the terms
and conditions upon which one can validly enter into contractual agreements with others;
(f) one’s right to recompense from another who inadvertently causes injury or loss; (g)
the obligations one owes to one’s family; and (h) the obligations one owes to the social
system itself (which can range from paying taxes to serving in the military).212 In more
evolved social systems, constitutive rules come in two forms: norms (informal
consensus-based standards that define what is, and is not, “correct” behavior); and laws
(formally adopted standards governing behavior, obligations and expectations).213 Both
work to sustain social order, but they do so in different ways: Norms operate internally;
to the extent the members of a social system accept and internalize its norms, they will
seek to conform their behavior to the standards the norms embody.214 Laws can operate
both internally and externally; the members of a social system will conform their behavior
to its laws because they accept the legitimacy of the standards they embody and/or
because they seek to avoid the consequences of not doing so.215 Constitutive laws and
norms create and maintain social order by providing direction (indicating the choices
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members of a social system should make and the behaviors they should engage in) and
channeling behavior in socially constructive directions.216 Their effectiveness is due in
large part to the socialization process all members of a human social system undergo; it
is in the course of this process that the members of a social system internalize its
constitutive rules and learn to follow them. 217

The laws embodying constitutive rules are the “civil law” of an evolved human
social system; they are “rule[s] of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a
state, `commanding what is right’”.218 Constitutive rules are sufficient to maintain order
in social systems populated by entities that are not “intelligent.”219 As explained earlier,
Intelligence introduces a “wild card” – the possibility of choice.220 Choice means that the
entities who populate a social system can decide (a) what the rules are and (b) whether
or not they, as individuals, will follow a particular rule or set of rules. The intelligence of
the entities who populate a system determines the extent of their ability to make these
choices; the greater their intelligence, the greater their ability to make these choices will
be.221 Humans, who are equipped with what Henri Bergson called the “dissolving power”
of intelligence, 222 can make these decisions. The existence of that ability creates a direct
and intolerable threat to social order: If each member of a social grouping can decide for
him/herself whether to follow the constitutive rules in effect in that system, the rules are
of no import; the system essentially exists in a state of anarchy because any member
can freely elect to abide by its constitutive “civil” rules or ignore them.223 This erodes the
system’s ability to maintain order in two ways:224 (1) individual behavior is not structured
and channeled in socially constructive ways, which means that essential functions are
not performed; and (2) decisions not to abide by the “civil” rules can be prompted by one
person’s inclination to prey upon other,225 which means that socially destructive behavior
proliferates.226 Each of these alternatives is the product of deviant behavior; that is, each
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represents behavior which is predicated upon a deliberate decision not to conform one’s
conduct to the dictates of the constitutive rules in effect in the social system one
inhabits.227

We have not addressed the possibility of deviant behavior because we have
been concentrating on the tactics systems use to create order; that is, we have been
concentrating on how social order emerges from the interaction of constituent entities
whose behavior is ordered by a set of relatively simple rules. 228 As explained earlier,
deviant behavior, which serves to destroy order, is not an issue in systems that are
populated by less intelligent entities whose behavior is biologically constrained;229 the
primary threats to social order in these systems are external, posed by competing
systems composed of members of the same species or by predators.230

Systems populated by humans (and entities with equivalent capacities)231 must
confront the problem of deviant behavior; constitutive rules are not enough to maintain
order in these systems.232 To prevent the erosion of social order, systems populated by
humans (and equivalent entities) must therefore come up with a solution, a way to defeat
and discourage deviant behavior. The solution human social systems have used for
several millennia is to create a new set of rules – criminal rules – that essentially require
members of the system to follow the “civil” rules, i.e., the constitutive rules that constitute
the system.233

Human systems essentially employ a tripartite system to maintain internal order:
The first and most basic device is the internal controls implemented by the unwritten
rules, the norms every member of the social system learns in their socialization process.
Individual internalization of these norms is the primary technique used to establish order
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at a very basic level. The second device is the constitutive rules, which supplement the
norms by defining appropriate behavior at a higher level of complexity; while norms, for
example, dictate that individuals should support their children, a system may well find it
necessary to establish constitutive rules which formalize this obligation and attach
consequences to one’s failure to discharge it. The third device is the criminal rules
which are used for those who respond neither to the informal dictates of the norms nor to
the institutionalized commands of the constitutive rules.

Criminal rules will therefore be linked to the “civil” constitutive rules that define
the basic structure of expectations and obligations which constitute a social system.
Social systems, for instance, consistently, if not inevitably, adopt constitutive rules that
define parent-child relationships and obligations. These rules address such matters as
whether (and under what circumstances) adults are allowed to reproduce,234 the
circumstances under which a child will be deemed to be legitimate (which often triggers
other constitutively-defined obligations),235 to whom the custody of a child belongs,236
who is obligated to provide care and support for children and for how long that obligation
lasts.237 Correlative criminal rules impose criminal liability and penalties on those who
do not abide by these “civil” constitutive rules.238 The same dynamic exists in other
areas: Constitutive rules define property and concept of ownership;239 criminal rules
impose liability and penalties on those who violate these “civil” rules by stealing or
destroying another’s property.240 There is, though, another type of criminal rule: The
rules in this category are not specifically linked to constitutive rules; these are the rules
that impose criminal liability and sanctions for conduct that violates another individual’s
legitimate expectations of life, liberty and safety.241 Most social systems do not explicitly
articulate the legitimacy of such expectations vis-à-vis other members of that system,
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perhaps because they are(such deeply-embedded assumptions that it does not seem
necessary.242

Since the capacity for deviant behavior is a constant across human populations,
every social system will have criminal rules. These rules will be designed to maintain
the integrity of several vital interests: the safety of persons; the security of property; the
stability of the government; and the sanctity of particular moral principles.243 No system
can survive if its constituents are free to harm each other at will, to appropriate each
other’s property, to undermine the political order and/or to flout the moral principles the
citizenry hold dear.244 Every society will therefore formulate penal prohibitions defining
(i) crimes against persons (e.g., murder, assault, rape); (ii) crimes against property (e.g.,
theft, arson, fraud); (iii) crimes against the state (e.g., treason, rioting, obstruction of
justice); and (iv) crimes against morality (e.g., obscene materials, defiling a place of
worship).245 As to the content of these rules, the greatest degree of consistency will
occur in the first two categories because they intrinsically involve citizens preying upon
each other, something no social system can tolerate if it is to survive. There will be a fair
degree of consistency on a core of rules in the third category --e.g., treason, riot, and
obstructing justice --because every social system must ensure the stability of its political
order.246 Beyond this core, there will be more deviation in the rules that fall into this
category because nations vary in terms of the extent to which they feel it necessary to
discourage political dissidence.247 Finally, there will be a great deal of inconsistency as
to rules in the fourth category because they are the product of a society’s values and
religious principles and, as such, tend to be much more idiosyncratic in nature.248

All of these rules are designed to establish and maintain internal order. They
are, therefore, formulated by the members of a particular human social system and are
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applied to those who constitute that social system throughout time.249 Human systems,
like systems populated by other species, must also maintain external order.250 The rules
that establish and maintain internal order in human systems play an essential role in
efforts to maintain external order insofar as they allow the system to focus its resources
on external threats; if a social system is undergoing inner turmoil, it is likely to
experience difficulty in fending off external threats.251 The rules that establish and
maintain internal order have not, historically, been otherwise implicated in the system’s
efforts to resist external threats because they simply did not apply to the nature and
source of external threats. External threats to a system historically came from another
system -- another group of human beings. The other system could be another band,
another tribe, another principality or another state, but it was always comprised of a
separate populace with a distinct identity and its own agenda.252 Consequently, the
rules one system devised to maintain internal order, including criminal rules, were quite
ineffectual against external threats posed by a second system because (a) the members
of the “other” system were in no way bound to abide by these rules and (b) the conduct
involved in the external threat was not conduct addressed by these rules.253 Section III
explains how cybercrime alters assumptions about the relationship between internal
order and external threats.

As to internal order, the existence of a set of criminal rules – a criminal law – is
only one part of what is involved in maintaining internal order. Implicit in the notion of a
criminal law is the premise that some members of a social system will obdurately violate
the rules that govern behavior within the system; indeed, this is why criminal rules are
needed. But criminal rules do not merely prohibit certain behaviors; they also prescribe
the consequences of engaging in such behavior.254 Prescribing consequences, though,
is not enough; there must be some mechanism, some process, in place which ensures
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that these consequences are imposed upon those who violate applicable criminal
rules.255 The section immediately below and § II(B), infra, examine this process.
3.

Control

Fatta la legge, trovato l'inganno.256

Our analysis of social systems populated by ants, wolves and humans shows
that there are two very different ways of approaching the problem of maintaining order
in a social system. One is the lateral, distributed approach found among ants and other
social insects. In an ant colony, there is no “authority” -- social order emerges from and
is sustained by the interactions of the constituent members of the colony, none of which
are individually “intelligent:”

[A]nt colonies . . . form long-range structures without relying on the
centralized, hierarchical control used in human organizations. . . . A
dramatic example is the army ant raids. Army ant colonies comprise
hundreds of thousands of individuals. . . .[T]he swarm behaves as a
single entity, searching and expanding . . . as though guided by some
kind of intelligence. The colony, however, is blind and responds only to
local concentrations of pheromones laid down by its individual members.
There is no central control or individually complex behavior. This emerges
from the interactions between ants.257
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Lateral constitutive rules suffice to establish and maintain order in systems such as this
because there is no potential for deviant behavior.258 Lacking that potential, the system
has no need for a set of criminal rules and for a mechanism to enforce those rules.

Systems populated by intelligent entities must confront the potential for deviant
behavior, i.e., the possibility that individual members will violate system rules. Because
the entities who comprise these systems are intelligent, they are also volitional and can
elect not to conform their behavior to system dictates. Such systems cannot, therefore,
rely only on internal controls to establish order; they must also institute measures that
exert a level of external control upon the behavior of the members of a system. These
measures become the “authority” that enforces the rules of a system.259 In a wolf pack,
authority is relational: Subordinate wolves’ relationship to the alpha male and to each
other determines the behavioral rules each must follow; if a wolf violates one of these
rules, the alpha male or whichever wolf is the target of the violation will respond in an
effort to bring the offender in line. 260 If the offender submits to the authority of the wolf
who reacts to his/her misbehavior, order is restored; if the offender overcomes the
reacting wolf, a new order is restored. 261 This is a classic example of a dominance
hierarchy.262

“Pure” dominance hierarchies, which are based on relational rules, are typically
the means by which intelligent species maintain order in small social systems, such as a
wolf pack or a band of hunter-gatherers. 263 As social systems grow in size, relational
rules cease to become an effective means of maintaining order within a system; the size
of the constituent population means that the web of relationships becomes too complex
to function efficiently.264 To understand why this is so, imagine a wolf pack composed of
a thousand wolves: There is one alpha male and one alpha female, but there are many,
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many beta males and beta females, many, many gamma males and gamma females,
and so on. Relying on relational rules – with their attendant patterns of challenge,
response and resolution (which can alter the structure of the relational rules) – would
leave the system in chaos.265

Wolves do not live in packs of thousands or hundreds of thousands or millions,
so they can continue to rely on relational rules. Humans, however, evolved ever-larger
social systems and, as the size of these social systems increased, found it necessary to
develop a different approach to maintaining order. Humans gradually replaced relational
rules with structural rules; unlike relational rules, structural rules are institutionalized and
apply categorically.266 Structural rules have been formally adopted according to some
accepted process and apply categorically across a set or subset of the population of a
social system.267 They are, therefore, not legitimately subject to testing by individual
members of that population; the members of the population are bound to accept and
abide by the structural rules which apply to them. 268 This eliminates the potential for
chaos that results from the challenges that are an integral part of the relational rules
which comprise a dominance hierarchy. 269 In a system populated by volitional entities,
it does not eliminate the possibility that some members of the system will refuse to abide
by these rules. This requires the incorporation of a control mechanism, of some system
for enforcing the structural rules. As § II(B) explains, human social systems developed
different approaches to enforcing their structural rules, particularly their criminal rules,
over the course of human history; as that section also explains, the current approach,
like a dominance hierarchy, concentrates the power and authority to respond to
violations of criminal rules in a small subset of the population of the social system.
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4.

Territory

As noted earlier, the rules human social systems devise to maintain system order
are, for the most part, territorially-based.270 That is, each social system is situated in a
physical space to which it lays claim by the tenets of the law, by the force of weapons
and/or by whatever other standard applies. This is a trait human social systems share
with wolf packs, ant colonies and, indeed, all real-world social systems, that is, all of the
social systems that have heretofore been established by biological species. This is, as §
III explains, a trait that can make the enforcement of system rules problematic when the
conduct at issue occurs in or is mediated through cyberspace.

B.

Model

[S]overeignty . . . is rooted to . . . territory and is contingent on
the ability of the state to protect its citizens, maintain order and
uphold the law within confined geographical boundaries. . . . 271

The traditional model of law enforcement, which is the model still in use today,
evolved to deal with real-world crime; 272 the essential components of the model were,
for all intents and purposes, in place by the nineteenth century. The discussion below
examines this model: Section II(B)(1) identifies four assumptions that shaped the model,
while § II(B)(2) sketches its evolution.
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1. Real-world crime

Because it is firmly situated in a corporeal, physical environment, real-world
crime has several defining characteristics; these characteristics became assumptions
that shaped the extant model of law enforcement. The sections below examine the four
characteristics that are the most significant for this discussion.
a)

Proximity

Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of real-world crime is that the
perpetrator and the victim are physically proximate to each other at the time the offense
is committed or attempted.273 It is, for instance, not possible to rape or realistically
attempt to rape someone if the rapist and the victim are fifty miles apart; by the same
token, in a non-technological world it is physically impossible to pick someone’s pocket,
take their property by force or defraud them out of their property if the thief and victim
are in different countries (or even different counties).

b)

Scale

A second characteristic of real-world crime is that it tends to be one-to-one crime;
that is, it consists of an event involving one perpetrator and one victim. This event – the
“crime” – commences when the victimization of the target is begun and ends when it has
been concluded; during this event the perpetrator focuses all of his/her attention on the
consummation of that “crime.”274 When the “crime” is complete, the perpetrator is free to
move onto another victim and another “crime.” The one-to-one character of real-world
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crime derives from the constraints physical reality imposes upon human activity:275 A
thief cannot pick more than one pocket at a time; an arsonist cannot set fire to more than
one building at a time; and prior to the development of firearms and similar armament, it
was exceedingly difficult for one bent upon homicide to cause the simultaneous deaths
of more than one person.276 Real-world crime is therefore serial crime.

The one-to-one nature of real-world crime is more a default than an absolute;
exceptions occur, especially with regard to the number of perpetrators. Rape, murder,
theft, arson, forgery and many other crimes can involve multiple perpetrators; indeed,
the aggregation of offenders and the rise of “organized crime” is a tendency that has
accelerated over the last few centuries.277 But while many-to-one deviations from the
one-to-one model have occurred for centuries, one-to-many deviations were rare prior to
the use of technology. For example, in a world without computers, copiers and similar
devices the forging of a document must be done by hand, which takes time and means
that only a limited number of forgeries can be produced. Consequently, prior to say,
1800, forgery is almost inevitably a one-to-one crime; the forger falsifies a document,
uses it to victimize his target and then moves on, to another document and another
victim. The same is true of fraud; the perpetrator necessarily focuses his or her efforts
on a single target, succeeds, and, having done so, moves on to another target.278

c)

Physical constraints

A third characteristic of real-world crime is that its commission is subject to the
physical constraints that govern all activities in the “real,” physical world.279 Since we are
accustomed to living our lives according to the dictates of these constraints, we do not
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appreciate how they enhance the complexity of criminal endeavors.280 Every “crime,”
even routinized offenses such as prostitution and street-level drug dealing, requires
some level of preparation, planning and considered implementation if it is to succeed.
For real-world crime, these activities must be conducted in physical space, actual space.

So, one who decides to rob a bank must visit that bank corporeally to familiarize
herself with its physical layout (entrances, teller windows, vault location), security (visible
alarm systems, guards, surveillance cameras) and general routine (when employees
arrive and leave, when the bank is likely to have the fewest customers, currency pickup
and delivery).281 This process exposes the robber to public scrutiny, which can lead to
her being apprehended after she commits the crime.282 The same is true of the robbery
itself; while physically inside the bank, the robber can leave evidence or become the
subject of observations that can lead to her being apprehended.283 It is equally true of
the perpetrator’s flight once the robbery has been committed; again, the perpetrator is
exposed to public view and runs the risk of being noticed and identified.284 In addition to
the risks of exposure that arise from planning and committing the “crime,” the robber will
presumably need to secure a weapon and some type of disguise;285 and she may need
to launder the funds she takes from the bank.286 Like the processes involved in the
robbery itself, each of these steps takes time and effort and incrementally augments the
total exertion required for the commission of this “crime;” and like the robbery itself, each
increases the likelihood that she will be identified and apprehended.287

d)

Patterns
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A fourth characteristic of real-world crime is that over time it becomes possible to
identify the general contours and incidence of the “crimes” committed within a social
system.288 Real-world victimization tends to fall into demographic and geographic
patterns for two reasons. One is that, as is explained below, only a small segment of a
functioning society’s total populace will be persistently engaged in criminal activity.289
Those who fall into this category are apt to be from economically-deprived backgrounds
and reside in areas that share certain geographic and demographic characteristics.290
They will be inclined to focus their efforts on those with whom they share a degree of
physical proximity because these are their most convenient victims.291 This means that
much of the “crime” in a social system will be concentrated in specific areas, such on the
“West Side of Notown” or “South of 31st Street in Megalopolis.” 292

The other reason why “crime” falls into certain patterns is that each society has a
repertoire of “crimes” -- of legal rules that proscribe a set of behaviors ranging from more
to less serious in terms of the respective “harms” each inflicts.293 The “harm” caused by
a specific “crime” is encompassed by, and limited to, the definition of the offense: A rape
produces the “harm” targeted by the “crime” of rape;294 a theft causes the “harm” inflicted
by the “crime” of theft;295 a forgery yields the “harm” subsumed by the “crime” of forgery,
and so on.296 In a functioning society, the more egregious “crimes” will occur much less
often and may occur less predictably than the minor “crimes.”297 Murder, for instance, is
an extraordinary event in any society that is successfully maintaining social order and
resisting chaos.298 Theft in its various forms299 is a far less extraordinary event;300 and,
depending on the cultural mores of the society, drunkenness and/or prostitution may be
quite common.301 Also, various “crimes” fall into localized patterns reflecting geography
and particular types of victimization.302
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Because these characteristics are inevitable aspects of “crime” in the real-world,
they shaped the traditional model of law enforcement that evolved to deal with this type
of “crime.” The section below explains how each characteristic contributed to the model.

2. Traditional Model of Law Enforcement

As social control strategies303 evolved, the empirical characteristics of real-world
crime -- physical proximity of victim-victimizer; one-to-one scale; physical constraints;
and offender-offense “crime” patterns304 --became embedded assumptions that shaped
the traditional model and its approach to “crime.” The model encompasses both a
general strategy for dealing with “crime” and an organizational model for implementing
this strategy. The sections below explain how these assumptions shaped the model and
how the model evolved through time.

a)

Assumptions

The first characteristic contributed a presumed dynamic to the model: victimoffender presence in the same general locale; victim-offender proximity and resulting
victimization; offender’s efforts to leave the locale or otherwise avoid apprehension and
prosecution; investigation; identification, apprehension and prosecution of the offender.
The dynamic reflects a time when life and crime were both parochial, when victims and
offenders generally lived in the same village or in the same city neighborhood. If a victim
and offender did not actually know each other, they were likely to share community ties;
this facilitated the process of apprehending offenders because there was a good chance
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they could be identified by the victim, by witnesses or by reputation. If the perpetrator
and the victim did not share community ties, that is, if the perpetrator was a stranger, his
alienness was likely to contribute to his being apprehended, since the local citizenry paid
particular attention to those who “did not belong” in their portion of the physical world.305
Law enforcement dealt effectively with this type of crime because its parochial character
meant that investigations were limited in scope.306 The model therefore assumes that
the investigation of a “crime” can focus upon a specific geographical area surrounding
the site where the “crime” occurred.307

The second characteristic contributed another element: The traditional model of
law enforcement assumes one-to-one victimization and that assumption, in conjunction
with an unrelated assumption, structures its conceptualization of the scale of “crime”.
The unrelated assumption is that incidents of criminal activity are extraordinary events in
a social system; the model assumes, in other words, that “crime” is a deviation from the
law-abiding conduct that constitutes the prevailing pattern of behavior in a system. This
assumption derives not from the physical characteristics of real-world crime but from the
nature of criminal law, the function of which is to maintain an acceptable level of social
order within a social system.308 It does this by defining what behaviors are unacceptable
and by specifying the consequences of engaging in such behavior. 309 The presumptive
result is that “crime” becomes a subset, generally a small subset, of the total behaviors
in a system population; law enforcement personnel can, therefore, focus their efforts on
a limited segment of the conduct within a given society.

This assumption that “crime” is committed by a small subset of the populace is
the first element – the “offender element” – that structures the model’s conceptualization
of the scale of “crime.” The second element – the “offense element” – is the assumption
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that one-to-one victimization is the default case. As explained earlier, “crimes” involve
the infliction of a specific type of “harm” upon the victim.310 If one-to-one victimization is
the norm, each completed “crime” inflicts one “harm” upon one victim; additive “harms”
must be inflicted sequentially.311 So, while a serial killer can cause many deaths, many
“harms,” he necessarily does so sequentially.312

The conceptualization of scale derived from these assumptions posits that the
incidence of victimization in a system will be relatively small both (a) in relationship to the
size of the population and (b) in terms of the absolute level of “harm” inflicted. The first
proposition derives from the assumption that only a subset of the system populace will
engage in criminal activity. The derivation of the second proposition is more complex.
The level of “harm” inflicted by the incidence of victimization in a system is a function of
three variables: (1) the number of individuals engaged in committing “crimes”; (2) the
number of discrete “crimes” these individuals commit during a given time period; and (3)
the types of “harm” caused by the “crimes” these individuals commit. The operation of
these variables is illustrated by a hypothetical. Assume that a social system consists of
10,000,000 people, of whom 500,000 engage in criminal activity on a more or less
regular basis.313 Assume that 200,000 of these 500,000 miscreants are incarcerated or
are for other reasons not actively engaged in criminal activity during the time period at
issue. This defines the first variable by giving us the basic pool of individuals who will
commit “crimes” during this time period.314 Defining the remaining two variables is more
problematic because they tend to interact. That is, it is difficult to set a generic number
of “crimes” our 300,000 persistent offenders are likely to commit because the number of
“crimes” an individual commits tends to be a function of the seriousness of the “crimes”
at issue. A low-level drug dealer or a street prostitute may commit fifty or more “crimes”
a week, but this will most certainly not be true of an arsonist or a career bank robber.315
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As the seriousness of a “crime” increases, the frequency with which it is committed tends
to decrease; most murderers, for example, kill only once.316 Crime statistics therefore
indicate, and the traditional model assumes, that most of the “crimes” committed by a
system’s persistent offenders – the 300,000 miscreants in our hypothetical – will be less
serious “crimes,” i.e., “crimes” that do not involve the infliction of death, physical injury or
massive property damage/loss.317

Finally, the traditional model’s conceptualization of scale incorporates the fourth
characteristic of real-world crime: the assumption that offenses and offenders fall into
identifiable patterns.318 What this adds is the notion of localization. As explained above,
the traditional model’s conceptualization of the scale of real-world “crime” postulates that
it will be limited in incidence and in the relative type of “harms” it inflicts on a populace.319
This final premise contributes the notion that an identifiable percentage of these realworld “crimes” will occur in geographically and demographically demarcated areas.320

The traditional model therefore assumes real-world “crime.” It relies upon the
empirical characteristics of real-world “crime” and certain extrapolations from these
characteristics to structure its approach to law enforcement. The model assumes that
“crime:” (a) consists of discrete events – “crimes” – each of which is physically situated;
(b) is subject to the constraints associated with activity in the physical world; (c) is
qualitatively and quantitatively limited; and (d) falls into identifiable geographical and
demographic patterns. These assumptions combine to generate the principle upon
which the model’s approach to “crime” is based -- that it is a manageable phenomenon
for law enforcement. The first two contribute the premise that “crimes” necessarily leave
information, evidence, in the real-world locale where they are committed; extrapolating
from this premise yields the conclusion that law enforcement personnel reacting to the

48

Brenner – Distributed Security
report of a “crime” can locate this evidence and use it to apprehend the perpetrator. The
model further postulates that perpetrators remain in or near the area where their “crime”
was committed, which facilitates their being apprehended. The first two assumptions,
therefore, inferentially establish law enforcement’s ability to deal with specific “crimes.”
The last two establish its ability to deal with “crime” as a systemic phenomenon; the
premise here is that since real-world “crime” occurs on a limited scale and assumes
certain patterns, law enforcement can mobilize its modest resources so as to deal with it
effectively.321

b) Strategy and Structure

The model assumes real-world crime because it is historically derived; like the
common law, the traditional model of law enforcement is a compilation of past practices
that have been deemed to be effective in dealing with the phenomena it confronts. The
model’s general strategy has been in use since pre-history and the dynamic employed in
its implementation is the same as it was centuries ago, when law enforcement consisted
of a constable or night watchman: A “crime” is committed and called to the attention of
law enforcement personnel, who investigate; if their investigation is successful, they
identify and apprehend the perpetrator, who is charged with the “crime,” prosecuted, and
presumably convicted and punished.322

This reactive approach to deviant behavior is a very basic strategy, functionally
analogous to the social control tactics common in dominance hierarchies.323 A violation
of the rules in effect in a social system occurs, which produces a reaction by the member
of that system charged with maintaining order. In a wolf pack, this is typically the alpha
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male, who enforces the relational rules that maintain order in the pack; 324 in evolved
human social systems, it is typically a member of the system who has been assigned to
enforce the structural rules that maintain order in the system. The source of authority for
the rules differs in the two systems, but the operating rationale is the same: A violation
of the rules requires a reaction by someone in authority; the purpose of the reaction is to
achieve a response. Ideally, the response takes the form of continuing submission to
authority; the offender ceases to offend at that moment and does not re-offend in the
future. This is control-by-deterrence (though it can also be control-by-incapacitation if
the reaction results in the offender’s incarceration or demise).325 That is, the threat of
sanction brings the offender into line and has the consequent effect of impressing the
other members of the system with the consequences of offending, thereby helping to
ensure that they will not offend in the future.326 As human societies develop more
complex cultures, the reaction can also be seen as having a symbolic effect, i.e., “doing
justice” or “exacting retribution” according to some philosophical or religious principles.327

This reactive approach emerged millennia ago as a pragmatic solution to what
was then atypical behavior. “Crime” is an unusual event in small social systems because
the informal social control exerted by shared norms and values is sufficient to deter most
would-be offenders.328 When a “crime” does occur, it is relatively easy to address given
the nature of the system in which it is committed: Identifying the perpetrator, who may
literally be caught red-handed, is generally not difficult given the small size of the
populace; the operation of the physical constraints discussed above is magnified, so it
may be impossible for an offender to avoid observation and detection in the process of
committing the “crime” or in the process of fleeing from it.329 And the unlikelihood of
“stranger danger” makes it relatively easy to deduce who might have had the motive and
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opportunity for the offense.330 The reactive approach to deviant behavior emerged from
this context and persisted as social systems evolved in size and complexity.

Why has it endured? One reason, no doubt, is that we are accustomed to this
model and the dynamic it incorporates; we expect law enforcement to respond when a
“crime” is committed and we assume the identification, apprehension, prosecution and
eventual punishment of the offender will satisfactorily resolve things, returning “harm” for
“harm” and deterring future “crimes.”331 Another reason is that societies are unwilling or
unable to allocate the increased resources that are needed to implement a proactive
model which emphasizes “crime” prevention as well as control-by-deterrence.332 Yet
another reason is that it is still a workable means of dealing with real-world “crime”. The
reactive approach may not be the most effective means, but real-world “crime” retains
the characteristics described earlier; the persistence of those characteristics means this
approach continues to be a viable strategy for addressing traditional “crime.”333

But strategy alone is not enough. There must also be an allocation of human
and other resources plus an organizational structure designed to implement the strategy,
i.e., to identify and apprehend those who commit “crimes.” The level of organizational
development in the society determines who will actually be responsible for reacting to a
completed “crime.” Among some hunter-gatherers, for example, “communal, collective
security efforts generally suffice;” 334 in others, this function is assigned to a subset of the
populace, typically males who enjoy higher status within the grouping.335 Historically, as
human social systems became larger and more complex they tended to institutionalize
this function: Egypt had established an “early system of citizen police” by 1500 B.C.; the
ancient Greeks used “an effective system of `kin policing’” and the ancient Romans used
both civilian patrols and military forces to “maintain law and order.” 336 The disintegration
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of the Roman Empire plunged Europe into chaos; social systems that had relied on
Roman institutions were forced to resort to older measures to maintain order:

The closest equivalent to the modern police officer that emerged
at the time of Alfred the Great . . . was the `Saxon tythingman.’ Every
male person over the age of twelve was required to participate in . . . the
tything system. A tything was a group of ten families, headed by a
`tythingman’ responsible for the acts of the persons . . . in his group. It
was each tythingman's duty to raise the `hue and cry’ when a crime was
committed, to collect his neighbors and to pursue a criminal who fled. . . .
If such a group failed to apprehend a lawbreaker, the tything could be
required to pay a fine. . . . 337

The Normans kept this system in place but expanded the role of the “shire reeve”
(later, sheriff). Under the Norman system, the shire reeve could “raise a `hue and cry,’
but instead of merely requiring the members of a tything to . . . apprehend an accused,
he was able to summon the posse comitatus which consisted of the tythingmen . . . of
several hundred tythings.” 338 The shire reeve was responsible for maintaining order in
the shire over which he presided; by the end of the thirteenth century, the shire reeve
had an assistant, the constable, who eventually assumed responsibility for maintaining
law and order. 339 In 1285, the Statute of Winchester established a system of

patrols in each of the large towns of England. Men between the ages of
fifteen and sixty were required to perform watch service on a rotating
basis between sunset and sunrise. They were responsible for protecting
property against fire, guarding the town gates and apprehending anyone
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who committed a crime. The `hue and cry" could be commenced by any
watchman and the entire community of able-bodied males was required
to join in the pursuit of any wrongdoer. A failure to participate in the watch
or to aid in the pursuit of fugitives would result in punishment. . . .340

The statute also “required every man between the ages of fifteen and sixty to maintain
specified weaponry, which varied according to his wealth.” 341

Policing in England, and later in the American colonies,342 “continued to follow
this style, known as the `watch and ward’ system of law enforcement, for nearly five
hundred years.” 343 But “as time passed the voluntary observance of the `watch and
ward’ system” weakened, and it became common practice “to pay others to do the
required service.344 The substitutes were generally “too old to be of any value” and the
consequent rise in crime rates caused wealthy merchants to hire “private watchmen to
guard themselves and their businesses”. 345 The Industrial Revolution brought “a vast
migration to urban areas and the need for a regular system of policing became greater
than ever before.”346 For a time, London experimented with “a number of fragmented
civic associations,” which tended to disintegrate into bounty hunters.347 The “first regular
professional police force” in London was created in 1800; when the privately-funded
force was a success, Parliament authorized a publicly funded police force. 348 But since
it was small, the primary burden of law enforcement remained with elderly or indifferent
night watchmen.349

This changed in 1829 when Sir Robert Peel successfully maneuvered the
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Metropolitan Police Act through Parliament. The act called for the
creation of a tax-supported police force for the London metropolitan area.
. . . [T]he Metropolitan Police created by this legislation provided the
model for modern policing. . . . First, the officers were independent from
the courts. . . . Second, the force was uniformed, and quasi-military in
organization. Patrols were assigned to constables, who were supervised
by sergeants, who in turn reported to inspectors, who were under the
command of superintendents, who reported to the commissioner. Third,
policing was a full-time occupation, and officers were not allowed to
demand or to accept supplemental private payments for their work.350

In 1856, Parliament required that similar police forces be established in the cities and
towns outside London, and “the English police system has remained practically
unchanged since that time.” 351

As American cities rapidly expanded in the nineteenth century, they experienced
the same problems London had dealt with until it established the Metropolitan Police. 352
In the early part of the nineteenth century, some called for the creation of a public police
force, but these early advocates of professional policing “were unable to overcome the
long-standing American aversion to anything resembling a standing army -- an aversion
dating back to the abuses of Cromwell's constabulary in seventeenth-century England
and reinforced by the Redcoats' behavior prior to the Revolution.”353 By the mid-1800s,

unrestrained growth, frequent mob violence . . . and the influx of foreign
immigrants into urban areas fueled social disorder and contributed to
rising fear among the country's growing middle class. . . . When fears of
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social disintegration finally became stronger than distrust of a quasistanding army, America's larger and more disorderly cities began
searching for a successful model. . . . [T]hey seized upon the `modern’
police model established by the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, which
created the first police force in the world. . . . 354

In 1845, New York “became the first American city to establish a fully consolidated police
force, with 800 paid full-time officers.” 355 Other cities followed suit, and in “less than
fifteen years, New York-style, full-time consolidated police departments . . . had become
standard in all large American cities.” 356 A similar process occurred in other countries,
and eventually public police forces modeled on Peel’s Metropolitan Police became the
general global standard for maintaining internal order.357

The net effect of all this was to eliminate citizen involvement in the process of
maintaining internal order and assign that task exclusively to professionals employed by
the state.358 In exchange for receiving free police services,359 citizens effectively
surrendered responsibility for their own security. We return to this issue in § IV, infra.

III.

Cybercrime and the Current Model

There is currently no effective way to police cyberspace.360

While our experience with cybercrime is still in its infancy, it is already apparent
that the traditional model of law enforcement is not an effective strategy for dealing with
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cybercrime. The primary reason it cannot deal effectively with cybercrime is that online
crime possesses few, if any, of the essential characteristics of real-world “crime.”

A.

Proximity

Unlike real-world “crime,” cybercrime does not require any degree of physical
proximity between victim and victimizer at the moment the “crime” is committed.361
Cybercrime is unbounded crime, borderless crime.362 It can be committed against a
victim who is in another city, another state, another country.363 All a perpetrator needs
is access to a computer that is linked to the Internet; with this, he can inflict “harm” upon
a victim directly, by attacking her computer, or indirectly by obtaining information that lets
him assume her identity and use it commit fraud on a grand scale. As a report issued
several years ago explained,

In the physical world . . . . human travel is spatially based. By
contrast, because one can access a computer remotely without knowing
where, in physical space, that computer is located . . . . cybercriminals are
no longer hampered by the existence of national . . . boundaries. . . .

[A] cyberstalker in Brooklyn . . . may send a threatening e-mail to
a person in Manhattan. If the stalker routes his communication through
Argentina, France, and Norway . . . the New York Police Department may
have to get assistance from the Office of International Affairs at the
Department of Justice . . . which . . . may have to get assistance from law
enforcement in . . . Buenos Aires, Paris, and Oslo just to learn that the
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suspect is in New York. . . . [T]he perpetrator needs no passport and
passes through no checkpoints as he commits his crime, while law
enforcement agencies are burdened with cumbersome mechanisms . .
.that often derail or slow investigations. . . . . And any delay in an
investigation is critical, as a criminal’s trail often ends as soon as he or
she disconnects from the Internet.364

B. Scale

Cybercrime differs from real-world “crime” in another important regard: It is not
one-to-one “crime” because it is not corporeal crime; consequently, a one-to-one scale
of offense commission is not a viable default assumption for cybercrime.365 Much of
cybercrime is already “automated crime,” and the use of automation will only increase.
“Automated crime” is using technology to multiply the number of “crimes” someone can
commit in a given period of time;366 automation gives perpetrators the ability to commit
many cybercrimes very quickly.367 Indeed, with automation, a perpetrator can start the
process of victimization and then turn his attention to other matters, letting automated
systems complete it.368

This capacity to automate crime alters traditional assumptions about the scale of
crime and thereby creates problems for law enforcement.369 Under the traditional model
of law enforcement, officers react to a report of a “crime” by initiating an investigation;
the investigation is intended to culminate in the identification and apprehension of the
perpetrator, who will then be prosecuted and presumably sanctioned.370 This ensures
that the criminal law is enforced and order is maintained.371 The problem with this
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scenario is that it assumes real-world “crime” and, in so doing, assumes “crimes” will be
committed on a manageable scale. 372

Cybercrime violates these assumptions in two ways: (a)i t is committed on a
scale far surpassing that of real-world “crime;” 373 and (b)it represents an entirely new
class of “crime” that is added to the real-world “crimes” with which law enforcement has
traditionally dealt and with which it must continue to deal.374 These factors combine to
create a overload; law enforcement’s ability to react to cybercrime erodes because the
resources that were adequate to deal with the real-world “crime” are inadequate to deal
with real-world “crime” plus cybercrime.375

C. Physical Constraints

Cybercrime differs from real-world “crime” in a third respect: The perpetrators of
cybercrime are not restricted by the constraints that govern action in the real, physical
world. 376 Cybercrimes can be committed instantaneously and therefore require a rapid
response; law enforcement, however, is accustomed to dealing with real-world “crimes,”
the investigation of which proceeds at a more deliberate pace.377 Another complication
is that all or substantially all of the conduct involved in the commission of a cybercrime
occurs in an electronic environment; since a perpetrator is not physically “present” when
the “crime” is committed, one can no longer assume she will leave trace evidence at the
crime scene.378 The transborder nature of cybercrime further enhances the difficulties
officers face when they attempt to react to a cybercrime because traditional assumptions
about a perpetrator’s being observed preparing for, committing and/or fleeing from an
offense no longer hold.379
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Cyberspace also lets perpetrators conceal or disguise their identities in a way
that is not possible in the real-world.380 In the real-world, an offender can wear a mask
and perhaps take other efforts to conceal his identity, but certain characteristics -- such
as height, weight, accent, age -- will still be apparent. In cyberspace, one can achieve
perfect anonymity or perfect pseudonymity;381 consequently, officers may have no way
of identifying the person who victimized someone in their jurisdiction.382 As one report
noted, “[t]he ability for criminals to remain anonymous on the Internet presents a huge
challenge for police”.383

Even if police can identify a perpetrator, gathering evidence of the cybercrime
can be difficult for various reasons. The country that hosts the cybercriminal and his
activities may not define what he did as illegal and may therefore be unable to prosecute
him or cooperate in his being extradited for prosecution elsewhere;384 the host nation
may not have agreements in effect with the victim nation which obligate it to assist in
gathering evidence that can be used against the perpetrator;385 or the evidence may
have been destroyed, advertently or because it was routine transactional data that was
not retained by the Internet Service Provider which the offender used to commit his
crime.386

D.

Patterns

Perhaps because cybercrime is still such a new phenomenon, we cannot identify
patterns comparable to those that exist for real-world crime. 387 We cannot, at least so
far, empirically derive conclusions as to how various types of cybercrime will manifest
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themselves geographically and demographically.388 Consequently, we cannot develop
the type of crime maps law enforcement uses to allocate its resources in dealing with
real-world crime.389

One factor which contributes to our inability to identify patterns in cybercrime is
that it is not accurately documented; nations are not tracking the incidence of cybercrime
in the same way they track real-world crime.390 There are several reasons for this lack of
accurate cybercrime statistics: One is that countries have not defined what “cybercrime”
is and how it differs from “crime.”391 Another is that while law enforcement agencies do
record reported cybercrimes, they tend not to break them out into a separate category;
online fraud, for example, is recorded as “fraud.”392 Yet another reason for the lack of
accurate cybercrime data is that it can be difficult to parse cybercrime into discrete
offenses. Was the “Love Bug” virus which caused billions of dollars of damage in over
20 countries one crime or thousands of crimes? 393 Clearly, though, the most important
reasons why we do not have accurate information about cybercrime are that (a) many
cybercrimes go undetected and (b) many detected cybercrimes go unreported.394

But maybe the lack of accurate statistics is not the real reason why we cannot
identify patterns: perhaps the notion of “cybercrime patterns” is an oxymoron. After all,
the existence of patterns in real-world criminality is a function of the physical space in
which real-world criminals operate: Economic forces dictate that most real-world “crime”
is committed by individuals who suffer from varying levels of economic deprivation and
who are, therefore, apt to reside and function in identifiable, economically-disadvantaged
neighborhoods. 395 These neighborhoods generate offense and offender patterns
because perpetrators tend to target victims of opportunity, i.e., vulnerable individuals
who are within some convenient zone of physical proximity.396
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Cyberspace makes physical space irrelevant: It becomes as easy to victimize
someone who is halfway around the world as it is your next-door neighbor.397 Does this
mean cybercrime will never assume patterns, either as to the location of the offense or
the types of offenses being committed?

It is impossible to answer that question at this stage of our experience because
all we know about this new type of crime is what we have seen so far. The apparent
absence of cybercrime patterns may be a function either of the fact that they have not
had time to develop or that they exist but we cannot identify them because they assume
forms different from those we are accustomed to seeing in real-world crime. We cannot
resolve this issue, but it may be helpful to speculate about whether patterns will evolve
and, if so, how they might be useful in combating cybercrime.

It is useful to begin by considering the patterns that emerge in real-world crime
and how law enforcement uses them to maximize its effectiveness. Real-world patterns
reflect “crime”-categories and “crime”-locations.398 As to the former, the frequency with
which real-world “crimes” are committed is in inverse proportion to the seriousness of the
“crime”; less serious “crimes” are committed with greater frequency than more serious
“crimes,” such as murder.399 This means, among other things, that property “crimes” are
committed much more often than crimes of violence and that the same is true of “crimes”
involving traffic in societally-banned substances such as drugs and child pornography.400
“Crime”-category patterns are derived from compilations of data on reported offenses.401
How does law enforcement use the patterns that appear in the commission of offenses?
They can be used to develop profiles of offenders;402 they can also be used to determine
the best means of allocating limited police resources among various units.403 “Crime”-
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location patterns are also used to allocate resources; they let law enforcement agencies
allocate officers to geographical areas where certain types of “crimes,” at least, are
committed with the greatest frequency.404 Location patterns are derived both from data
compilations concerning reported offenses and crime-mapping techniques.405

Since “crime”-category patterns are driven by human behavior more than by
geography, it seems likely that category patterns will manifest themselves in cybercrime.
Indeed, there is some evidence they are already emerging. The current inadequacy of
statistical data concerning the incidence of cybercrime makes it difficult to extrapolate
with any precision as to offense patterns, but anecdotal evidence suggests that much of
the contemporary cybercrime falls into three categories. One is hacking, which can be
defined as gaining unauthorized access to a computer system either for the purpose of
exploration or to cause damage once inside.406 Another is online fraud, which may
exceed hacking in the frequency with which it is committed.407 The third category
encompasses child pornography and using the Internet to solicit children for sexual
activity.408 Interestingly, the apparent frequency of these offenses is at least partially
consistent with the proposition adduced above concerning the frequency of real-world
crime; that is, in the real-world we can predict that property “crimes” and trafficking in
banned substances will be committed more often than, for example, “crimes” that involve
the infliction of death, serious bodily injury or massive property damage.409

What, if anything, does this mean for the development of offense patterns in the
commission of cybercrimes? It could mean that the behaviors which shape the contours
of real-world offense categories are constants in illicit human activities. That is, crime is
finite: Since humans commit “crimes” for specific, identifiable reasons, such as to enrich
themselves, to take revenge, or to discharge psycho-sexual or other impulses, there is a
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fixed class of “crimes.” 410 If crime is finite, then we should see the same types of “crime”
being committed in and via cyberspace -- online “crime” will manifest itself in essentially
the same ways as real-world “crime.” This assumes that we have seen mankind’s entire
repertoire of antisocial activity, an assumption which may very well be invalid. While it is
reasonable to assume that our experience over the last several millennia has treated us
to the gamut of motivations which prompt individuals to engage in antisocial activity, we
need to remember that the way these motivations have manifested themselves so far
has been the product of the physical constraints imposed by the real-world.411 We may
well see traditional motivations generating antisocial activity that takes new and different
forms in cyberspace,412 which of course would mean that real-world offense patterns will
not recapitulate themselves in this new environment.

There is another possible explanation for the apparent recapitulation of real-world
“crime” trends in cybercrime: It may be that we are so far only seeing the migration of
real-world offense categories to cyberspace; that is, those who are currently using the
Internet to commit “crimes” grew up with and were socialized by a climate in which the
predominating mode of unlawful activity was real-world “crime,” in its traditional guises.
It would not be surprising, therefore, if these individuals recapitulated what they had
observed of real-world criminality in their illicit activities online; they are, in other words,
committing “crimes” and have not yet begun to imagine “cybercrime.” Cyberspace, after
all, not only erases the importance of geography - it also lets us do things we cannot do
in real-space. So we may see the emergence of new and as yet unimagined varieties of
“crime” (which will, of course, have to be defined as such). It is probably reasonable to
anticipate that much of “crime” will continue to take the form of attempts at illicit selfenrichment; it is also probably reasonable to anticipate that the incidence of non-violent
offenses will continue to exceed that of violent offenses. But beyond that, it is difficult to
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speculate; we will, for example, no doubt see the emergence of “collective crime,” i.e., of
automated mass victimization. If that occurs, we shall have to decide how to factor that
into the way we categorize the “crimes” that were committed in a given time period: Is
the automated victimization of 5,000 victims by one human assisted by technology the
commission of one “crime” or 5,000 “crimes”? 413 Law enforcement will have to decide
how to react to phenomena such as this: Should the allocation of resources continue to
reflect the frequency with which certain types of “crime” are committed in an era when
this process is automated and a few offenders can account for thousands and thousands
of discrete “crimes”? Or should the allocation of resources be based on other criteria?

And what about the possibility of mapping the location of cybercrimes? Is there
any purpose in doing so? One difficulty that arises is determining what is meant by the
“location” of the “crime.” As explained earlier, the traditional model of law enforcement
assumes real-world “crime”; one characteristic of real-world “crime” is that the victim and
victimizer must be in relatively close physical proximity when the “crime” is committed.414
Geography consequently assumes a great deal of importance in dealing with real-world
“crime;” focusing an investigation on the physical location of a “crime” offers police their
best opportunity for identifying and apprehending the offender(s).415 But in cyberspace
there is no “crime” scene, at least not in the traditional sense; for most cybercrimes,
evidence is scattered over several locations, including the computer the perpetrator
used, the victim’s computer and the intervening computers and computer servers the
perpetrator used to accomplish the offense. If a woman in the Ukraine uses the Internet
to defraud a man in Texas, where did the “crime” occur? If one assumes the victim is
the locus of a “crime,” then it occurred in Texas; but little evidence of the “crime” will be
found in Texas and the perpetrator will certainly not be found there. Does this mean
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“crime”-location patterns will be irrelevant in dealing with cybercrime? It is impossible to
answer that question with any certainty.

E.

Sum

While the apparent difficulty of identifying patterns in cybercrime does not itself
sound the death knell for the traditional model of law enforcement, it, in conjunction with
the other difficulties discussed above, clearly establishes that the traditional model is not
a suitable means of dealing with online criminal activity. We must come up with a better
approach. Doing so could involve devising an entirely new model of law enforcement,
one that is more suited for online crime, or modifying the traditional model so it becomes
an effective means of addressing cybercrime. The next section takes up these issues.

IV.

Toward a New Model: Distributed Security416
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[T]here are impediments in the current legal system to fostering .
. . computer security.417

This section takes up the question posed at the beginning of the article: why do
we need a criminal law for cyberspace? The first part of the discussion explains why the
traditional model of law enforcement will become an ever-less-effective means of dealing
with cybercrime; this section also explains how modifications in our criminal law can
improve our ability to deal with cybercrime.418 The remainder of this section posits some
specific changes to criminal law doctrines and analyzes the extent to which each could
enhance our efforts to address cybercrime.419

A.

From Hierarchy to Network

[N]onstate actors . . . are able to organize into networks . . . more
readily than can traditional, hierarchical, state actors. . . .
[W]hoever masters the network form stands to gain the
advantage.420

Our need for a criminal law of cyberspace derives from three premises, the first
of which was derived above: It is already apparent that the traditional model of law
enforcement, with its reactive approach and hierarchical, military-style organization,
cannot deal effectively with cybercrime. 421 The second premise derives from the
proliferation of technology: Technology – in the form of computers, personal digital
assistants, cell phones, mobile entertainment devices, pagers, Global Positioning
System gear and other appliances – pervades much of our daily life, at least in more
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developed countries.422 This tendency will only become more pronounced as our
environment is transformed by wireless communication technologies, sentient chips,
wearable computers, smart rooms, digital cities and other techno-components of life in
the twenty-first century.423 As one student of this phenomenon explains,

major population centers of the planet will be saturated with trillions of
microchips, some of them tiny computers, many of them capable of
communicating with each other. . . . [P]eople . . . will have a device with
them most of the time that will enable them to link objects, places, and
people to online content and processes. . . . 424

The proliferation of these devices, all linked in various and varying ways, will create and
sustain a fluid global network operating 24/7 x 365.

This takes us to the third premise: the proliferation of these technologies will
have a profound effect upon the organization of human social systems and activities. As
noted above, the world will become a single interdependent, interlinked network.425 For
the last several millennia, the organization of human social systems and activities –
government, commerce, education, religion, military – has been hierarchical: a topdown approach to the structuring of social relationships and the allocation of authority.426
This default hierarchical organizational model evolved to deal with the organization of
activity in the real-world; since human activity in the real-world is subject to the physical
constraints of empirical reality, it requires the use of techniques such as a chain of
command to orchestrate and focus the efforts of groups of humans on achieving
particular tasks, e.g., mining coal, smelting steel, sailing ships, building pyramids,
waging wars and keeping order within a social system.427
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The proliferation of technology and consequent rise of cyberspace change this.
Communication technologies free us from the physical constraints of the empirical world;
we can communicate instantaneously with anyone anywhere, with multiple anyones in
many anywheres.428 This produces a new type of social organization -- the network.429
The rise of the network is not without precedent; the development of new technology has
historically resulted in the appearance of new forms of social organization.430 Networks
are displacing hierarchies in every sector of society because hierarchical organization is
not an effective means of organizing technologically-mediated activities;431 but
hierarchical organization will persist in areas of human endeavor that are based in the
real-world because hierarchies are an effective means of organizing activities in this
venue.432

Networks, unlike hierarchies, are lateral, fluid systems. 433 Networks, unlike
hierarchies, decentralize power and authority and thereby empower individuals.434
Networks have the capacity to, and very likely will, usher in a new era of cooperation
among peoples and among social systems.435 Unfortunately, they can also be exploited
for destructive purposes:

Most people might hope for the emergence of a new form of organization
to be led by `good guys’. . . .But history does not support this contention.
The cutting edge in the early rise of a new form may be found equally
among malcontents . . . and clever opportunists eager to take advantage
of new ways to maneuver, exploit, and dominate. Many centuries ago . . .
the rise of hierarchical forms of organization . . .was . . . attended . . . by
the appearance of ferocious chieftains bent on military conquest and of

68

Brenner – Distributed Security
violent secret societies. . . . [T]he early spread of the market form, only a
few centuries ago, was accompanied by a spawn of usurers, pirates,
smugglers, and monopolists, all seeking to elude state controls over their
earnings and enterprises.

Why should this pattern not be repeated in an age of networks? There
appears to be a subtle, dialectical interplay between the bright and
dark sides in the rise of a new form of organization. The bright-side
actors may be so deeply embedded in and constrained by a society’s
established forms of organization that many have difficulty becoming
the early . . . adopters of a new form. In contrast, nimble bad guys may
have a freer, easier time acting as the cutting edge. . . .436

As §III explained, this is precisely what is occurring with regard to cybercrime.
Law enforcement, which is for the most part still “embedded in and constrained by . . .
established forms of organization”, is lagging behind the “bad guys,” who have learned
how to exploit the distributed, non-territorially-based, automated realities of cyberspace.
The question is, how do we bring law enforcement up to speed? That is, how can law
enforcement adapt to the new realities of cybercrime?437

The core problem is law enforcement’s reactive approach to “crime.” As §III
demonstrated, the traditional reactive mode is not effective for cybercrime because
cybercrime is elusive: Offenders are elusive because there is no necessary nexus
between the situs of a “crime” and the perpetrator’s physical location, either at the time
the “crime” is committed or afterward.438 Offenders are elusive because they can shield
their identities and avoid leaving traditional types of physical evidence.439 “Crimes” are
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elusive because they do not fall into recognizable offense and/or offender patterns.440
Finally, “crimes” are elusive because they can be committed on such a scale that law
enforcement officers simply cannot react to all of them.441

One solution, therefore, would be to somehow improve law enforcement’s ability
to react to completed cybercrimes. Doing this could involve any of several things: It
could require significantly expanding the number of officers who are available to react to
cybercrime; as noted earlier, one of the reasons cybercrime is so problematic for law
enforcement is that it constitutes an incremental addition to the quantum of “crime” to
which law enforcement must react.442 Since cybercrime undermines the effectiveness of
the reactive strategy by increasing the number of “crimes” to which officers must react, it
seems that increasing the number of officers should offset this effect and restore the
efficacy of the reactive strategy. Unfortunately, the problem is that since cybercrime is
increasingly automated “crime,” there is no longer a necessary one-to-one correlation
between offender and offense;443 cybercrime is becoming an “arms race” between
criminals and law enforcement and cannot, therefore, be combated effectively simply by
hiring more law enforcement officers.444

If hiring more officers is not the answer, what is? Another alternative would be to
combat fire with fire, i.e., to automate policing in cyberspace. This would involve using
automated agents to react to completed cybercrimes and to “patrol” public areas of
cyberspace in an effort to prevent the commission of cybercrime.445 While automated
cyberpolicing is certainly a logical alternative, its implementation is surrounded with
difficulties, technical and legal, 446 that make it an unrealistic option for the foreseeable
future.
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A third alternative is to authorize civilian use of defensive technologies, i.e., to let
cybercrime victims use “`strike-back’ or `counterstrike’ tools”.447 The rationale here is that
victims react when they are the targets of cybercrime and thereby supplement the
reactive capabilities of law enforcement personnel.448 The premise is that a computer
system which is “under attack automatically traces back the source and shuts down, or
partially disables, the attacking machine(s).”449 This alternative raises difficult legal
questions,450 but ultimately founders on the risks involved in authorizing victim self-help:

Not all attacks will . . . reveal a path back to their source . . . [T]racing an
attack to an intermediate attacking machine, not to speak of the computer
owned by the originator in a DDoS attack, may be impossible. . . . And
intermediate machines . . . may be operated by hospitals, governmental
units, and telecommunications entities . . . that provide connectivity to
millions of people: counterstrikes which are not very, very precisely
targeted . . . could easily create a remedy worse than the disease. Where
the offense is spam . . . the trace will generally lead to an anonymous
account on a server -- a server which is legitimately used for other
communications as well. Disabling that server is overkill.451

Since these three alternatives exhaust the available options for improving
reactions to completed cybercrime, it seems this is not a viable way to improve law
enforcement’s ability to deal with cybercrime. The solution must lie elsewhere. The
conceptual alternative to the reactive model is a model based on crime prevention.
While the reactive approach incorporates notions of crime prevention insofar as it is
predicated on incapacitating and deterring offenders,452 the alternative model is based
on strategies that are designed to inhibit the commission of “crimes.”453 Known as

71

Brenner – Distributed Security
“community policing,” this real-world model emphasizes “putting officers back on the
streets”, where they become “part of the fabric of the neighborhood, as a constant,
known, dependable presence, instead of racing around the city in patrol cars, reacting to
crimes that have already happened.” 454 It also emphasizes cooperation between police
and citizens in creating a climate where “crime” is not tolerated.455 Community policing
has had notable successes in the real-world, but it can be difficult to implement, as it is
labor-intensive, requires organizational restructuring and can raise ethical issues about
the allocation of scarce resources.456

Community policing has not been implemented in the cyber-world for at least two
reasons. One is that doing so would require assigning police officers to “patrol” areas of
cyberspace, and that would require hiring new officers and/or assigning officers who are
currently dealing with real-world “crime” to cyberspace. In an era of scarce resources,
neither is a viable option.457 The other reason is that there really are no “communities” in
cyberspace, at least not the kind of communities law enforcement officers can deal with;
“communities” in cyberspace tend to be defined by interests, not by territory.458 They
therefore attract people from various locations around the world and consequently defy
the territorially-based assumptions that are an essential part of “community policing,” at
least as it has evolved in the real-world.459

While community policing cannot be extrapolated to cyberspace, two aspects of
the community policing model suggest an approach that can be used to address online
“crime.” The traditional, reactive model of law enforcement cannot deal effectively with
cybercrime because cybercrime is a fluid, lateral phenomenon; it is, in effect, distributed
“crime.”460 Since cybercrime is a lateral, pervasive phenomenon, it demands a lateral,
pervasive solution. This solution can incorporate a reactive element but, as explained
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above, a purely reactive approach is inadequate. 461 The solution therefore needs to be
proactive; it must focus on preventing cybercrime, not merely reacting to it. The solution
also needs to employ a collaborative approach, one that combines the efforts of civilians
and law enforcement; combining the efforts of civilians and law enforcement addresses
the problem noted earlier, i.e., that it is neither financially nor pragmatically possible to
deploy enough law enforcement officers to maintain order in cyberspace.462 Clearly,
therefore, the way to address cybercrime is to utilize the community policing model’s
concepts of a proactive, collaborative approach to “crime.”463

Doing that would seem to require creating a new model of law enforcement, one
specifically directed at cybercrime. Actually, it requires disassembling assumptions and
expectations predicated on the traditional model and replacing them with a different set
of assumptions and expectations. As noted earlier, under the traditional model citizens
have no responsibility for reacting to “crime”;464 consequently, they have come to think of
law enforcement as the exclusive responsibility of the police.465 The community policing
model seeks to reverse this process, at least in part, and involve citizens in combating
“crime” in their real-world neighborhoods.466 Community policing does this by putting
officers in neighborhoods where they work to prevent “crime” by patrolling the area to
discourage criminal activity and by encouraging citizens not to tolerate such activity.467
Citizens are involved, but they still are not responsible for reacting to crime.

This particular model cannot be used to deal with cybercrime because, as was
explained earlier, police cannot patrol “neighborhoods” in cyberspace.468 This model
relies on an active police presence, reinforced by neighborhood support, to control
“crime” and maintain order. A different model, however, a variation on the community
policing model, could be used to control cybercrime. This modified model does not rely
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primarily on an active police presence and only secondarily on citizen efforts; instead, it
relies primarily on active citizen efforts and secondarily on police support of those efforts.
It is not a community policing model; it is a distributed policing model in which citizens
assume responsibility for discouraging the commission of cybercrime. It represents the
disassembling of the traditional model of law enforcement insofar as citizens assume
responsibilities with regard to a particular type of “crime;”469 it does not represent the reestablishment of the antecedent model because while citizens may have some role in
reacting to completed cybercrimes, their primary responsibility is to prevent the
commission of cybercrimes.470 Citizen prevention serves at once to maintain internal
order and to ward off external threats, since cyber-attacks, unlike conventional real-world
“crimes,” can constitute acts of war or terrorism, as well as criminal activity.471

Postulating this model raises two questions: Why should citizens assume
responsibility for preventing cybercrimes when they have no such responsibility as to
real-world “crimes”? And, assuming citizens should assume such responsibility, how is
this to be achieved? That is, how are assumptions fostered by the traditional model of
law enforcement to be displaced and new expectations to be inculcated? The sections
below address these questions.

1.

Why impose responsibility for prevention?

We in no way make citizens472 responsible for preventing real-world “crimes.”
We take a laissez-faire attitude toward crime prevention in the real-world.473 I can go to
work leaving my front door unlocked and a rear window open secure in the knowledge
that if a burglar takes advantage of the situation to steal my television, my laptop and my
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stereo I can call the police, who will make an effort to find the burglar and recover my
property. It is, of course, possible that the officers involved may not exert themselves to
the fullest in doing so; they may make the burglary of my home a lesser priority than
other “crimes,” perhaps out of a sense of frustration at my irresponsibility. I, however, will
never know that this is the case and, indeed, it may not be; the officers may well expend
their best efforts to recovery my property and apprehend the perpetrator. The point is
that my irresponsibility is legally irrelevant; criminal law does not require a blameless
victim.474 The doctrinal reason why the criminal law disregards my carelessness is that a
“crime” is an offense against the authority of the state and therefore must be addressed
by the state, without regard to the circumstances which contributed to its commission.475
This proposition from the systemic need to maintain internal order and the empirical
reality that deviant behavior constitutes a serious threat to such order. 476 The criminal
law’s disinclination to take victim blameworthiness into account is probably also
attributable to another factor, namely, that dealing with “crimes” such as these is no
doubt easier than trying to enforce laws requiring people to maintain security.477

Why should citizen obligations be different with regard to cybercrime? The
primary reason is that if I leave my front door unlocked and a rear window open and a
burglar takes advantage of my carelessness, the only one harmed is me, the architect
of my own victimization.478 This is not necessarily true for cybercrime: Assume that
instead of leaving my front door unlocked and a rear window open, I access the Internet
using an always-on broadband connection without using any security to prevent my
laptop’s being hijacked by a hacker.479 I have opened my laptop up to attack, which
creates a situation analogous to the burglary discussed above: I have carelessly
exposed myself to “harm” from a criminal. But I have also created the potential for
“harm” to others; my carelessness has created a situation in which a hacker can take
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over my laptop and use it to victimize other individuals and entities.480 This latter
scenario results in the infliction of incremental “harms” that exceed those which I would
suffer from any personal attack: A cybercriminal can use my laptop, along with other
hijacked laptops, to launch a denial of service attack on an online business or a
government website, shutting them down; to do this, the perpetrator requires access to
a critical mass of zombie computers, which I have helped to supply.481 The effects of
my carelessness will be particularly egregious if terrorists or organized criminals use my
laptop to attack my country’s infrastructure; it is at this point that victim defaults threaten
to jeopardize a system’s ability to sustain both internal and external order.482

The first, most compelling answer, to the question posed above, therefore, is that
responsibility for preventing cybercrimes should be imposed upon citizens because their
failure to secure their systems can result in the infliction of “harm” upon other members
of the social system to which they belong, and could even threaten the security of the
entire system. Another answer is that law enforcement is less effective in maintaining
order in cyberspace than it is in real-space: In the real-world example, police may well
apprehend the burglar who stole my property because he was seen by my neighbors,
because he left trace evidence in my house and/or because he came to their attention
when he tried to dispose of the property he took from me.483 In the online example, the
cyberperpetrator stands an excellent chance of avoiding apprehension, since he is able
to act remotely and anonymously, and since he has no need to risk identification and
apprehension if he elects to dispose of electronic property he acquired in the course of
his online depredations.484 Therefore, since (a) citizen lapses in security can endanger
others and (b) law enforcement cannot, alone, maintain order in cyberspace, citizens
should assume a measure of responsibility for maintaining order, just as they have done
in the past.485
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2.

How is responsibility to be imposed?

If responsibility for preventing cybercrime is to be imposed, it becomes necessary
to decide how that should be done. In deciding how this should be done, it is necessary
to consider two dichotomies. The first deals with how a social system goes about
achieving particular conduct on the part of its constituents: Conduct can be voluntary or
obligatory. In this context, voluntary conduct is conduct which the members of a social
system engage in because they believe that it is “right” or “appropriate.” Their belief that
particular conduct is “right” or “appropriate” (and, conversely, that other conduct is
“wrong” or “inappropriate”) is based on norms which the members of the social system
have internalized; this type of conduct is “voluntary” because it is the product of internal
social control mechanisms.486 Obligatory conduct, on the other hand, is the product of
external social control mechanisms. Obligatory conduct is conduct which the members
of a social system engage in or avoid engaging in because they understand that their
failure to conform their behavior to what is externally required can result in their being
sanctioned by that system to some greater or lesser degree.487 Obligatory conduct is
voluntary in the sense that a member of a social system decides whether or not he or
she will engage in the prescribed conduct; it is not “voluntary” in the sense used above
because the decision to behave in particular ways is prompted by the awareness of
externally-imposed consequences for one’s failure to do so.488

a)

Voluntary
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A voluntary approach to achieving citizen responsibility for preventing cybercrime
would require establishing a norm to that effect; once the members of a social system
had internalized this norm, they would regard preventing cybercrime as the “right” or
“appropriate” thing to do and would therefore endeavor to achieve this. How could such
a norm be established? The process would involve educating the populace of a social
system as to the need for preventative efforts; it could also educate them in the use of
tools that can reduce or eliminate the risk of cybercrime.489 It might appeal to their sense
of system loyalty by emphasizing the impact cybercrime can have upon the system’s
economy and the potential for external threats to system infrastructures.490 An approach
such as this would be the most effective way to achieve citizen prevention of cybercrime;
the most effective means of channeling behavior into desired paths is not the “imposition
of external sanction, but the inculcation of internal obedience.”491 The problem is that it
can take a long time to establish a norm and inculcate an optimum level of obedience.492
This is likely to be especially true for cybercrime prevention because the conduct to be
encouraged involves cyberspace, which is an alien environment for many members of
contemporary social systems. They may believe, particularly if they live in certain urban
neighborhoods, that it is advisable to install alarm systems and “burglar bars” to ensure
their safety from real-world threats,493 but they are unlikely to appreciate the very “real”
dangers that lurk in the virtual world of cyberspace.494 The difficulty of establishing this
norm is further exacerbated by the fact that it would, at least in part, have to displace a
deeply embedded norm, namely, that addressing actual or potential criminal activity is
the exclusive province of law enforcement.495 For these reasons, and others, a purely
voluntary approach is unlikely to be effective.496
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b)

Obligatory

This leaves the obligatory approach. An obligatory approach requires citizens to
conduct themselves in certain ways or face sanctions;497 the conduct required can take
the form either of acting or not-acting.498 An obligatory approach relies upon the law to
establish the obligation to act or not to act,499 which brings us to our second dichotomy.
Such laws are of two types: “do” laws and “do not” laws.500 “Do” laws impose an
obligation to act and sanctions for a failure to discharge that obligation;501 “do not” laws
impose an obligation not to act and sanctions for committing the proscribed act.502 The
laws used to implement an obligatory approach can be civil or criminal in nature;503 this
discussion will assume that the laws which are used to impose an obligation to prevent
cybercrimes impose criminal liability for failing to discharge that obligation.504 It makes
that assumption because criminal liability is generally more effective than civil liability in
encouraging citizens to conform their conduct to a prescribed standard.505 Use of that
assumption is also predicated on adapting certain principles of criminal liability for this
specific purpose.506

Before we can consider how principles of liability can be used for this purpose,
we must resolve the second dichotomy. That is, we must decide whether the obligatory
approach to achieving citizen participation in preventing cybercrime should be based on
a strategy utilizing “do” laws or on one utilizing “do not” laws.

A strategy utilizing “do” laws would impose an obligation upon citizens to prevent
cybercrime by taking measures to secure their computer systems and otherwise avoid
online victimization.507 A failure to discharge that obligation with the requisite degree of
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effectiveness would result in the imposition of a sanction, presumably a relatively minor
one.508 Seat-belt laws provide a useful point of comparison: By 2002, forty-nine states
and the District of Columbia had enacted such laws.509 They require the occupants of a
motor vehicle to use seat-belts when the vehicle is in operation and impose sanctions,
usually a fine, for failure to comply.510 Seat-belt laws impose a type of criminal liability,
since the sanction is a fine levied by the state,511 and they have proven effective in
increasing seat-belt use among American motorists.512 One might conclude from this
that a similar approach would prove effective in increasing American citizens’ efforts to
prevent cybercrime.

There are, however, important differences between the two types of security
measures; these differences mean that the approach which encouraged seat-belt use is
unlikely to encourage cybercrime prevention. For one thing, federal law required that all
vehicles manufactured after 1968 have seat belts, so when states began to require the
use of seat belts, they were installed and readily available.513 The duty imposed by the
seat-belt laws was consequently not an onerous one: to use a device that had already
been provided and that required no technical skill to implement. The duty imposed by
the hypothesized cybercrime prevention laws is far more complex: Among other things,
citizens would have to (a) identify and obtain the tools needed to protect their computers
from cyber-attacks; (b) educate themselves about these tools so they could install them,
utilize them and keep them updated; and (c) use these tools in an effective manner.514
Since computer software and hardware is constantly being modified, tasks (a) and (b)
would be ongoing obligations. One differentiating factor, therefore, is the relative
complexity of the duty being imposed.
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Another differentiating factor is the likelihood that law violators will be identified
and sanctioned. Both the seat-belt laws and the hypothesized cybercrime prevention
laws establish a duty and impose sanctions in an effort to deter what society regards as
“dangerous” behavior. The behavior to be deterred is, respectively, (a) not wearing seatbelts and thereby exposing oneself to a risk of injury and (b) not utilizing cybercrime
preventative measures and thereby exposing oneself, others and the social system to
cyber-attackers. The effectiveness of sanctions in deterring behavior is a function of the
risk (perceived risk) of being apprehended and sanctioned; the deterrent effect increases
as the risk (perceived risk) of being apprehended increases.515 Seat-belt laws apply to
conduct that occurs in public; consequently, it is not particularly difficult for police officers
to tell if someone is wearing a seat-belt. Indeed, this is something they can observe in
the course of carrying out their routine duties. This means the risk (perceived risk) of
being apprehended is high and that, coupled with the ease with which one can conform
one’s conduct to the requirements of the law, makes seat-belt laws an effective means
of deterring the conduct noted above. That would not be true of cybercrime prevention
laws. They would for the most part address conduct occurring in very private places -one’s home or office.516 This means that absent some method of remote monitoring
(which could raise Fourth Amendment issues),517 it would be difficult for those charged
with enforcing such laws to determine compliance. To do so, they would presumably
have to conduct location by location checks, which would be extremely labor-intensive
and intrusive. The consequent low risk (perceived risk) that violators would be identified
and apprehended, coupled with the difficulty of complying, means these hypothesized
cybercrime prevention laws would not be an effective means of securing citizen
collaboration in enhancing cybersecurity.518
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This leaves the final strategy: the use of “do not” laws. “Do not” laws impose an
obligation not to act and sanctions for committing the proscribed act.519 They may seem
a peculiar candidate for enlisting citizens in the fight against cybercrime, as they typically
proscribe committing a “crime.” Homicide laws (“do not take another person’s life”) and
theft laws (“do not take another person’s property) are examples of “do not” laws.520 It
seems, therefore, that laws of this type would be quite inapplicable to the undertaking at
hand: We are not, after all, talking about sanctioning citizens for committing cybercrime;
we are talking about sanctioning citizens for not preventing cybercrime.

Actually, “do not” laws fit quite nicely into the calculus we are endeavoring to
construct. One problem with using “do” laws to achieve this is that such an approach is
fundamentally inconsistent with how we approach criminal liability. We do not, as was
explained earlier, require citizens to prevent “crimes” in the real-world; this means that
an effort to impose a duty to prevent “crimes” in the cyberworld conflicts with norms and
expectations that are firmly embedded in our culture, as least as to real-world “crime.”521
Under the approach outlined earlier, we would impose a duty on citizens to take steps to
prevent their being victimized by cybercriminals and impose sanctions if they failed to do
so. This is inconsistent with the way we have traditionally approached criminal liability in
two ways: (a) we would impose an unprecedented obligation to prevent “crime;” and (b)
we would impose criminal liability for a failure to discharge that obligation even though
no “crime” has been committed. We would, in effect, be imposing liability for a failure to
prevent something that never happened. It is true that we impose criminal liability for
“crimes” that are not committed, but we require that there have been some steps taken
to accomplish a “crime” for such liability to be imposed.522
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The fact that the use of “do” laws to achieve citizen participation in the battle
against cybercrime would violate traditional practice is important not because it goes
against the way things have been done in the past. There is sometimes a lot to be said
for changing how we approach things. The inconsistency with current and past practice
is important because we are trying to use legal principles to establish a new pattern of
behavior; if legal rules are inconsistent with traditional expectations and understandings,
they are likely to meet with resistance.523 The hypothesized “do” laws would probably be
regarded as Draconian, intrusive and, given the public’s current lack of awareness of the
nature and extent of cybercrime threats, unnecessary.524 If we are to succeed in using
legal rules to un-do expectations about law enforcement’s responsibility for dealing with
“crime” and inculcate a sense of personal responsibility for preventing cybercrime, we
need to use an approach that does less violence to societal expectations. As the next
section explains, “do not” laws or, more properly, modified versions of traditional “do not”
laws, can form the basis of such an approach.525

B. Distributed Security526

[A] centralized system is not going to work. We have got to think
about distributed security.527

As the previous section explained, criminal rules that take the form of “do not”
laws can be used to inculcate a social climate in which citizens assume responsibility for
preventing cybercrime without violating implicit social expectations as to the proper use
and scope of criminal liability.528 The sections below demonstrate how laws of this type
can be used for that purpose; they examine two complementary possibilities.
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The first is a specialized expansion of accomplice liability; it allows the imposition
of criminal liability for conduct that promotes, facilitates or otherwise contributes to the
successful commission of a cybercrime or an attempt to commit a cybercrime. This is
essentially a “do not” law targeting affirmative conduct; it proscribes not the failure to
prevent cybercrime but the act of contributing to the commission of a cybercrime. The
distinction is important for two reasons: (1) it means criminal liability cannot be imposed
unless and until a cybercrime has been committed; and (2) it means liability is imposed
not for the act of becoming a victim (only) but for the consequential effect of contributing
to another’s victimization.529 This alternative avoids the “overkill” problem discussed in
the previous section: assessing criminal liability when no “crime” has been committed,
solicited or attempted.530 It is also consistent with traditional practice and preserves the
appearance of justice in predicating the imposition of liability upon the act of furthering a
crime against someone else; imposing criminal liability for the act of becoming a victim is
unlikely to be regarded as “fair” or “just.”

The second alternative imports an attenuated version of the assumption of risk
principle applied in tort law into criminal law. The purpose here is to negate citizens’
expectations that their victimization by cybercriminals will produce an effective reaction
on the part of law enforcement officers. The attenuated assumption of risk principle is a
way of emphasizing the need to protect oneself from the risks attendant upon venturing
into cyberspace. This alternative does not impose criminal liability upon victims and it
does not prevent the imposition of such liability upon their victimizers; it merely nullifies
the contemporary commonsense default assumption of official reaction and redress. It
operates as a correlate to the complicity principle: If Jane Doe ventures into cyberspace
without taking necessary precautions and becomes a victim (only), she has no right to
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expect “justice” in the form of sanctions imposed upon her victimizer; if she ventures into
cyberspace without taking necessary precautions, becomes a victim and, as a result of
the carelessness that resulted in her victimization, contributes to another’s victimization,
then Jane Doe can be held criminally liable for facilitating the consequent cybercrime.

1.

Complicity

As § IV(A)(1) explained, the goal of the alternatives discussed in this section and
subsequent sections is to realign responsibility for preventing cybercrime: shifting it from
the police (who prevent by reacting-apprehending-deterring offenders) to citizen users of
technology. The goal is to allow the imposition of criminal liability for failing to prevent
personal victimization that contributes to the commission of cybercrime against others.531

Complicity doctrines are an obvious choice for such an undertaking because they
impute liability for another’s criminal act to a non-actor (an accomplice) who facilitated
the criminal act.532 An accomplice who facilitates the commission of a “crime” can be
held criminally liable for that “crime,” just as if he actually committed it.533 Complicitous
liability is usually based on an accomplice’s performing an affirmative act, such as giving
a weapon to a would-be robber, but it can be based on a failure to act. Under the Model
Penal Code, one is an accomplice if “having a legal duty to prevent the commission of
the offense, [she] fails to make proper effort so to do.” 534 This doctrine of complicity-byomission has been used, for example, to hold parents liable for failing to prevent harm to
their children.535 For the doctrine to apply, the putative accomplice must have had a
legal duty to prevent the commission of the “crime;” a moral duty is not enough.536 Most
criminal codes require that an accomplice have acted “with the purpose of . . . facilitating
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the commission of the” target crime.” 537 There is some authority for the proposition that
accomplice liability can be imposed on those who knowingly facilitate the commission of
a “crime;”538 and general agreement that it cannot be predicated on reckless or negligent
conduct under U.S. law.539 Other codes are more lenient: The statute governing the
proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia imposes
complicity-by-omission liability upon commanders who recklessly or negligently failed to
prevent their subordinates from committing war crimes.540 This result is, as one author
noted, “troubling to national [legal] systems because they all subscribe to the general
principle that people should be held accountable according to their own actions and their
own mode of culpability.”541

The insistence on “intention” (i.e., purpose and, perhaps, knowledge) found in the
Model Penal Code and in domestic criminal codes is the product of two considerations:
One is a concern that “otherwise everyday lawful activities would be made perilous”;542 if
simple negligence sufficed for act-of-commission complicity, selling lawful products could
result in the imposition of criminal liability if the products were used to commit “crimes.”
The other consideration is “the belief that people's freedom to act within the law should
not be restrained by considerations of wrongs others might commit”; 543 in other words, I
should not be held liable for the intervening volitional act of one over whom I exercise no
command or control. This is what differentiates the “command complicity” found in the
statute governing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia from the
codes that govern average citizens; civilians, unlike military commanders, generally do
not have the authority to control the actions of others.544

At first glance, it might seem that complicity-by-omission liability for one’s failure
to prevent consequent victimization545 is quite an unacceptable prospect because it

86

Brenner – Distributed Security
violates certain basic tenets of accomplice liability: It imposes omission liability in the
absence of a legal duty to act; and it contravenes the two considerations noted above.
Actually, with some modifications complicity-by-omission liability can be used for this
purpose.

The first and most problematic hurdle is the conduct upon which liability is to be
predicated. If we use the Model Penal Code’s formulation of complicity, an omission
cannot support the imposition of complicitous liability unless a duty to act is imposed by
law;546 one solution to the difficulty noted above is, therefore, to establish a legal duty to
prevent oneself from becoming the victim of a cybercriminal.547 In establishing such a
duty, we must resolve two issues: (1) the scope of the duty; and (2) the extent of the
obligation one bears in discharging it. As to the first issue, it is sufficient and reasonable
to limit the duty to preventing one’s personal victimization; allowing myself to be attacked
is, after all, how I contribute to the victimization of others.548 This limited duty is sufficient
because if I protect my computer from attack, I thereby prevent its being used to attack
others; conversely, if I do not protect my computer from attack, I have created at least
the possibility that it can be used to attack others. Making this limited duty the predicate
for complicitous liability is reasonable because by failing to secure my computer I have
created the conditions a cybercriminal can exploit to victimize others;549 if a cybercriminal
takes advantage of the opportunity I have supplied, it is reasonable to hold me liable, at
least to some extent, for the resulting cybercrimes.550 As to the second issue, the duty
would have to specify the extent of the obligation one bears to avoid being victimized; it
could impose strict liability, which would make one categorically liable for consequent
victimization, but the more reasonable approach is to incorporate a negligence standard.
Strict liability would undermine the incentive to take precautions, since one would be
held liable for consequent victimization regardless of the efforts he took to avoid being
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personally victimized.551 Under a negligence standard, liability would be imposed for a
failure to take all precautions a reasonable person should have known were necessary
to protect the system(s) at issue;552 the determination as to whether particular measures
were necessary would have to include a temporal element, that is, it would have to focus
on contemporaneously available security measures.553

The imposition of such a duty is, in a sense, implementing a “do” rule under the
scheme outlined earlier;554it imposes an affirmative obligation to institute and maintain
security measures that are designed to fend off attacks by cybercriminals.555 This duty
differs from the implementation of a “do” rule, however, in that criminal liability is not
imposed for the mere failure to discharge the duty:556 If someone becomes the victim of
a cybercrime, she will not be held liable as an accomplice to her own victimization;557 the
sanction for her default in carrying out the duty to prevent cybercrime is that she will be
deemed to have assumed the risk of her own victimization.558 Criminal liability -- in the
form of complicity -- is imposed only if she fails to discharge her duty to prevent herself
from becoming the victim of a cybercrime and thereby contributes to the victimization of
another or others. This result is consistent with traditional principles of criminal liability
because she is being sanctioned for playing a causal role in the commission of a “crime”
against someone else.559

That brings us to the second hurdle: the considerations which have heretofore
dictated that accomplice liability must be based on “intentional” (purposeful or knowing)
conduct.560 We begin with the second consideration, as it is the more challenging of the
two. The second consideration dictates that we require purpose or at least knowledge
for the imposition of accomplice liability because doing otherwise runs the risk of holding
citizens liable for the intervening volitional act of one over whom they exercise neither
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command nor control.561 This may seem a fatal objection to the type of complicitous
liability postulated here: The scenario encompassed by this type of liability involves a
cybercriminal (X) who victimizes A and then uses his victimization of A to consummate
his victimization of B (and C and D and so on).562 It seems inconceivable that we should
hold A liable for this anonymous cyber-miscreant’s successful attacks on B (and C and D
. . . ).563 If we assume the most difficult scenario,564 in which A does not know X, has no
control over X’s actions and was merely negligent in not preventing X’s gaining access
to his computer, it seems we are holding A liable for nothing more than failing to prevent
a stranger of whose identity and activities he is ignorant and over whom he exercises no
control from attacking other strangers. This may, at first glance, seem as unreasonable
as holding a liquor store clerk liable as an accomplice if a customer to whom she sold a
bottle of whiskey uses it to (a) incapacitate a young woman whom he rapes or (b) enter
a state of gross intoxication in which he batters his wife to death.565

But there are important differences between the two: In the second scenario, the
clerk is being held liable for the purely volitional and consequently quite unforeseeable
“bad acts” of another human being, one whose predilections are entirely unknown to her.
The clerk has no capacity to control what the purchaser does after he leaves the store.
In the first scenario, A is being held liable not for failing to control X (which is impossible
given that A does not know X and has no authority to control X’s actions) but for failing to
prevent equipment and processes that are within A’s control from being attacked and
compromised to the detriment of others.566 We cannot hold A liable for what X does on
the theory that A should have prevented X from attacking others; but we can hold A
liable for giving X access to the tools he needs to victimize others by defaulting on his
obligation to prevent his computer system from being compromised.567 The latter theory
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is consistent with traditional accomplice liability in that A is held liable for contributing to
the success of the criminal venture.

Some may still find this outcome unpalatable, since it would result in A’s being
held liable for the cybercrimes X committed against B (and C and D . . . ).568 This is an
undeniably harsh result, which is no doubt why criminal law has historically insisted upon
purposive (or at least knowing) conduct as the basis for imposing accomplice liability.
The harshness of this result can be alleviated by implementing yet another modification:
Instead of holding A liable as an accomplice to X’s cybercrimes, A can be held liable as
a criminal facilitator of those crimes. New York and several other states have a separate
“criminal facilitation” offense; under these statutes, one who provides another with the
means and/or opportunity to commit a “crime” can be held liable as a facilitator of that
“crime.” 569 The difference between criminal facilitation and accomplice liability is that the
facilitator is not held liable for the “crimes” she promoted; she is instead held liable for
criminal facilitation, which can be a relatively minor offense.570 New York, for example,
divides criminal facilitation into four degrees: criminal facilitation in the first degree (a
class B felony);571 criminal facilitation in the second degree (a class C felony); 572
criminal facilitation in the third degree (a class E felony);573 and criminal facilitation in the
fourth degree (a class A misdemeanor).574 Criminal facilitation liability, or an analogue
thereof, could be used to impose criminal liability upon those who default on their duty to
avoid becoming a cybercriminal’s victim and thereby facilitate consequent victimization
without the harsh results entailed by employing accomplice liability for this purpose. The
sanctions for this kind of criminal facilitation of cybercrime575 should probably be a fine or
perhaps a fine coupled with another minor sanction, such as a restriction of access to
computers or the requirement that an offender take a course in cyber-security.576 True
accomplice liability could be reserved for those who purposefully or knowingly contribute
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to the commission of cybercrimes against other, and would permit the imposition of more
severe sanctions, such as incarceration.577

2. Assumption of Risk578

Criminal law does not require a blameless victim,579 but should things be different
in cyberspace? Should “assumption of risk” be incorporate into the criminal law that
governs cyberspace? Why would we consider doing such a thing? How would such an
option fit into the present discussion? Assumption of risk, after all, is a doctrine that bars
victims from obtaining redress – it negates liability, it does not impose it.

“A
ssumption of risk” could not be incorporated into criminal law as it is applied in
tort law. In tort, if one is found to have assumed the risk of harm that caused her injury,
she is barred from obtaining redress for the injury.580 If we were to import this notion
whole into the criminal law, the consequence would be that those who assumed the risk
of their victimization would be denied justice. The effect would be to give cybercriminals
a “Get out of jail free card” for victims who did not or could not protect themselves. This
result is unacceptable: One of the purposes of the criminal law is to maintain order by
protecting members of society, including the young, the disadvantaged and the elderly.

But what about incorporating the concept, not the tort rule? That is, what about
incorporating an assumption of risk principle that does not absolve the perpetrator of
liability for his or her crimes but can be used to underscore the fact that there may well
be no official redress for “harms” inflicted in cyberspace?
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There is no guarantee of redress for real-world “crime”. Prosecutors have always
declined to prosecute offenses that are brought to their attention.581 Real-world “crimes”
and cybercrimes differ, however, as to the factors that result in a lack of prosecution.
Declination decisions for real-world “crimes” are based on specific factors, such as a
prosecutor’s doubt that an accused is guilty, an accused’s cooperation in apprehending
others, the extent of the harm caused by the offense and the likelihood of prosecution in
another jurisdiction. In these instances, prosecution is declined because a prosecutor
has determined it would be unjust or unnecessary; the declination decision represents a
considered decision not to prosecute when prosecution is a viable option. Prosecution
is, however, often not an option for cybercrimes because of the difficulties involved in
apprehending cybercriminals.582 This is the critical difference: Declination decisions are
a sign that the justice system is functioning effectively as to real-world “crime”; having
the ability to prosecute, it chooses not to. The justice system’s inability to prosecute
cybercrime, on the other hand, is an indicator that it is not functioning effectively in this
area. Since this state of affairs will continue, if not worsen, we need to ensure citizens
realize that when they venture into cyberspace they enter an insecure environment in
which the implicit guarantees of redress applicable to the real-world no longer apply;
they must therefore become the guarantors of their own safety online.

An attenuated assumption of risk principle could be used to accomplish this.
Such a principle would include two components: (1) a proposition negating the current
default expectation of an effective law enforcement reaction to victimization; and (2) a
declaration that the negation of such a generalized expectation does not prevent the
investigation and prosecution of cybercriminals. It might look something like this:
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(1) One who [understanding the risk of harm to self or property] accesses or
employs cyberspace to engage in commercial or other activity without having
taken all reasonable, available measures to protect herself and her property from
being victimized by online criminal actors during the course of and with regard to
any matters related to such activity shall be deemed to have assumed the risk of
that victimization. Such a victim should report the offense(s) to the appropriate
law enforcement agency. The filing of such a report in no way obligates the
agency to investigate or otherwise pursue the matter; domestic law enforcement
agencies have full discretion to determine what, if any, action will be taken as the
result of their receiving such a report. Law enforcement agencies are under no
obligation to take action with regard to offenses targeting those who assumed the
risk of becoming a victim online, though they may do so.

(2) The fact that a person or entity assumed the risk of being victimized pursuant to
paragraph (1), above, creates no enforceable rights in the party or parties who
are in any way responsible for that victimization. The principles set forth in
paragraph (1), above, cannot be used as an affirmative defense in a prosecution
for offenses committed against one who assumed the risk of being so victimized
and they in no way restrain law enforcement’s ability to initiate the investigation
and prosecution of those responsible for such offenses.

The bracketed language in the first paragraph creates the option of structuring
the principle so that one must understand the risk he/she assumes; this is a traditional
component of the tort law principle.583 If the criminal law principle is to achieve the
desired result, however, it must impose strict liability. The assumption of risk must arise
from the act of venturing into cyberspace without having taken adequate precautions;
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knowledge of the risk being assumed should not be required because the purpose is to
encourage citizens to learn about risks and take steps to avoid them. Incorporating
knowledge of the risk nullifies the efficacy of the principle without increasing the fairness
of the result. The tort principle incorporates knowledge of the risk assumed because the
consequence of assuming a civilly-defined risk is that the victim loses the right to seek
redress for resulting injuries; requiring notice is therefore a matter of simple fairness.584
In the criminal context, the victim loses, at most, the expectation of a law enforcement
response to her victimization; since this expectation may be quite unrealistic, the victim
actually “loses” nothing. The assumption of a criminally-defined risk does not bar the
victim from seeking damages in a civil action brought against an appropriate party, nor
does it preclude the apprehension and prosecution of the victimizer. It merely negates
the supposition that one’s victimization triggers an entitlement to a law enforcement
response that is instantaneous and efficacious.

This is where assumption of risk fits into the model being explored in this article.
As explained earlier, the goal is to recruit citizens into the battle against cybercrime by
encouraging them to take all necessary and available steps to prevent their being the
target of a cybercriminal. The complicity principle discussed in the previous section
does this by imposing a different kind of assumption of risk -- the risk of criminal liability
for facilitating a cybercrime.585 This type of liability will be reserved for egregious cases; it
is neither reasonable nor possible to impose accomplice liability upon everyone whose
negligence somehow promotes the commission of a cybercrime.586 The assumption of
risk principle, however, applies automatically to anyone who becomes the victim of a
cybercriminal; it requires no law enforcement effort to implement, does not affirmatively
impose liability upon victims but it can serve to underscore the risks attendant upon
venturing into cyberspace without taking the necessary precautions.
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The goal is to make it clear to citizens that their victimization will be, at most, a
low priority for law enforcement. This merely reflects what is already occurring: Police
cannot, for example, seek justice for everyone who foolishly sent someone, somewhere,
$45 for a Beanie Baby that was advertised on eBay but never delivered (and probably
never existed).587 Police and prosecutors know cases like this stand no chance of being
prosecuted but have no viable way to communicate this to the public. In a system that
assumes the effectiveness of the traditional, reactive model of law enforcement, it would
not be a wise career move for a county prosecutor to inform his constituents that if they
are victimized in certain ways while online, his office will not pursue those cases. An
attenuated assumption of risk principle such as the one set out above could be used to
make the public understand the risks they face online and their evolving responsibility to
prevent their victimization.

V.

Conclusion

“. . . public power into private hands. . . .”588

The premise driving the alternatives presented in § IV(B) is that the only way to
effectively address cyber-threats is through a system of distributed security; this system
of distributed security supplements the traditional reactive approach to criminal activity,
at least as to cybercrime.589 The goal of a system of distributed security is to adopt or
modify rules so as to create incentives for users of computer technology to ensure a
baseline, minimal level of safety as to the technologies they use. It is a “bottom-up,”
rather than a “top-down,” approach to cybersecurity;590 it uses lateral rules that specify
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options and consequences to encourage the development of new behaviors among the
general populace.

Distributed security is a necessary consequence of the continuing evolution and
proliferation of technology. The traditional model of law enforcement is the product of an
era when nation-states ruled supreme; nation-states are defined by and primarily
operate within specific territorial boundaries. Nation-states maintain internal order by
implementing the constitutive and proscriptive rules discussed earlier;591 they maintain
external order by protecting their citizens from “outside” threats, which have historically
been encroachments by other nation-states.592 The primary challenges nation-states
have heretofore faced are, therefore, internal “crime” and external warfare; they deal
with both challenges by monopolizing power, or force. Internally, nation-states set up
hierarchical organizations (“police”) to which they delegate a measure of authority and
the ability to use force against citizens who threaten internal order by committing
“crimes” within the nation-state’s physical boundaries; these organizations maintain
internal order by reacting to threatened and completed “crimes.”593 The reaction is
assumed to maintain order by (a) removing the authors of disorder (actual or attempted)
and (b) using their removal to deter them and others from engaging in similar activity.594
This system works reasonably well as long as “crime” is domestic “crime;” once “crime”
begins to bleed across territorial boundaries, the effectiveness of this approach begins to
erode.595

Cyberspace transcends territorial boundaries and consequently erodes the basic
assumption animating this model of law enforcement, namely, that policing organizations
can exert a sufficient measure of control over deviant behaviors within a nation-state’s
populace to maintain internal order.596 Cyberspace lets external actors threaten internal
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order by committing “crimes” against the members of a nation-state’s populace; 597 it also
lets internal actors evade or overwhelm the efforts of traditional policing organizations.598
Both trends are already apparent; the effects of both will become more pronounced as
technology continues to evolve. It therefore becomes necessary to move from the old
state-monopolized-reactive model to a new model, at least as to technologicallyfacilitated crime.599 This requires a shift in emphasis -- from deterrence to prevention. It
also requires distributing a substantial part of the responsibility for prevention among the
members of a nation-state.600 It requires, in effect, shifting from a model of security
analogous to the Maginot Line strategy that proved so disastrous for the French in World
War II601 to a model in which the obligation to resist and avoid cyber-threats is pervasive
throughout a society.602

Shifting to this new model requires altering the focus of criminal law with regard
to conduct involving the use of computer technology. Traditionally, criminal law has
focused on perpetrators only. It has operated on the premise that targeting perpetrators
for retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and, at some moments in history, rehabilitation
is an effective way of maintaining internal order in a society. This premise gave rise to
the traditional, reactive model of law enforcement which has proved sufficient, or at least
has been perceived as sufficient, for dealing with real-world “crime.”

The concept of a criminal law for cyberspace proposed in this article focuses
both on the advertent perpetrators of cybercrimes and on citizens who inadvertently but
nevertheless contribute to the commission of online “crimes.”603 The perpetrator rules
remain essentially the same (so far, anyway). The citizen rules focus on the victims of
cybercrimes, dividing them into two categories: “mere” victims and victim-facilitators.
Both, in a sense, assume the consequences attendant on their victimization: “mere”
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victims assume the “harm” resulting from their victimization, as they have no cognizable
expectation that the social system will seek redress for that “harm”; victim-facilitators
assume the risks both of the “harm” resulting from their personal victimization and of
criminal liability for facilitating consequent victimization resulting from their failure to
protect themselves from cyberattacks.

This new model does not shift the obligation to prevent cybercrime entirely to
citizens. The public sector – the nation-state – still has a role in this model of online law
enforcement. Its obligation is to:

•

monitor cyberspace in an effort to identify cybercrime patterns;604

•

impose liability on cybercrime perpetrators and facilitators; 605

•

pursue cybercriminals to the extent possible, prioritizing the pursuit by (a) the
systemic harm inflicted or threatened by specific cybercrimes; (b) the scale of
cybercrimes committed by particular perpetrators; 606 (c) attacks on those who did
not assume the risk of being victimized;607 and (d) attacks on those who did
assume the risk of being victimized; 608

•

develop and encourage the development of increasingly sophisticated security
measures;609 and

•

promote the distribution of security measures and citizen training in their
implementation.610

In discharging their obligation to avoid becoming the victims of cybercrime,
individuals may find it advantageous to affiliate with commercial or non-commercial
entities as a way of ensuring security for their online activities. One can see cyberspace,
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at least for the foreseeable future, as analogous to the world of the early Middle Ages: a
world in which there were no nation-states to establish order over segments of territory
and therein create a generally secure environment. Medieval citizens coped with this
lack of internal order by grouping together in towns, cities and fortresses for security.611
Something similar may evolve online; individuals and their families could use secure
portals provided by collective entities as their gateways to cyberspace.612 The collective
entities would assume the obligation of ensuring users the level of security necessary to
prevent their being victimized while online (which would negate both victim assumption
of risk and victim-facilitator liability).613 Employees might, for instance, use a corporate
employer’s system as their individual (and family) portal to cyberspace; the benefit for
the employees would be that they could use the corporate entity’s presumably superior
security systems instead of trying to protect themselves severally. This could perhaps
become a benefit of employment, available either gratis or for a relatively modest fee.614
Similarly, access via secure portals could be offered by government entities, educational
institutions, commercial services and religious or other groups. A potential downside of
this alternative is that these portals could provide tempting targets for cybercriminals – a
readily identifiable collection of potential victims. This should not, however, prove to be
a major problem: The portals would offer sophisticated technical security measures that
should protect their users from cyber-attacks; they could also provide educational and
informational programs to help their users avoid becoming the victims of online scams
and other lapses in judgment.615

It is, of course, a perilous undertaking to speculate as to how human collectivities
will organize themselves in the future. From the vantage point of the early twenty-first
century, it seems clear that a system of distributed security is a superior way to address
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cyber-threats. Indeed, as technology continues its advance, we may conclude, as one
expert noted, that “the monopolization of policing by government is an aberration.”616
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ENDNOTES
1

Grahame F. Thompson, Between Hierarchies & Markets: The Logic and Limits of Network

Forms of Organization 120 (2003) (listing the features of an “institution”).
2

“Cybercrime” is not a distinct type of crime, such as rape or murder; “cybercrime” denotes the

use of computer technology to achieve illegal ends. See Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a
Thing as Virtual Crime?, 4 California Criminal Law Review 1 (2001),
http://boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm. “Cybercrime” essentially encompasses two types of
unlawful activity: The first consists of conduct that targets a computer or a computer system;
attacks on networks -- hacking, denial of service attacks, and virus dissemination-- fall into this
category. See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About Computer Crime, 10
HARVARD J. LAW & TECH. 465, 468-469 (1997),
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/10hjolt465.html. Conduct of this type is usually the subject of
“new” criminal prohibitions, even though it is for the most part functionally analogous to prohibited
conduct found in the real, physical world. See Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime,
supra. The second type of activity constituting “cybercrime” consists of using technology to
commit traditional crimes such as theft, fraud, and forgery; here, the perpetrator uses the
computer as a tool, in the same way criminals use guns or motor vehicles. See, e.g., Brenner, Is
There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra. See also Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care
About Computer Crime, supra.

“Cybercrime” can also denote a third use of computer technology: Computers can play
an incidental role in the commission of a traditional offense, such as when a blackmailer uses a
computer to generate blackmail letters (or e-mails) or a drug dealer uses a spreadsheet program
to track his drug purchases and sales. See also Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About
Computer Crime, supra. Though scenarios such as these do not represent “true” varieties of
cybercrime, they do pose challenges for law enforcement; if nothing else, they contribute to the
enormous amount of investigativework that will eventually become part of most, if not all, criminal
cases. See infra § III.
3

As used in this article, “a model of law enforcement” denotes the institutions and processes

employed to enforce the criminal law in place in a social system. See infra note 6. See also infra
§ II(A)(2)(c) & § II(B)(2).
4

This proposition is developed in more detail in §§ II & III, infra.
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5

See infra § II.

6

For an explanation of “order,” see § II(A)(1), infra. See, e.g., The President's Commission on

Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967):

Any criminal justice system is an apparatus society uses to enforce the standards
of conduct necessary to protect individuals and the community. It operates by
apprehending, prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing those members of the
community who violate the basic rules of group existence. The action taken
against lawbreakers is designed to serve three purposes. . . . It removes
dangerous people from the community; it deters others from criminal behavior;
and it gives society an opportunity to attempt to transform lawbreakers into lawabiding citizens.

See also Mark H. Moore & Margaret Poethig, The Police as an Agency of Municipal Government:
Implications for Measuring Police Effectiveness in National Institute of Justice, Measuring What
Matters: Proceedings from the Policing Research Institute Meetings (1999),
http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles1/170610-3.txt.

[P]olice, prosecutors, courts, and correctional agencies [are] constituent
parts of a criminal justice system. . . . [T]heir operations are linked in a specific
process: the handling of criminal cases. The process begins with the allegation of
a criminal offense, proceeds through an investigation to the arrest of suspects,
progresses to the formal charging and prosecution of those arrested, and . . .
concludes with the adjudication and disposition of the cases. . . . .

This view of the police as the crucial first step . . . meshes . . . with . . .the
`professional law enforcement model’ of policing. . . . [T]he fundamental goal of
the police is to reduce crime by enforcing the criminal law. They do so largely by
arresting . . . offenders. To . . . produce arrests, they rely on three key operations:
(1) patrolling public spaces, (2) responding to calls from citizens, and (3)
investigating crimes.

Id. (citing The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, supra).

As the excerpts quoted above demonstrate, a “model of law enforcement” can include not
only the processes that are used to investigate “crimes” and apprehend criminals, but also those
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that are used to adjudicate guilt and impose sanctions. The “model of law enforcement” used in
this article focuses only on (a) the rules that define behaviors as “criminal” and (b) the processes
law enforcement officers use to prevent “crimes” and to pursue and apprehend criminals.
7

See § II, infra.

8

See, e.g., The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, supra (“For example, the American system

was not designed with Cosa Nostra-type criminal organizations in mind, and it has been notably
unsuccessful to date in preventing such organizations from preying on society”). See generally
infra § II.
9

See, e.g., Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1335, 1335 (1992)

(arguing that United States law has employed five different conceptions of “privacy” “with
historical jolts or `catalysts’ producing new brands of privacy when existing law is incapable of
dealing with unexpected societal and technological changes”).
10

See § III, infra. “Social reality” is the “humanly produced, constructed objectivity” which the

members of a given society experience as “real.” See Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The
Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge 51-55 (1966). See also
infra § II(A)(2).

This article focuses on the challenges cybercrime poses for law enforcement because
cybercrime is, so far, the most commonly-encountered variety of technologically-mediated crime,
i.e., crime which exploits the technologies that are proliferating and/or emerging in the twenty-first
century. It is true that many technologies antedate the twenty-first century, and it is equally true
that these technologies can be and have been exploited for illegal purposes. Telephone fraud,
for instance, is a type of technologically-mediated crime but neither telephone fraud nor criminal
activity exploiting other older types of technology creates the kind of challenges that result from
the use of these new technologies. See § III, infra.

While the unlawful exploitation of other technologies is in its infancy, it is reasonable to
infer that other varieties of techno-crime will create challenges similar to those produced by the
use of computer technology. See § III, infra. It is, therefore, also reasonable to infer that much of
the analysis presented in the text will apply with equal force to as-yet-to-emerge varieties of
techno-crime.
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11

See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model of Law

Enforcement, __ Rutgers Computer & Technology Law Journal ___ (2003). This proposition is
developed in more detail in § III, infra. As § III explains, a new approach is required for dealing
with cybercrime; the current model works satisfactorily with regard to traditional, real-world crime.
12

See § III, infra.

13

The new model should, with some modifications, be able to address the operational challenges

resulting from the exploitation of other new technologies for unlawful ends. See supra note 10.
14

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

15

As an example, the model that was in effect until roughly the middle of the nineteenth century

did not include “police practices” because it consigned law enforcement to private citizens:

Law enforcement in the Founders' time was a duty of every citizen. Citizens were
expected to be armed and equipped to chase suspects on foot, on horse, or with
wagon whenever summoned. And when called upon to enforce the laws of the
state, citizens were to respond `not faintly and with lagging steps, but honestly
and bravely and with whatever implements and facilities [were] convenient and at
hand.’ Any person could act in the capacity of a constable without being one. . . .

The Founders could not have envisioned 'police' officers as we know them today.
The term `police’ . . . . was generally used as a verb and meant to watch over or
monitor the public health and safety. . . . Only in the mid-nineteenth century did
the term 'police' begin to take on the persona of a uniformed state law enforcer.

Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 685, 692-693 (2001) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Barrington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928)).
See also § III, infra. The law in effect in the colonies and in the early American Republic imposed
duties on citizens that derived from an older system, which is described in § II(B)(2)(b), infra.
16

Thomas Hobbes, Of Man, Being the First Part of Leviathan, Chapter XIII ¶ 9 (1909),

http://www.bartleby.com/34/5/13.html.
17

See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal

Conduct in Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. 3, 56
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http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.pdf. See also ROLLIN
M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 5 (3d ed. 1982).
18

See, e.g., Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal

Conduct in Cyberspace, supra, 2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. at 56. For a discussion of what a social
system must do to maintain an acceptable level of internal order, see infra § II(A)(2)(c).
19

See infra § II(B)(2).

20

New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Trends in Case and Defendant Characteristics, and

Criminal Court Processing and Outcomes, of Prosecuted Arrests for Misdemeanor and LesserSeverity Offenses in New York City 1 (2001), http://www.nycja.org/research/reports/fnrpt.pdf.
21

See, e.g., Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 17 (1960). See also Black’s Law
th

Dictionary 1028 (Rev. 4 ed. 1968) (defining “law” as “[a] rule or method according which
phenomena or actions co-exist or follow each other”) & infra note 22.
22

th

See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1496 (Rev. 4 ed. 1968) (defining “rule” as “a principle or

regulation prescribing or directing action or forbearance”).
23

See, e.g., Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the “Relative Autonomy” of Law, 19 Cardozo L. Rev.

1987, 2007-2008 (1998) (German sociologist Niklas Luhmann describes the legal system as a
binary code specifying positive and negative values, i.e., “legal” and “illegal” actions).
24

See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities and

Software 29-40, 53-57 (2001); John H. Holland, Emergence: From Chaos to Order 1-2 (1998);
John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals 72-92 (1980).
25

See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 53-57 (pattern recognition software); John H.

Holland, Emergence, supra, at 53-80 (checkers). Some games – like simple board games – do
not really conform to the model of self-organizing collective systems advanced in the text above,
since they generally only involve a few participants and since each discrete system (each “game)
only last for a very short period of time. Structurally, however, more complex games do begin to
resemble the model; many online games, for example, involve thousands of players and continue
for months or years.

See, e.g., Ultima Online, http://www.uo.com/ (online game); Origin

Systems, Inc., http://www.origin.ea.com/ (four years after it was launched, Ultima Online has
225,000 players from countries around the world).
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26

See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition

and Collaboration (1997) (noting evolution from informal norms to formal laws).
27

See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 29-40, 53-57 (ants, human cities, software).

The concept of self-organizing systems emerged in biology to describe structure, such as ant
colonies and schools of fish, in which “pattern and organization develop through interactions
internal to the system, that is, without the intervention of external influences such as a `leader’
who directs or oversees the process.” Scott Camazine, Self-Organizing Systems, Encyclopedia
of Cognitive Sciences, http://www.cognitivescience.net/s00644.pdf. See also Steven Johnson,
Emergence, supra, at 17-20. See, e.g., Carl Anderson, Self-Organization in Relation to Several
Similar Concepts: Are the Boundaries to Self-Organization Indistinct?, 202 Biol. Bull. 247-255
(2002), http://www.isye.gatech.edu/~carl/papers/BoundariestoSO.pdf:

Consider the collective movement of a school of fish. The school snakes through
the water like a single entity, turning in unison, waves of activity flashing across
the shoal. This group-level behavior is not encoded within each individual, nor is
there a leader or small group of individuals directing the movement of the school.
It is a process whereby individual fish react to movements of their immediate
neighbors, and, as a result of such local interactions, the grouplevel pattern of
activity emerges spontaneously . . . in short, the school is self-organized.

Id. at 248 (citations omitted). The principle of self-organization (or “emergent behavior) has since
evolved to encompass a variety of systems, including human societies and organizations. See,
e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra:

What features do all these systems share? . . . . They are bottom-up systems,
not top-down. . . . [T]hey are complex adaptive systems that display emergent
behavior. . . . [A]gents residing on one scale start producing behavior that lies
one scale above them: ants create colonies; urbanites create neighborhoods;
simple pattern-recognition software learns how to recommend new books. The
movement from low-level rules to higher-level sophistication is . . .l emergence.

Id. at 18. See also Grahame F. Thompson, Between Hierarchies & Markets: The Logic and
Limits of Network Forms of Organization 129-135 (2003).
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This article uses the phrase “self-organizing collective systems” to emphasize its focus on
systems that are made up of many (tens, hundreds, thousands, millions) of discrete parts, each of
which has the ability to act autonomously, at least within certain boundaries. See, e.g., M. Luck,
S. Monroe & M. d’Inverno, Autonomy: Variable and Generative in Agent Autonomy 9-22 (H.
Hexmoor, C. Castelfranchi & R. Falcone, eds. 2003),
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~mml/papers/autonomy03.pdf. Later sections of the article use the
terms “society” and “social system” to denote self-organizing collective systems comprised of
human beings.

A “system” is a “group of interacting, interrelated or interdependent elements” that form a
th

complex whole. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4 ed. 2001),
http://www.bartleby.com/61/12/C0611200.html. See, e.g., Michael van de Kerchove, The Legal
System Between Order and Disorder 5-6 (1993):
[T]he notion of system appears . . . to require the uniting . . . of a set of elements.
. . . These elements may be not only of a very different nature, between one
system and another, but also of a different nature within a single system.
Moreover, it is perfectly possible for these elements themselves to constitute
subsystems, uniting in their turn more elementary entities. . . .
The notion of system therefore appears to imply the existence of specific
relations between these elements and not their simple juxtaposition; it supposes .
. . the existence of an ordered or organized totality: that is, the existence of
bonds of interdependence, interaction, and solidarity among the system's
components. Thus, at this level the central idea is that of order or organization.
Finally, the notion of system appears to imply . . . unity. . . . [U]nity . . . involves
both . . . differentiation from the exterior and . . . identity, which makes it possible
to determine both the elements that belong and those that do not belong. . . This
unity . . . is based . . . on . . . principless governing the relations among the . . .
constitutive elements. . . The essential idea . . . is therefore that of structure.
(notes omitted). A simple system is composed of only a few elements; complex systems are
composed of many elements. See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 47-48. See also
Michael van de Kerchove, The Legal System Between Order and Disorder, supra, at 5-6.
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The elements, or agents, that comprise a system can be autonomous or nonautonomous. See infra §II(A)(2). A non-autonomous agent “either depends on others or is an
automaton”; an autonomous agent can, but need not depend on others. See, e.g., M. Luck, S.
Monroe & M. d’Inverno, Autonomy: Variable and Generative, supra. An autonomous agent has
the capacity to choose between two courses of action, even if the choices involve a very low level
of abstraction. See, e.g., Bertil Ekdahl, How Autonomous Is an Autonomous Agent? (2001),
http://www.cs.lth.se/home/Bertil_Ekdahl/publications/HAisanAA.pdf. See also infra §II(A)(2).
The capacity for autonomous behavior is typical of, though not exclusive to, systems populated
by biological entities. An ant, for example, can act autonomously in carrying out a set of basic
behaviors the instructions for which are genetically programmed; specific behaviors are triggered
by environmental conditions, pheromonal signals and, in some species, at least, tactile
communication with other ants. See, e.g., John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals
77-86 (1980). See also Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 30-33, 73-80; Edward O. Wilson,
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis 397-415 (2000). The ant is not acting independently, that is, is
not exercising individual judgment and deciding what its next action should be; but it is acting
autonomously in the sense that it can modify its behavior if circumstances so require. See infra
§II(A)(2).
28

th

See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4 edition 2000),

http://www.bartleby.com/61/3/O0110300.html (defining “order” as “[a] condition of methodical or
prescribed arrangement among component parts such that proper functioning or appearance is
th

achieved”). Cf. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (10 ed.), http://www.m-w.com (defining
“chaos” as “ a state of things in which chance is supreme”).
29

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 37-62. Systems populated by artificial

entities must also ensure the continuation of the entities of which they are comprised. The steps
they take to accomplish this may, however, differ from those that are characteristic of systems
populated by biological agents. Systems populated by artificial entities will no doubt find it
necessary to replace members of their population (as they fail or become hopelessly outdated),
but the replacement process will presumably not include a period of maturation and socialization
comparable to that required for biological entities. See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra,
at 58-63 (describing the evolution of software able to simulated the trail navigation abilities of
ants).

The conditions stated above are the threshold requirements for the sustainability of
biological systems composed of non-intelligent entities. As is explained below, the rise of
intelligence adds an additional requirement to this list.
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30

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 399 (three basic castes found in ants:

queen, worker and soldier). See also John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals,
supra, at 79-81 (castes among ants and other social insects). Environmental triggers can cause
social insects to manifest behaviors other than those that are their basic assignment. See, e.g.,
Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 30-31 (describing how, among harvester ants, interior
workers will carry their queen to the colony’s “escape hatch” at the first sign of disturbance).
31

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 245 (describing strategies Scottish ant

colonies use to obtain the “warmest nest sites,” i.e., gradual encroachment on a competitor’s
nest, occupation of sites abandoned by competitor colonies and siege warfare). While this is, so
far, less common, the same dynamic can be found among non-biological agents; artificial entities
comprising one system can either attack the members of another system or compete with them
for necessary resources. See, e.g., Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, Growing Artificial
Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up (1996). See also Gordon Christopher Zaft, Social
Science Applications of Discrete Event Simulation: A DEVs Artificial Society (2001),
http://www.zaft.org/gordon/XeriScape/Thesis.pdf. The discussion in the text uses biological
examples because the vast majority of our experience is with biologically-based systems.
32

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 245 (war) and 139-142 (creation of new

ant and termite colonies).
33

See, e.g., Michael Schillo, et al., Self-Organization in Multi-Agent Systems: From Agent

Interaction to Agent Organization in Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on
Modelling Artificial Societies and Hybrid Organizations 37 (2002), http://www.ki.informatik.huberlin.de/~lindeman/Masho-rcsia-etp-proceedings.pdf:

[T]heoretical approaches . . . call any kind of system self-organizing if it is able to
determine its internal structure by itself as the environment changes. The
boundaries of a self-organizing system and its structure . . . are not determined
by environmental factors. Rather, these systems generate, change and adapt
their internal organization within their own logic in a dynamic process to cope
with environmental changes.
34

See, e.g., Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control 3 (1966):
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[I]f human beings are to do business with one another, there must be rules, and
people must be able to assume that, by and large, these rules will be observed.

Whatever people want--food, clothing, shelter, sex, fame, contract bridge-they
must get it by working with and through other people. They must take up
positions in organized and complex social enterprises: families, clubs, schools,
armies, political associations, ball teams. Each of these may be thought of as a
way of fitting together the diverse actions of many people so that the work of the
world gets done. But if the actions of many people are to be fitted together, there
must be understandings about who is supposed to do what and under which
circumstances. . . . [T]he first prerequisite to organized human activity is that
there be some understandings, however arbitrary they may be. For example, if
traffic is to move along the highway, it is less important whether the rule
prescribes that people must drive on the right-hand side or the left-hand side of
the road then that there be a rule. The alternative is chaos.

(emphasis in the original). See also infra §II(A)(2)(c). Even the aggregation of slime mold cells
into colonies, which represents one of the simplest forms of a self-organizing collective system,
follows certain rules. See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 12-17 (citing slime mold
cells as an example of how “simple agents following simple rules” can “generate amazingly
complex structures). See also Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 387-392.
35

See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 120-121:

The intelligence of a harvester ant colony derives from the densely
interconnected feedback between ants that encounter each other and change
their behavior according to pre-ordained rules. Without that feedback, they’d be
a random assemblage of creatures butting heads and moving on, incapable of
displaying the complex behavior that we’ve come to expect. . . .
36

Francis Heylighen & Donald T. Cambell, Selection of Organization at the Social Level:

Obstacles and Facilitators of Metasystem Transitions § 2.5, 45 World Futures: The Journal of
General Evolution 181 (1995), http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Papers/SocialMST.pdf.
37

See supra § II(A)(1).

38

See supra § II(A)(1).
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39

See generally supra note 27.

40

See, e.g., Thomas M. Georges, Digital Soul: Intelligent Machines and Human Values 58

(2003):

[I]t is useful to recognize as intelligent certain kinds of behavior, regardless of the
package it comes in—be it human, animal, . . . or machine. We recognize that
intelligent behavior is multidimensional, that is, not measurable along a single . . .
scale. We distinguish between linguistic, mathematical, musical, kinesthetic,
spatial, logical, interpersonal, and emotional intelligence, to name a few.

See also John McCarthy, What Is Artificial Intelligence?, KurzweilAI.net (2001),
http://www.kurzweilai.net/articles/art0088.html?printable=1 (“Intelligence is the computational part
of the ability to achieve goals in the world. Varying kinds and degrees of intelligence occur in
people, many animals and some machines”).
41

See, e.g., W.C. Stirling & R.L. Frost, Intelligence with Attitude in National Institute of Standards

and Technology, Proceedings of the Performance Metrics for Intelligent Systems Workshop § 1.4
(2000),
http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/research_areas/research_engineering/PerMIS_Workshop/Part%20II_
Section%201.pdf:

The ability to make decisions is essential to intelligent behavior. Indeed, the
word intelligent comes from the Latin roots inter (between) + legere (to choose).
We thus assume that there is only one essential characteristic of intelligence in
man or machine—an ability to choose between alternatives.

See generally supra note 27.
42

See, e.g., Jane M. Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf (L.D. Mech &

L. Boitani, eds. 1998), http://canis.tamu.edu/wfscCourses/Concepts/Packa98.html (“Intelligence is
the ability to apply knowledge from previous experience to solving novel problems”). See also
Measuring Performance and Intelligence of Systems with Autonomy: Metrics for Intelligence of
Constructed Systems in National Institute of Standards and Technology, Proceedings of the
Performance Metrics for Intelligent Systems Workshop § 1.4 (2000),
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http://www.isd.mel.nist.gov/research_areas/research_engineering/PerMIS_Workshop/Part%20I%
20White%20Paper.pdf; Soar, Soar: A Functional Approach to General Intelligence,
http://www.eecs.umich.edu/~soar/docs/SoarFunctionalOverview.pdf.
43

While we tend to associate “intelligence” with an “individual,” i.e., a discrete organism, some

species exhibit a collective intelligence. See infra notes 58 - 62 & accompanying text.
44

See, e.g., Gregory J. Smith & John S. Gero,The Autonomous, Rational Design Agent in

Workshop on Situatedness in Design: Artificial Intelligence in Design 19-23 (H. Fujii, ed. 2000),
http://www.arch.su.edu.au/%7Ejohn/publications/2000/SmithGeroAIDWkshp.pdf (“An agent is
called autonomous if its beliefs and behaviour are determined from its own
experience”). See also Intelligent Autonomous Systems,
http://www.science.uva.nl/research/ias/ (“The IAS group studies methodologies
to create intelligent autonomous systems, which perceive their environment
through sensors and use that information to generate intelligent, goal-directed
behaviour”).

See also supra note 27.
45

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 382-386. See also John T. Bonner, The

Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 72-77.
46

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 26-27. Professor Wilson defines instinct

as an “innate behaviorial difference between . . . two species. . . that is based at least in part on a
genetic difference”. Id. at 26 (“We then speak of differences in the hereditary component of the
behavior pattern, or of innate differences in behavior”). He also notes that instinct is “a behavior
pattern that . . . is subject to relatively little modification in the lifetime or the organism, or varies
very little throughout the population, or . . . both.” Id. See also John T. Bonner, The Evolution of
Culture in Animals, supra, at 73; Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 387-393.
47

See, e.g., Jennifer Golbeck, Unintelligent Swarming for Robust Exploratory Systems in

Proceedings of the IASTED International Conference on Automation, Control, and Information
Technology (2002), http://www.cs.umd.edu/~golbeck/downloads/Swarm02.pdf.
48

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 151, 516. See also John T. Bonner, The

Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 179.
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49

See, e.g., Thomas M. Georges, Digital Soul: Intelligent Machines and Human Values 58 (2003)

(“Just as IQ tests have well-known cultural and gender biases, our present thinking about
intelligence surely has species biases as well”).
50

See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 81 (if ants from an older colony meet ants

from a neighbor colony, “the next day they’re more likely to turn and go in the other direction to
avoid each other”); Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 444 (describing how lizards
learned their way through mazes and how to press a bar to obtain more heat for their cages).
51

See, e.g., Thomas M. Georges, Digital Soul, supra, at 58-59:

We could say . . . that an entity is intelligent to the degree that it

1. stores and retrieves knowledge;
2. learns from experience and adapts to novel situations;
3. discriminates between what is important and what is irrelevant to the
situation at hand;
4. recognizes patterns, similarities, and differences in complex
environments;
5. creates new ideas by combining old ideas in new ways;
6. plans and manages strategies for solving complex problems;
7. sets and pursues goals;
8. recognizes its own intelligence and its place in the world.

Using these criteria, we would say that an entity is minimally intelligent if it
does only (1), for example, and more intelligent the more it is able to do. Dogs,
for example, appear to do (1) through (4) reasonably well.

See also id. at 57-73 (various aspects of intelligence).
52

See supra notes 40 and 51 & accompanying text.

53

See Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 151-152.

54

See id. at 151.

55

Id.
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56

Id. at 152.

57

See supra note 44 & accompanying text.

58

See supra note 44 & accompanying text. At the most basic level, an “individual” is a “physically

distinct organism.” Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 8. This definition serves to
differentiate more evolved species – such as insects, amphibians, birds, fish and humans – from
simpler biological entities in which the line between “individual” and “colony” blurs. See id. at 383386. It does not, however, address the functional difference between, say, an ant and a human
being; each is a “physically distinct organism,” but the ant’s “individuality” ends there. Unlike a
human being, a single ant is not capable of autonomous behavior because, as is explained in
note 60, infra, an ant’s behavior is programmed by a series of simple, pre-determined rules, not
by individual cognition. See supra note 39 & accompanying text (autonomous behavior). While
humans, like ants, live in a collective environment, human behavior, unlike ant behavior, is
individuated, i.e., the product of idiosyncratic reasoning which takes into account both the
circumstances of the empirical world and the realities of the collective environment. See, e.g.,
Kerstin Dautenhahn, Evolvability, Culture and the Primate Social Brain in Proceedings of the
Evolvability Workshop at the Seventh Annual International Conference on the Simulation and
Synthesis of Living Systems (Artificial Life) (2000),
http://homepages.feis.herts.ac.uk/~nehaniv/al7ev/:

In primate societies, and different from members of social insect societies, an
individual is not only socially situated (being part of and surrounded by a social
environment) but also socially embedded which means that the agent needs to
pay attention to other agents and their interactions individually. Particularly
human primates are specialized in predicting, manipulating and dealing with
highly complex social dynamics. . . . Humans, different from social insects live in
individualized societies . . . .

Id. (citations omitted & emphasis in the original). See also W.D. Christensen & C.A. Hooker, An
Interactivist-Constructivist Approach to Intelligence: Self-Directed Anticipative Learning, 13
Philosophical Psychology 5 (2000),
http://www.kli.ac.at/personal/christensen/SDAL_PhilPsych.pdf.
59

See infra § II(A)(3). See, e.g., Brian Goodwin & Ricard Solae, Signs of Life: How Complexity

Pervades Biology 148 (2000). See also Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 74-75:
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[A]nt colonies constantly adjust the number of ants actively foraging for good,
based on a number of variables: overall colony size . . . ; amount of food stored
in the nest; amount of food available in the surrounding area; . . . the presence of
other colonies in the near vicinity. No individual ant can assess any of these
variables on her own. . . . There are no . . . ways to perceive the overall system—
and, indeed, no cognitive apparatus that could make sense of such a view.
60

See infra § II(A)(3). For a description of how this collective intelligence emerges, see, e.g.,

Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 78-79:

[T]he statistical nature of an interaction demands that there be a critical mass of
ants for the colony to make intelligent assessments of its global state. Ten ants
roaming across the desert floor will not be able to accurately judge the overall
need for foragers or nest-builders, but two thousand will do the job admirably. . . .

The simplicity of the ant language – and the relative stupidity of the individual
ants—is . . . a feature. . . . Having individual agents capable of directly
addressing the overall state of the system can be a real liability in swarm logic,
for the same reasons that you don’t want one of the neurons in your brain to
suddenly become sentient. . . .

[A]nt colonies rely heavily on the random interactions of ants exploring a given
space without any predefined orders. Their encounters with other ants are
individually arbitrary, but because there are so many individuals in the system,
those encounters eventually allow the individuals to gauge and alter the
macrostate of the system itself. . . .

The primary mechanism of swarm logic is the interaction between neighboring
ants in the field: ants stumbling across each other, or each other’s pheromone
trails, while patrolling the area around the nest. Adding ants to the overall
system will generate more interactions between neighbors and will consequently
enable the colony . . . to solve problems and regulate itself more effectively.

Ant communication strategies are crude and typically quite limited. See id. at 75 (communication
between workers in fire ant colonies relies “on a vocabulary of ten signals, nine of which are
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based on pheromones”). See also Deborah M. Gordon, The Organization of Work in Social
Insect Colonies, Complexity (2002), http://www.santafe.edu/~cmg/netdyn/:

[A]n ant’s moment-to-moment decision about which task to perform, and whether
to perform it actively, depends on its interactions with other workers. Interactions
between workers of some task groups apparently provide negative feedback,
while others provide positive feedback. It appears that what matters to an ant is
the pattern of interactions it experiences, rather than a particular message or
signal transferred at each interaction. Ants do not tell each other what to do
when they meet, but the pattern of interaction each ant experiences influences
the probability it will perform a task. Each ant uses a set of rules such as, `I’m a
forager and if I meet a returning patroller every so often, I remain likely to go out’.

See generally Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 413-415.
61

See supra notes 41 - 44 & accompanying text.

62

See supra note 51 & accompanying text.

63

See supra notes 37 - 38 & accompanying text.

64

The intelligence levels roughly correspond with the categories discussed above. See supra

notes 53 - 56 & accompanying text.
65

See supra § II(A)(1).

66

See supra § II(A)(1).

67

In insect colonies, the system of allocating individuals to perform particular functions is usually

referred to as involving “castes,” not roles. See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at
298-299. This distinction is made because the allocation of tasks in insect societies often reflects
physiological differences. See, e.g., id. (“In social insects, a caste is any set of individuals of a
particular morphological type, or age group, or both, that performs specialized labor in the
colony”). See also John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 70-75.
Among ants, “[t]here basic physical castes are found . . . all members of the female sex: the
worker, the soldier, and the queen.” Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 399. Males are
not usually considered a caste, primarily because they live for such a short time. See, e.g.,
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Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 81 (males live for a single day: “Their life span is so
abbreviated that natural selection didn’t bother to endow them with jaws to eat”). Ant colonies
“can live as long as fifteen years—the life span of the egg-laying queen ant, whose demise
signals the final death of the colony itself.” Id. at 80.
68

See, e.g., Vanessa S. Fraser, et al., Genetic Influence on Caste in the Ant Camponotus

consobrinus, 47 Behav. Ecol. Sociobiology 188 (2000),
http://www.bio.usyd.edu.au/Beelab2/BensPDFs/FraserGeneticInfluenceCaste.pdf.
69

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 302 (“The behavior of the ant soliders is

often extremely specialized”). See also id. at 301-304. The task-performance rules operate in a
fashion analogous to the rules governing moves in a board game, such as checkers. See, e.g.,
John H. Holland, Emergence: From Chaos to Order, supra, at 33-42 (game theory). That is, they
specify the behaviors that are appropriate for an ant assigned to a particular role, or caste; worker
ants have a repertoire of behaviors that differs from soldier ants and queens have a repertoire
which differs from that of either workers or soldiers. The repertoire of behaviors defines the range
of behaviors in which the ant can engage. Ants shift into a new range of behaviors if they move
from performing one task to performing another, but in either event the universe of behaviors in
which they can engage is delimited, much the way the moves of one playing checkers are
delimited. See supra notes 59 & 60.
70

See supra notes 59 & 60. See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 549 (“As one

requirement such as brood care or nest repair intensifies, workers shift their activities to
compensate until the need is met, then change back again”).
71

See supra § II(A)(1).

72

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 245 (strategies include encroaching on a

competitor’s nest, occupying sites temporarily abandoned by other colonies and siege warfare).
73

See supra notes 59 - 61 & accompanying text. See also infra § II(A)(3).

74

See, e.g., Kenneth G. Ross & Laurent Keller, Genetic Control of Social Organization in an Ant,

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 14232 (Nov.
1998), http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?tool=pubmed&pubmedid=9826683.
75

See, e.g., John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 83.
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76

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 303-309 (analyzing effects of

environmental factors upon colony size and function allocation).
77

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 85 (discussing cannibalism among social

insects). Nutrition can also produce morphological specialization among ants and other social
insects. See, e.g., id. at 303-309. See also John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals,
supra, at 82 (noting that “an individual that is genetically a queen may become a worker if she is
deprived of sufficient food during her development”).
78

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 413-414. See also Steven Johnson,

Emergence, supra, at 75 (“the great bulk of ant information-processing relies on the chemical
compounds of pheromones. . . . Ants secrete . . . chemicals . . . as a means of communicating
with other ants”).
79

Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 76 (“Gradients in the pheromone trail are the difference

between saying `There’s food around here somewhere’ and `There’s food due north of here’”).
80

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 55-56, 413-414; Steven Johnson,

Emergence, supra, at 765. See also Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 32-33 (ant burial
details).
81

See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 29-33, 73-79. See also infra § II(A)(3).

82

See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 29-33, 73-79. See also infra § II(A)(3).

83

See, e.g., Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 77-79.

84

See supra notes 41 - 44 & accompanying text.

85

See supra notes 59 - 61 & accompanying text.

86

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 55-56, 413-414; Steven Johnson,

Emergence, supra, at 765. See also Steven Johnson, Emergence, supra, at 32-33 (ant burial
details).
87

See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-

Based Decisionmaking in Law and in Life 6 (1991):
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[C]onstitutive rules create the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain
kind. They define and thereby constitute activities that could not otherwise even
exist. Rules of games are the archetypes. . . . The rule providing . . . that in order
to castle a chess player must not previously have castled does not just control a
process but constitutes it. Without the rules of chess you cannot castle at all.
88

See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra, at 7 (noting that constitutive rules

can have “regulative” aspects, i.e., can prescribe and proscribe behavior).
89

See, e.g., Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control, supra at 12 (“Deviant behavior . . . is

behavior that violates normative rules); Edwin M. Lemert, Human Deviance, Social Problems and
Social Control 13 (2d ed. 1972) (“deviance is defined as violations of norms, or departures from
social expectancies”). See also supra note 34.

The definition given above incorporates the requirement that the failure to follow rules
must be “deliberate,” that is, the result of “careful thought and thorough consideration”. Merriamth

Webster Online Dictionary (10 ed.), http://www.m-w.com (defining “deliberate”). A failure to
abide by governing rules can be deliberate or unintentional, advertent or inadvertent. If, for
example, an ant were to find a morsel of food and take it to the wrong colony, the ant would not
have followed the rules that prescribe a foraging ants’ conduct; under those rules, foragers find
food and bring it back to their own colony. See supra note 86 & accompanying text. The ant has
failed to follow applicable rules, but the error is more properly characterized as a “deviation” from
expected behavior than as deviant behavior.

Why is that the correct characterization? There are two reasons, one context-specific
and one general. The context-specific reason derives from the limited capacities of ants. As was
explained earlier, an individual ant is not “intelligent” and therefore cannot engage in a process of
decision making. See supra notes 59 - 61 & accompanying text. The hapless forager who goes
to the wrong colony is, therefore, incapable of having done so “deliberately.”

The general reason is found in the tension between order and disorder. As explained
above, self-organizing collective systems strive for order because without it they cannot perform
the functions that are essential for the survival of the system and its constituent entities. See
supra § II(A)(1). In a sense, any entity’s failure to follow the constitutive rules of such a system
undermines the system’s ability to maintain order; the ant’s error proves that the rules in place in
the hypothesized colony are not perfect. If the imperfection responsible for this ant’s default in
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the performance of her duty were to spread, the colony’s ability to maintain order would be
threatened and it might well collapse. But little in life (real life, anyway) is perfect; it is therefore
reasonable to assume that some level of inadvertent errors will occur in any system. See, e.g.,
James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science 15, 193 (1988). This ant’s failure to follow the rules
is an anomaly of the type to be expected in the operation of a system such as this. It is,
therefore, a matter of no particular concern for the colony (though it is for the ant, since she will
no doubt be killed by ants from the other colony). See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology,
supra, at 206-207.

“Deviant behavior,” on the other hand, has a significant potential for undermining the
order or a self-organizing collective system populated by intelligent entities. This issue is
discussed later. See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
90

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 165 (social insects do not play). Cf. Antz,

http://www.pdi.com/feature/antz.htm.
91

For an overview of how deviant behavior threatens internal order, see supra note 89. See also

infra § II(A)(2)(c).
92

th

See, e.g., Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (10 ed.), http://www.m-w.com (defining

“antisocial” as “hostile or harmful to organized society” and “being or marked by behavior
deviating sharply from the social norm”). See also supra note 89.
93

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

94

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

95

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

96

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

97

See generally John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 38-53.

98

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 499. “Solitary” means that the species’

social groupings are “comprised exclusively of the mother and her unweaned young, and adult
males and females associate only during the breeding season.” Id.
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99

Although ants are described as “social insects,” biology differentiates the simple sociality found

in insect species from the more complex social arrangements characteristic of mammals. See,
e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 7 (defining “society” as “a group of individuals
belonging to the same species and organized in a cooperative manner”) & 8 (defining “colony” as
a group “of organisms which are highly integrated, either by physical union . . . or by division into
specialized . . . castes”). In sociobiology, “colony” is reserved for communities of social insects,
“tightly integrated masses of sponges . . . and other `colonial’ invertebrates.” Id. at 8.
100

See supra notes 41 - 44 & accompanying text. See also supra note 51. See, e.g., Peter

Steinhart, The Company of Wolves 126-136 (1995). See also Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology,
supra, at 504-513; “Wolves: The Basics of Wolf Biology and Taxonomy,” Defenders of Wildlife,
http://www.defenders.org/wildlife/wolf/wolfbio.html.
101

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 12-13 (“Wolves are social

creatures. . . . The life of the individual is inextricably woven into the life of the pack”).
102

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 499. This section examines wolves, rather than one

of these primate species, because the goal is to analyze a species that is, in effect, intermediate
between the social insects and man. Wolves are individually intelligent, but their behavior and
social organization is sufficiently distinct from mankind’s to provide a useful point of comparison.
The behavior and social organization of the higher primates is in many respects functionally
analogous to that of mankind, which provides little basis for comparison. See, e.g., Frans de
Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex Among Apes 3-41 (Rev. ed. 1998).
103

See supra § II(A)(1). Like ants, a wolf pack is an extended family. See, e.g., L. David Mech,

Alpha Status, Dominance, and Division Of Labor In Wolf Packs, 77 Canadian J. of Zoology 11961203 (1999), http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/2000/alstat/alstat.htm; John T. Bonner, The
Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 79.
104

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 13 (“wolves live in packs of two

to twenty, the pack size depending on the size of available prey”). See also John T. Bonner, The
Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 89. “A new pack is formed when a mated pair leaves its
parental group to produce a litter on its own.” Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509.
See also Jane M. Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf (L.D. Mech & L.
Boitani, eds. 1998), http://canis.tamu.edu/wfscCourses/Concepts/Packa98.html (“Packs usually
are founded by an unrelated male and female, each having dispersed from their natal families

121

Brenner – Distributed Security

and joining up in an area defensible from encroachment by other packs. . . . Each family grows
with successive litters (typically 5-6 pups) and shrinks as offspring disperse”).
105

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 15.

106

See supra § II(A)(2)(a). Pack members work together to “maintain territories, obtain food and

rear young.” Jenny Ryon Social Organization of Wolves, Canadian Centre for Wolf Research
(2000), http://www.wolfca.com/SocialOrg.html.
107

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

108

See supra § II(A)(2)(a).

109

See supra § II(A)(2)(a).

110

See supra § II(A)(1). See also supra note 89.

111

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 283 (“the vast majority of mammal

species forming groups with any degree of social complexity . . . display dominance” hierarchies).
112

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 279 (citation omitted & emphasis in the original).

113

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 280.

114

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 280.

115

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 280.

116

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 290.

117

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 290.

118

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 290-291; Peter Steinhart, The Company

of Wolves, supra, at 13-14.
119

“Essential Wolves,” Raised by Wolves, Inc.,

http://www.raisedbywolves.org/EssentialWolvesWord.pdf. A wolf pack consists of “an alpha, or
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dominant pair, their pups, and several other subordinate or young animals. The alpha female and
male are the pack leaders, tracking and hunting prey, choosing den sites, and establishing the
pack's territory.” Wolves: The Basics of Wolf Biology and Taxonomy,” Defenders of Wildlife,
http://www.defenders.org/wildlife/wolf/wolfbio.html. See also Peter Steinhart, The Company of
Wolves, supra, at 15.
120

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509.

121

Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 13. See also id. at 113 (“A hierarchy of

strong to weak is constantly evolving and changing in the pack”). When a dominant wolf is
dethroned, he/she may leave the pack and form a new pack. See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing how
an alpha female who was displaced as lead female left her original pack, found a new mate and
founded a new pack; the new pack included wolves who had left the original pack to join her).
122

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509. See, e.g., Wolves: The Basics of Wolf Biology

and Taxonomy,” Defenders of Wildlife, http://www.defenders.org/wildlife/wolf/wolfbio.html.

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 113: “Wolves compete for status
from an early age. Fox found wolf pups routinely working out dominance hierarchies at eight
weeks; Mech saw four-week-old pups fighting for status.” (citing Michael W. Fox, The Behavior of
Wolves, Dogs and Related Canids (1971) and L.David Mech, The Wolf: The Ecology and
Behavior of an Endangered Species (1970)).
123

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509. See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of

Wolves, supra, at 113 (“A hierarchy of strong to weak is constantly evolving and changing in the
pack”). See also An Overview of Wolf Aggression, The Anglian Wolf Society,
http://www.anglianwolf.com/D_FrontPage/D_AR_Article/D_Waggr/Waggr.htm.
124

Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 113-114. “If a stare is not enough, a

dominant may lunge at a subordinate, growling with bared teeth, erect ears and tail, and bristling
hackles”) See also id. (“Usually, bites . . . are inhibited and do not draw blood. A dominant wolf
may discipline a subordinate wolf merely by placing its mouth around the subordinate’s muzzle”).
125

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 312 (alpha male exercises leadership in a

manner that is “more nearly consonant” with leadership among human beings than the leadership
found among other species); Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 103 (noting that
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it is not known whether the alpha male accomplishes this by “being aggressively intolerant of
disorder or by fostering a sense of companionability”).
126

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 509. See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The

Company of Wolves, supra, at 121.
127

See Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 312. See also Peter Steinhart, The Company

of Wolves, supra, at 121.
128

John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 89.

129

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 112-113. Some suggest that

adult wolves’ tendency to engage in frequent play is a way of “rehearsing” the coordination
needed for the hunt. See id. at 112-113. See also id. at 127 (describing how wolves split up to
encircle a deer); Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 505 (describing how wolves split up,
with one hiding and the others driving the prey toward the hidden wolf).
130

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 24 (“When wolves hunt, they

make use of disparate special abilities. Some wolves are good at finding prey, some at reading
the strengths and weaknesses of prey, some at chasing prey, some at killing prey”).
131

John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 89. See also Peter Steinhart,

The Company of Wolves, supra, at 15, 121.
132

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 286.

133

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 505. See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of

Wolves, supra, at 16 (pack territories can range from 50 t0 800 square miles or even more,
depending on the nature of the terrain). Wolves “move ceaselessly over their domains in search
of prey.” Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 505
134

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 16 (“We think wolves keep

territories either to protect den sites or to conserve hunting opportunities, and that the abundance
of pretty generally defines the size of a territory”).
135

Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 16.
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136

Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 115.

137

Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 115-116. See also Edward O. Wilson,

Sociobiology, supra, at 505.
138

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

139

See supra note 113 & accompanying text.

140

See supra note 129.

141

See supra notes 128 - 131 & accompanying text. See also supra notes 103 & 104. See, e.g.,

Jane M. Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf, supra:

At all ages, relatively hard-wired responses to specific stimuli bring individuals
into situations where each is likely to learn the contingencies of interaction with
the specific environmental conditions into which it is born. Examples include
caching, food-begging, social interaction, foraging, risk-avoidance, activity
patterns, leadership and orientation relative to homesites.
142

See supra notes 128 - 131 & accompanying text. See also supra notes 132 - 135 &

accompanying text.
143

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 99 (a lone wolf “may starve

without the shared hunting experience and concentrated killing power of the pack, or be . . . killed
by other wolves. . . . [T]hey are immensely more vulnerable to hunters”).
144

See supra § II(A)(2)(a).

145

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 102 (“Any wolf in possession of

food is likely to have a zone of one to two feet around it that no other wolf will enter”).
146

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 127-136. Ants in a colony

collectively find and acquire food by sending hundreds or thousands of foragers out into their
territory; when a forager finds a food source, she brings back what she can carry and lays down a
trail that will signal other foragers to do the same. Wolves, on the other hand, collectively search
for, eventually find and then kill their food, a task which can be both challenging and dangerous.
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See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 22-23, 54-77. Wolves employ
intelligence in deciding where to hunt, when to hunt, what to hunt and how to hunt. See id.
147

See supra note 125.

148

See supra § II(A)(1). See also supra note 89.

149

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

150

See supra § II(A)(2)(a).

151

See supra note 143.

152

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 12, 93-101.

153

See supra note 121 & accompanying text.

154

See supra note 121 & accompanying text. The presence of queens, workers and soldiers may

suggest that ant colonies and the hives of other social insects are hierarchically organized, but
that is not the case. As the previous section explained, ant colonies are organized laterally; there
are castes in the sense that ants have a fixed, to some extent biologically-determined division of
labor, but the castes are not ranked. See supra § II(A)(2)(a).
155

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 102. See also Jane M.

Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf, supra (noting that alpha wolves
“`police’” access to clumped food”, such as an “ungulate carcass”).
156

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 99-100, 111-112. See also id. at

100:
Wolves are social beings, enjoying warm, companionable . . . lives within the
pack. But wolves are also individuals, . . . competing, sometimes violently, for
social standing. . . . It is in a wolf’s interest to accommodate and coordinate with
other wolves, yet also to contend with the same wolves. . . . Humans and wolves
both evolved as group hunters. . . . [T]hey have surprisingly similar social lives.
Both have dominance hierarchies; both care deeply for their young and their
families and can display . . . exacting coordination in complex tasks; both take
pleasure in companionship . . . and play. Yet both can be aggressive and violent.
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157

See, e.g., Jane M. Packard, Social Behavior in Ecology and Behavior of the Wolf, supra

(describing how, in one pack “two adult daughters approached their father [who was feeding on a
deer carcass] in a low crouch, he pinned each to the ground with an inhibited muzzle-bite. . . .The
grown daughters stayed away from the carcass until their father was finished”).
158

See supra note 125.

159

As noted earlier, there are also alpha females, beta males and females, and still other ranks.

See supra note 121 & accompanying text.
160

See supra note 121 & accompanying text.

161

See supra note 121 & accompanying text.

162

See, e.g., Jenny Ryon Social Organization of Wolves, Canadian Centre for Wolf Research

(2000), http://www.wolfca.com/SocialOrg.html (wolf social organization is “like politics in that there
is always a contender for the dominant position no matter how long the incumbent has been in
power. To quote a political adage `the day you are elected is one day closer to leaving office’”).
163

See supra note 95 & accompanying text.

164

See, e.g., Peter Steinhart, The Company of Wolves, supra, at 102. Conversely, it is not

prohibited (deviant) behavior for beta wolves to feed contemporaneously because this conduct
comports with the behaviors prescribed by the essential constitutive rules that create and govern
order within a wolf pack.
165

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

166

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

167

See supra note 96 & accompanying text.

168

See supra note 164 & accompanying text.

169

See supra note 121 & accompanying text.
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170

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

171

The status and consequent rights and privileges enjoyed by particular wolves is a dynamic

aspect of wolf social life. The general structure of wolf social life, on the other hand, is far less
dynamic than the structure of social life in human societies. See infra § II(A)(2)(c).
172

1 William Blackstone Commentaries 39.

173

See supra note 99 & accompanying text. See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) & § II(A)(2)(b).

174

See supra notes 41 - 44 & accompanying text. See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) & § II(A)(2)(b).

175

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 555. See also supra note 56 &

accompanying text. For the premise that intelligence and sociality interacted in the process of
human evolution, see, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 567-568.
176

See supra § II(A)(1).

177

For a discussion of the complexity of human societies, see infra notes 186 - 191 &

accompanying text.
178

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 548 (“The parameters of social

organization, including group size, properties of hierarchies, and rates of gene exchange, vary far
more among human populations than among those of any other . . . species”).
179

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 548-549.

180

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 549.

181

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 549 (citing the “slave society of Jamaica” and the Ik

of Uganda).
182

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 550. See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) & § II(A)(2)(b).

183

Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at 47 (footnote

omitted).
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184

Id. See, e.g., supra § II(A)(2)(b).

185

Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at 47.

186

Id. at 50. See also id. (“none of these formations may be understood as products of man’s

biological constitution, which . . . provides only the outer limits for human productive activity”).
See, e.g., id. at 47-50 (limited role of biology in human social evolution). See generally Edward
O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 567-574.
187

Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at 51.

188

See supra § II(A)(1).

189

Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at 52 (emphasis

in the original). See, e.g., David E. Van Zandt, Commonsense Reasoning, Social Change, and
the Law, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 894, 898 (1997) (“social order is produced by identifiable or
discoverable processes that hold society together”).
190

See supra § II(A)(1).

191

See infra § II(A)(2)(c).

192

See supra notes 89 - 96 & accompanying text.

193

See supra notes 24 - 25 & accompanying text.

194

See, e.g., “All About Entropy, The Laws of Thermodynamics, and Order from Disorder,”

Archives of Science (2001), http://www.entropylaw.com/entropyenergy.html (laws of
thermodynamics “sit above the ordinary laws of nature as . . . laws upon which the other laws
depend”).

Id. (citing R. Swenson & M. Turvey, Thermodynamic Reasons for Perception-Action Cycles, 3
Ecological Psychology 317 (1991), http://www.ecologicalpsychology.com/SwenTurv.pdf.
195

Id. See, e.g., supra § II(A)(2)(a). Cf. Antz, http://www.pdi.com/feature/antz.htm.
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196

See, e.g., John T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, supra, at 79. See also supra §

II(A)(2)(a).
197

See supra § II(A)(2)(a).

198

See supra notes 179 - 181 & accompanying text. See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) & § II(A)(2)(b).

199

See supra notes 179 - 181 & accompanying text. See also supra § II(A)(2)(a) & § II(A)(2)(b).

200

See supra notes 29 - 31 & accompanying text.

201

See supra note 95 & accompanying text.

202

John Steward, Evolution’s Arrow: The Direction of Evolution and the Future of Humanity 116

(2000), http://www4.tpg.com.au/users/jes999/Part%204.pdf. See also Edward O. Wilson,
Sociobiology, supra, at 553-554, 569.
203

See supra notes 29 - 31 & accompanying text.

204

The social order described above is characteristic of characteristic of a “complex” hunter-

gatherer band. See, e.g., Paul Rubin, Hierarchy, 11 Human Nature 259 (2000),
http://www.archaeoworld.com/journals/humannature/articleDetail.cfm?articleNumber=154 (noting
the distinction between “simple” hunter-gatherers and “complex” hunter-gatherers; the former are
“mobile, egalitarian, live in small settlements and the only `occupational specialization’ is by age”,
while the latter are organized by a dominance hierarchy and possess a division of labor).
205

There are other similarities between human social organization at this stage of is evolution and

the behavior of wolves. Like wolf packs, human bands were territorial; and like wolves, humans
played. See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 567-568.
206

See supra § II(A)(2)(b). For a theoretical model of why dominance evolves even in small

human social groupings, see, e.g., James L. Boone, Competition, Conflict, and the Development
of Social Hierarchies in Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior 301-337 (Eric Alden Smith, et
al., eds. 1992). See also Polly Weissner, Leveling the Hunter Constraints on the Status Quest in
Foraging Societies in Food and the Status Quest: An Interdisciplinary Perspective 171-188 (Wulf
Schiefenhovel & Pauline Weissner, eds. 1995). Physical prowess would have been the original
mode of gaining authority, just as it is with wolves. As human social life evolved in complexity,
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the notion of inherited authority appeared, supplementing, if not replacing, physical prowess.
See, e.g., Albert Somit & Steven A. Peterson, Darwinism, Dominance, & Democracy: The
Biological Bases of Authoritarianism 53 & 62 n. 2 (1997) (noting the inheritance of dominance in
chimpanzees and other non-human species).
207

In addition to these routine matters, the dominant male would no doubt deal with challenges to

his authority, resolve conflicts between members of the band and, perhaps, make decisions about
mating between members of his band and members of other bands.
208

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 553-554, 566, 569.

209

See supra § II(A)(2)(b).

210

Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 569.

211

See, e.g., David Ronfeldt, Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks: A Framework About Social

Evolution 5-17 RAND (1996), http://www.rand.org/publications/P/P7967/P7967.pdf.

See also

Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra at 168 (discussing “permissions” and powerconferring rules).
212

See generally Henry Maine, Ancient Law, Chapter 5 (1861); Claude Hermann Walter Johns,

Babylonian Law —The Code of Hammurabi, Encyclopedia Britannica (1910-1911),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hammpre.htm. See, e.g., The Code of Hammurabi,
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamframe.htm;
Laws of the Kings, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/laws_of_thekings.htm; The
Statute of Laborers (1351), http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/statlab.htm. See also
Tacitus, Germania, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/tacitus-germanygord.html.

The extent to which constitutive rules define and circumscribe the behavioral options of
its respective members varies with the nature of the social system; feudal societies, for example,
were characterized by an intricate system of constitutive rules. See, e.g., Norman F. Cantor. The
Civilization of the Middle Ages 195-204, 465-473 (1994).
213

See, e.g., Robert K. Merton & Robert A. Nisbet, Contemporary Social Problems: An

Introduction to the Sociology of Deviant Behavior and Social Disorganization 21-22 (1961):
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All societies have rules that specify appropriate and inappropriate ways of
behaving. These . . . `norms’ . . . are sets of directions for behavior, and
members of a society are expected to follow them. When a child is born, he . . .
comes under the influence of the . . . `society,’ in which he lives. . . . [W]hat he is
fed, when he is fed, and how he is fed all are determined by norms existing in
advance of his arrival. And as he grows older . . . he is increasingly expected to
conform to norms himself. . . .

[N]orms . . . are not all of equal importance. The most important ones have been
called mores, and they constitute the basic rules that are . . . holding a society
together. When the mores are violated, members of the society respond with
great moral indignation; punishment is likely to be quite severe. . . . [A]cts, such
as cannibalism, rape, and murder, are violations of mores. Less important norms
are called folkways, and punishments for violation of them are likely to be quite
mild. . . . Rules about table manners, styles of dress, and etiquette are folkways. .
. . . [T]he criminal law is a body of rules stipulating that anyone violating certain
folkways and mores will be considered a criminal and will be officially punished.

(emphasis in the original). See also Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmussen, Creating and
Enforcing Norms with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 369, 369-372
(1999).
214

See, e.g., Robert K. Merton & Robert A. Nisbet, Contemporary Social Problems, supra, at 21-

22. See also Cristiano Castelfranchi, Engineering Social Order, First International Workshop on
Engineering Societies in the Agents’ World (2000),
http://lia.deis.unibo.it/confs/ESAW00/pdf/ESAW04.pdf.

Norms have historically been effective because there was little in the way of behavioral
innovation; the rise and proliferation of technology, however, can undermine the effectiveness of
norms as an agent of social control. See, e.g., Cam Phones Spread New Brands of Mischief,
CNN.com (July 10, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/ptech/07/10/naughty.camphones.ap/index.html (“`The problem
with a new technology is that society has yet to come up with a common understanding about
appropriate behavior,’ said Mizuko Ito, an expert on mobile phone culture”)..
215

See, e.g., M. Weber, Economy And Society 34 (G. Roth & C. Wittich ed. 1978) (“An order will

be called . . . law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that . . . coercion will be applied
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by a staff of people . . . to bring about compliance or avenge violation”). See also Edwin M.
Schur, Law and Society: A Sociological View 76 (1968); Max Weber on Law in Economy and
Society 5 (Max Rheinstein, ed., trans. by E. Shils & M. Rheinstein 1954). The “consequences”
cited above are not the relatively Draconian consequences attendant upon failing to conform to
the dictates of the criminal law, which is discussed later in the text. The “consequences”
attendant upon failing to conform to the dictates of civil, constitutive law are less onerous in
nature and, indeed, may take the form of a default; if, for example, one purports to enter into
marriage without having obtained the necessary license and otherwise complying with the
requirements of the constitutive law, the marriage will null and void. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 30-1-9
(“No marriage shall be solemnized without a license”). See also Parks v. Martinson, 694 So.2d
1386, 1390 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
216

See, e.g., Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology, supra, at 562:

The extreme plasticity of human social behavior is both a great strength and a
real danger. If each family worked out rules of behavior on its own, the result
would be an intolerably amount of tradition drift and growing chaos. To
counteract selfish behavior and the `dissolving power’ of high intelligence, each
society must codify itself.

Id. (quoting Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1935)). See also H.L.A.
Hart, The Concept of Law 27 (1975) (“Legal rules defining the ways in which valid contracts or
wills or marriages are made do not require persons to act in certain ways whether they wish to or
not. Such laws do not impose duties or obligations. Instead, they provide individuals with facilities
for realizing their wishes”) (emphasis in the original).
217

See, e.g., Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, supra, at

129-147.
218

3 William Blackstone, Commentaries 1.

219

Systems populated by ants and other social insects, for example, have only constitutive rules.

See supra § II(A)(2)(a) & § II(A)(2)(b). For the definition of “intelligence” used in this article, see
supra notes 42 - 44 & accompanying text.
220

See supra note 216. See also supra notes 42 - 44 & accompanying text.
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221

See supra § II(A)(2)(a) & § II(A)(2)(b).

222

See supra note 216. See also supra notes 42 - 44 & accompanying text.

223

See supra note 34 & accompanying text. See, e.g., Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control,

supra at 11 (“Deviance, if not contained, is always a threat to organization”). See generally
th

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4 ed. 2000),
http://www.bartleby.com/61/20/A0282000.html (defining anarchy as “[a]bsence of any common
cohesive principle, such as a common standard or purpose”).
224

For a slightly different perspective, see, e.g., Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control, supra at

4 (deviance destroys social organization in three ways: (1) by disrupting coordinated processes;
(2) by destroying people’s willingness to play their parts in the system; and (3) by destroying
one’s faith that other members of the system will play their parts in the system).
225

“Preying upon” another can take any of a variety of forms, e.g., sexual attack, theft, fraud,

physical assault, murder.
226

It is, perhaps, helpful to illustrate the behaviors, and results, that fall into each category: If a

parent chose not to provide for his children, a function essential for the survival of the system
would not be performed. See supra note 29 & accompanying text. If a man chose to murder his
neighbor’s children, this would constitute socially destructive behavior.
227

See supra note 89 & accompanying text. See, e.g., Sex, Mob Hits: Sims Tests Virtual Morals,

CNN.com (July 5, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/fun.games/07/05/misbehaving.online.ap/index.html:

. . . Jeremy Chase admits to shaking down his enemies. His Web site advertises
extortion, hits and prostitution for a hefty fee.

Chase is a mob leader -- but only in the virtual world. He is one of hundreds of
players who found the path of lawlessness and deviance too irresistible when
`The Sims Online’ challenged them to `Be Somebody ... else.’

The popular . . . game . . . is turning into a petri dish of anti-social behavior. And
that's raising questions about whether limits on conduct should be set in such
emerging virtual worlds . . . .
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See also id. (“`We're going to be forced to create a whole new area of social convention -- and
probably law -- that reflects that kind of behavior,’ said psychologist David Greenfield”).
228

See supra § II(A)(2)(a) & § II(A)(2)(b).

229

The same is true of systems populated by intelligent artificial entities as long as their behavior

is subject to constraints which operate in a fashion analogous to those biology imposes on most
species. See, e.g., Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, Growing Artificial Societies, supra, at
23-26. If a social system were populated by artificial entities (a) whose intelligence was at least
comparable to that of humans and (b) who were not subject to constraints analogous to those
that channel the behavior of non-human biological species, then that system could confront the
possibility of deviant behavior. To be truly “deviant,” though, behavior has to originate in the
intellect and autonomy; deviant behavior, in other words, has to be contumacious. See supra
note 89 & accompanying text. See also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
th

Language (4 edition 2000), http://www.onelook.com/?w=contumacious&ls=a (defining
contumacious as “[o]bstinately disobedient or rebellious”).
230

See supra § II(A)(2)(a) & § II(A)(2)(b).

231

See supra note 229.

232

See supra notes 218 - 227 & accompanying text.

233

See Paul H. Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law 125 (1997) (criminal law “it

defines and announces the conduct that is prohibited. . . . Such 'rules of conduct' . . . provide ex
ante direction to the members of the community as to the conduct that must be avoided . . . upon
pain of criminal sanction”). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 42 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe, ed. 1963) (“purpose of the criminal law is . . . to induce external conformity to
rule”); Edwin M. Schur, Law and Society: A Sociological View 72 (1968) (noting that
“mechanisms of social control are required in all societies” to deal with the “conflict and deviance”
that “constitute integral aspects of social life”); Model Penal Code § 1.02(1)(a) (purpose of
criminal law is to “forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably . . . inflicts or threatens substantial
harm to individual or public interests”). See, e.g., The Code of Hammurabi, The Avalon Project
at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamframe.htm; The Salic Law,
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/salic.htm.
See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 27 (1975).
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The “civil” rules in a system can be, and often are, defined to include consequences that
follow upon a failure to follow a particular rule. These consequences can consist of civil litigation
brought either by a private party or by the system itself. They can also take the form of fines or
other regulatory sanctions imposed by the system.
234

Constitutive rules can also govern whether or not a lawfully-born child will be allowed to live.

See, e.g., Cynthia B. Patterson, The Family in Greek History 74 (1998) (describing how Spartan
fathers took their children to a council of elders, who decided whether it should live). Such rules
can also govern the number of children those who are allowed to reproduce can lawfully have.
See, e.g., Kate Xiao Zhou, The Family Revolution in Contemporary China in The Family in Global
Transition 201-204 (Gordon L. Anderson, ed. 1997) (“one child rule”).
235

See, e.g., 750 Il. Comp. Stat. § 5/303. See also John L. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family

Law 28 (1982) (rules determining legitimacy in classical Islamic law).
236

See, e.g., Ark. Code § 9-10-113 (custody of illegitimate child); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-56b

(presumption of parental custody). See also J.S. La Fontaine, The Family in Early Modern
England in The Family in Global Transition 102-105 (Gordon L. Anderson, ed. 1997) (in early
modern England, families often sent their children to live with others, e.g. wet-nurses, employers
or relatives).
237

See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 40-6-211 (“The parent or parents of a child shall give the child

support and education suitable to the child's circumstances”); Ind. Code § 31-14-11-19 (duty to
support child is terminated by emancipation). See also Jane F. Gardner, Family and Familia in
Roman Law and Life 6-113 (1998). Constitutive rules governing emancipation also establish
affirmative rules of conduct; that is, one a child has been emancipated, the parent is obliged to
recognize that emancipation and behavior in accordance with the child’s new status. See id.
238

See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 270 (“If a parent of a minor child willfully omits . . . to furnish

necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her
child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such
fine and imprisonment”). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2(a)(1)
(2003) (“a parent may be guilty of criminal homicide for failure to call a doctor for his sick child
[and] a mother for failure to prevent the fatal beating of her baby by her lover”).
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239

See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code § 654 (“The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons

to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this Code, the thing of which there may be
ownership is called property”); Mont. Code Ann. § 70-1-101 (“The ownership of a thing is the right
of one or more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others. In this code, the thing of
which there may be ownership is called property”).
240

See, e.g. Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 19.8 (theft) & 21.3 (arson) (2003).

241

These rules address what are often called “crimes against persons.” See, e.g., Model Penal

Code § 210.1(1) (“A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he . . . causes the death of another
human being”). See also id. at § 213.1 (rape) & § 212.1 (kidnapping). See also William L.
Barnes, Jr., Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime
and Punishment, 74 Ind. L.J. 627, 649 (1999).
242

See supra note 213. The U.S. Constitution and many state constitutions do contain provisions

that refer to general expectations, such as “enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”
Cal. Const. art. I § 1 (1849). See also U.S. Const. amends. v & xiv § 1; Col. Const. art. II § 3; Id.
Const. art. I § 1; Iowa Const. art. I § 1; Ky. Const. § 1; N.D. Const. art. I § 1; Va. Const. art. I § 1.
But these provisions are not the constitutive correlates of criminal rules that impose liability for
what are often called “crimes against persons.” They are due process guarantees that constrain
government, not individual action. See, e.g., In Interest of Reginald D., 533 N.W.2d 181, 184-185
(Wis. 1993) (provision of Wisconsin Constitution guaranteeing “life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness is the state equivalent of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See
also Jack Stark, A Practical Guide to Drafting State Constitutional Provisions, 72 Temp. L. Rev.
1061, 1067 (2000); John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to “State Action” as a Limit on State
Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 Rutgers L.J. 819, 850852 (1990).
243

See, e.g., Portugal, Código Penal, http://www.cea.ucp.pt/lei/penal/penalind.htm; Criminal Code

of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (1934),
http://www.tiac.net/users/hcunn/rus/uk-rsfsr.html.
244

See generally Michael E.Tigar, Crime Talk, Rights Talk, and Double-Talk: Thoughts on

Reading the Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 101, 108 (1986) (“When the
powerful prey upon the weak . . . the criminal law has a legitimate concern”).
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245

See H.L.A. Hart, Law as the Union of Primary and Secondary Rules, THE NATURE OF LAW

144, 145 (M. P. Golding ed. 1966) (society must enact “in some form restrictions on the free use
of violence, theft, and deception to which human beings are tempted but which they must, in
general, repress if they are to coexist in close proximity to each other”). See, e.g., Criminal Code
of the Republic of Belarus, http://www.belarus.net/softinfo/lowcatal.htm; Criminal Law of the
People’s Republic of China, http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw60.htm; German Penal Code,
http://www.bmj.bund.de/publik/e_stgb.pdf; The Indian Penal Code,
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/india/manu-full.html; See also American Law Institute, Model
Penal Code (1962).
246

See, e.g., Fiji Islands Penal Code, §§ 50 (treason), 87 (unlawful assembly) & 130 (destroying

evidence),
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Fiji_legislation/Consolidation_1978/Fiji_Penal_Code.html
; Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, Articles 114 (treason), 153 (tumults and other
disturbances of public order) & 180-181 (false testimony),
http://www.chanrobles.com/revisedpenalcodeofthephilippinesbook2.htm.
247

See, e.g., Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (1934), § 58-12,

http://www.tiac.net/users/hcunn/rus/uk-rsfsr.html (“Failure to denounce a counterrevolutionary
crime, reliably known to be in preparation or carried out, shall be punishable by . . .deprivation of
liberty for a term not less than six months”).
248

Compare Zamfara State of Nigeria, Shari’ah Penal Code Law (Jan. 2000), §§ 126 & 127

(fornication and adultery offenses),
http://www.nigerianlaws.com/frames/docs/stats/ShariaCodeContents.html with Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53a-81 (adultery offense repealed) and D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1001 (fornication offense
repealed). See also Fiji Islands Penal Code, §§ 145 (insult to religion) & 232 (witchcraft and
sorcery),
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/paclawmat/Fiji_legislation/Consolidation_1978/Fiji_Penal_Code.html
; Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, Article 200 (grave scandal),
http://www.chanrobles.com/revisedpenalcodeofthephilippinesbook2.htm; United Arab Emirates
Penal Code Article 358 (1988) (offense of committing “publicly an infamous act constituting a
violation of the rules of decency”).
249

See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 216 (1975) (noting that the term “state” is a

“way of referring to two facts: first, that a population inhabiting a territory lives under that form of
ordered government provided by a legal system with its characteristic structure of legislature,
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courts, and primary rules; and, secondly, that the government enjoys a vaguely defined degree of
independence”).
250

See supra notes 30 - 33 & accompanying text.

251

See, e.g., D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960 3-27 (1961) (negative

impact of Russian Revolution on Russia’s participation in World War I).
252

See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History 75-

205 (2002).
253

See, e.g., Mark A. Summers, The International Court Of Justice's Decision In Congo V.

Belgium: How Has It Affected The Development Of A Principle Of Universal Jurisdiction That
Would Obligate All States To Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. Int’l L.J. 63, 69-70 (2003)
(noting that “[t]erritory . . . is the bedrock of criminal law jurisdiction”, with some exceptions). For
the law of war, see, e.g., Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A
Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 Harv. Int’l L. J. 49 (1994). There are rules defining “war
crimes,” but these atypical rules transcend the structure of individual systems. See, e.g., Jeremy
Colwill, From Nuremberg to Bosnia and Beyond: War Crimes Trials in the Modern Era, 22 Social
Justice 111 (1995).
254

See, e.g., Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, supra, at 296-297.

255

See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 7 (1998) (“Whether one is ever

held liable for a particular offense depends on the rules of procedure. These rules determine how
the state enforces the criminal law by . . . convicting and punishing those responsible”).
256

The Italian proverb quoted above translates as “the law has been made, the loophole has been

found” or, more literally, “”made the law, found the loophole.” See, e.g., Proverbi e detti italiani,
http://www.italissimo.de/Proverbi.htm. Neil Mitchison, of the European Commission’s Joint
Research Centre in Ispra, Italy, was kind enough to call the proverb to the author’s attention and
to provide the translations.
257

Brian Goodwin & Ricard Solae, Signs of Life: How Complexity Pervades Biology, supra, at

149-150. See also supra § II(A)(2)(a).
258

See supra § II(A)(2).
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259

See, e.g., J.S. Eros, Karl Mannheim & W.A.C. Stewart, Systematic Sociology: An Introduction

to the Study of Society 126 (1957):

[C]ontrol is based upon the existence of authority. There are people of authority,
there are statements of authority. There is no social order without authority. . . .
Most societies are built up on an elaborate system of controls among which
physical force is only a last resort.
260

See supra § II(A)(2)(b).

261

See supra § II(A)(2)(b).

262

“Dominance is . . . the outcome of a competitive encounter where the prize for the contest

winner is prerogative to pursue desired incentives without interference from the loser.” Patricia R.
Barchas & Sally P. Mendoza, Emergent Hierarchical Relationships in Rhesus Macaques: An
Application of Chase’s Model in Social Hierarchies: Essays Toward A Sociophysiological
Perspective 81 (Patricia R. Barchas, ed. 1984).
263

See supra § II(A)(2).

264

See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 50-58 (1975).

265

th

Barbara W. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14 Century 482 (1978) (Wenceslas

IV of Bohemia “lacked the character to dominate” his subjects; “the incessant warring of groups
and classes, of towns versus princes, lesser nobles against the greater . . . created a network of
dissension that defied sovereignty—and destroyed the sovereign”).
266

See, e.g., Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 324-386 (Talcott

Parsons, trans. 1947). See supra notes 1, 165 - 166 & accompanying text.
267

See supra notes 1, 165 - 166 & accompanying text. See, e.g., M. Marvin Berger & Martin Alan

Greenberg, Auxiliary Police: The Citizen’s Approach to Public Safety 14 (1984) (“as ancient
villages became ancient kingdoms additional norms were imposed upon the community and
these norms were set down in written form”).
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268

See supra notes 1, 165 - 166 & accompanying text. The process was gradual, and relational

rules persisted, in some form, for centuries. See, e.g., Max Weber: The Theory of Social and
Economic Organization 324-386 (Talcott Parsons, trans. 1947). See also Norman F. Cantor.
The Civilization of the Middle Ages 195-204, 465-473 (1994).
269

See supra notes 1, 165 - 166 & accompanying text. The process was gradual, and relational

rules persisted, in some form, for centuries. See, e.g., Max Weber: The Theory of Social and
Economic Organization 324-386 (Talcott Parsons, trans. 1947). See also Norman F. Cantor.
The Civilization of the Middle Ages 195-204, 465-473 (1994).
270

See Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 4.1 (2003). See, e.g., Model Penal Code §

1.03 (territorial applicability of provisions).
271

Cybercrime: The Challenge to Leviathan, London School of Economics: The Hayek Society,

http://www.lse.ac.uk/clubs/hayek/Essays/cybercrime.htm.
272

Real-world crime is crime perpetrated in and via the real, physical world, that is, without the

use of technology. “Technology” refers to any technology, not simply computer technology. The
model of real-world crime articulated above is based upon the repertoire of “harms” a perpetrator
could inflict before, say, the nineteenth century, which saw great advances in firearms and other
technology.
273

One can avoid the need for physical proximity by engaging someone to carry out the offense

on their behalf, as when someone hires another to kill their unfaithful spouse or ungenerous
wealthy relative. This does not undermine the validity of the point being made above because, in
a non-technological world, the actual perpetrator will have to occupy some degree of physical
proximity to the victim at the time the crime is committed. See also infra note 276.
274

The characterization of real-world crime presented above assumes substantive crimes such as

murder, rape, theft, arson, burglary and the like. The one-to-one character of these substantive
offenses may not hold for inchoate crimes and clearly does not apply to compound crimes such
as felony-murder, CCE or RICO offenses. As to inchoate crimes, one can be part of a conspiracy
to commit bank robbery while robbing the bank; it is also possible simultaneously to conspire and
attempt or conspire and solicit the commission of a crime. See Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate
Crimes, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 54-58, 89-91 (1989). The one-to-one nature of real-world
substantive crime is abrogated by compound offenses such as felony-murder and RICO, the
rationale of which is that one course of conduct constitutes the simultaneous commission of
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various offenses. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The
Transformation of American Criminal Law?, 2 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 239 (1993).

Finally, the characterization presented above does not encompass the rare occasions
when a single course of conduct results in the coincident commission of two different substantive
crimes. A father, for example, who rapes his daughter simultaneously commits the crimes of rape
and incest. See, e.g., State v. Rosenbalm, 2002 WL 31746708 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
275

For the additional role physical constraints play in structuring the nature of real-world crime,

see infra § II(B)(2)(c).
276

This has never been true of murderers who employ poison; they can cause the more or less

simultaneous deaths of many victims by, say, poisoning the food served at a banquet. And those
who use poison also deviate from the model being articulated above in another way: They do not
have to be in physical proximity with their victim(s) at the time the homicide occurs, though they
do require physical proximity either to the victim or to some substance the victim will consume in
order to cause the victim’s death. In a non-technological world, “remote” poisoning is not a viable
possibility. It is, however, quite possible in a technological world. The killer might, for example,
hack into a hospital’s computer system and alter the medication prescribed for patients, either by
changing the medication entirely or by increasing the prescribed dose. Such an alteration could
cause the death of some patients, depending on the nature of the alteration and the likelihood
that the medical staff became aware of it and decline to administer the modified prescriptions.
277

See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Organized Cybercrime? How Cyberspace May Affect the

Structure of Criminal Relationships,4 North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 1 (2002),
http://www.jolt.unc.edu/.
278

There were, no doubt, one-to-many deviations in the pre-nineteenth century world. A forger

might, for example, falsify a document and use it to victimize a company, perhaps a bank; if one
construes the bank as constituting “many” victims, then this would be an instance of simultaneous
one-to-many victimization. Or a robber might intercept a stagecoach and use a weapon to take
property from several travelers at essentially the same time; this could be brought within the oneto-one premise if the occupants of the stagecoach are construed as “one,” but it is more logical to
construe this as an instance of simultaneous one-to-many victimization.
279

See generally Hans Geser, Toward a (Meta)-Sociology of the Digital Sphere, § 3, Sociology in

Switzerland (December 2002), http://socio.ch/intcom/t_hgeser13.htm#3.

142

Brenner – Distributed Security

280

The operation of physical constraints accounts for the one-to-one nature of real-world crime.

See supra § II(B)(2)(b).
281

See, e.g., John W. Kennish, Developing a Comprehensive Bank Robbery Prevention Program

(2000), http://www.kennish.com/robberythreat/. See also Nebraska Robbery Suspects Denied
Bail, Muzi News (Sept. 27, 2002), http://news.1chinastar.com/ll/english/1227483.shtml (bank
robbers planned the robbery for two weeks, “casing” the bank several times during that period).
282

th

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 254 F.3d 679, 680-682 (7 Cir. 2001).

283

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, supra, 254 F.3d at 681.See also People v. Ihrig, 2002 WL

31501922 *1 - *2 (Cal. App. 2002); Smith v. State, 571 S.E.2d 817, 819 (Ga. App. 2002).
284

th

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, supra, at 681 (7 Cir. 2001). See also People v. Barnes,

2002 WL 1999737 *1 (Cal. App. 2002).
285

See, e.g., Davis v. Commonwealth, 2002 WL 31163645 *2 (Va. App. 2002); People v. Barnes,

2002 WL 1999737 *1 (Cal. App. 2002).
286

See, e.g., State v. Mullins, 34 Ohio App.3d 192, 194, 517 N.E.2d 945, 948-949 (Ohio App.

1986).
287

See, e.g., People v. Aleman, 809 So.2d 1056, 1065-1066 (La. App. 2002).

288

See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice – Bureau of Justice Statistics, Crime Victimization 2001:

Changes 2001 with Trends 1993-2001 15 (2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv01.pdf;
U.S. Department of Justice – Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the United States
(2001), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/htius.pdf.
289

See, e.g., Leslie W. Kennedy, Erika Poulsen & John Hodgson, Problem Solving Using Crime

Mapping: Concentration and Context, Crime Mapping Research Center, 2001 Conference
Papers, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/cmrc/conferences/01conf/Kennedy.doc (“about 60 percent of
crime occurs in 10 percent of the places, 10 percent of offenders account for about 50 percent of
offenses, and 10 percent of victimized people are involved in about 40 percent of the crimes”)
(citing William Spelman & John E. Eck, Sitting Ducks, Ravenous Wolves and Helping Hands:
New Approaches to Urban Policing, 35 Public Affairs Comment 1-9 (1989)). See also Federal
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Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Arrests by State, 2001,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl69.xls; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime
Reports: Index of Crime – United States, 1982-2001,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls.

A “functioning society” is one in which the rule of law prevails and the assumption that
“crime” represents extraordinary behavior consequently holds. See supra § II(A).
290

See supra note 289. See generally Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman & Norman Loayza,

Crime and Victimization: An Economic Perspective, 1.1 Economia 219 (2000),
http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/eco/1.1fajnzylber.pdf.
291

See, e.g., Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman & Norman Loayza, Crime and Victimization: An

Economic Perspective, supra, at 266-273. See also Ken Pease & Gloria Laycock,
Revictimization: Reducing the Heat on Hot Victims, U.S. Department of Justice – National
Institute of Justice, Research in Action (November, 1996),
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/revictim.pdf.
292

See, e.g., Leslie W. Kennedy, Erika Poulsen & John Hodgson, Problem Solving Using Crime

Mapping, supra; Gary LaFree, et al., The Changing Nature of Crime in America, U.S. Department
of Justice – National Institute of Justice, Criminal Justice 2000 21-24,
http://www.ncjrs.org/criminal_justice2000/vol_1/02a.pdf; Luc Anselin, et al., Spatial Analyses of
Crime, U.S. Department of Justice – National Institute of Justice, Criminal Justice 2000,
http://www.ncjrs.org/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04e.pdf; Paul Brantingham & Patricia
Brantingham, A Theoretical Model of Crime Hot Spot Generation, 8 Studies on Crime and Crime
Prevention 7-26 (1999).
293

See Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct

in Cyberspace, supra, 2002 UCLA J. L. & Tech. at 55-65. See also supra § II(A)(3). For the
proposition that a “crime” inflicts “harm” upon the victim, see, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Is There
Such a Thing as “Virtual Crime”?, supra, 4 Cal. Crim. L. Rev. 1.
294

See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 213.1(1).

295

See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 223.2.

296

See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 224.1.
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297

See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Index of Crime – United

States, 1982-2001, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls. The unpredictability of some of
the more serious crimes, such as rape and murder, lies in the motivations for their commission;
crimes of passion, which is what often drives murder, are often committed spontaneously, in a
burst of emotion or, in the case of serial killers, as the result of irrational psychological impulse.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Giannangelo, The Psychopathology of Serial Murder: A Theory of Violence
7-43 (1996). While some types of murder – such as familial homicide – might have been
predicted by those who knew the family members, it is difficult, if not impossible, to generalize as
to the frequency with which this type of crime will occur. See generally Lawrence W. Sherman,
Preventing Homicide Through Trial and Error, Australian Institute of Criminology (1992),
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/proceedings/17/sherman.pdf . On the other hand, it is possible
to predict that certain types of offenses – such as various levels of drug-dealing, assaults,
robberies, trafficking in stolen goods and prostitution -- will occur in “hot spots,” i.e., urban
geographies in which crime is highly concentrated. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice –
National Institute of Justice, Policing Drug Hot Spots, NIJ Research Preview (January 1996),
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/hotspot.pdf/
298

See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Index of Crime – United

States, 1982-2001, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls.
299

See Model Penal Code § 223.1.

300

See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Index of Crime – United

States, 1982-2001, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls.
301

See generally Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2000, Tables 4.1 & 4.6,

http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t46.pdf
302

See, e.g., Security Alert, Kansas City Police Department – Property Crimes Division,

http://www.kcpd.org/propertycrimes.html (“[W]e have identified a pattern involving check
forgeries. These offenses usually occur in areas where there is a strip mall or several businesses
very close together”); Monica Alexander & Wei-Ning Xiang, Crime Pattern Analysis Using GIS,
http://wwwsgi.ursus.maine.edu/gisweb/spatdb/gis-lis/gi94001.html (“spatial pattern of homicides”
in the Charlotte, North Carolina urban area).
303

See supra § II(A)(3).
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304

See supra § II(B)(1).

305

Indeed, the presence of a stranger might offer a ready, simple solution to criminal investigation.

Since the stranger had no local ties, prosecuting and punishing him was unlikely to cause unrest
in the local community; and punishing an outsider avoided any controversy or ill-will that might
attend the apprehension and prosecution of a local citizen. See, e.g., Walter Van Tilburg Clark,
The Ox-bow Incident (2001).
306

The premise that victim and victimizer were necessarily physically proximate during the

commission of an offense also contributed another element to the traditional model: the concept
of criminal jurisdiction. See supra note 253 & accompanying text.
307

See, e.g., Richard H. Doney, et al., Serial Murder: An Elusive Phenomenon 164 (1990):

In a stranger-to-stranger murder lacking in physical evidence or witnesses,
criminal investigators are left to deal with a very large set of suspects, with only a
small probability of this set including the offender. . . . [M]ost serial murderers
are caught by chance or coincidence. . . . Law enforcement agencies today are
simply not adept at identifying or apprehending the murderer who kills strangers
and moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and crosses state lines.
308

See supra § II(A)(2)-(3).

309

See supra § II(A)(2)-(3).

310

See supra § II(B)(1)(b).

311

See supra § II(B)(1)(b).

312

See supra § II(B)(1)(b).

313

See generally Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2000, Table 4.5,

http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t45.pdf (total arrests per state in 2000 averaged
roughly 4%-6% of the state population).
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314

Some “crimes” will be committed by individuals who have no history of criminal activity; this is

often true of domestic violence offenses, for example. These non-career offenders are not
included in the analysis above for two reasons: One is that there is no accurate way to predict
the number of situational offenders who will emerge in a population during a given time period.
The other is that persistent offenders are primarily responsible for the rate of victimization in a
society. See, e.g., Narrowing the Gap 13, Criminal Justice System (October 17, 2002),
http://www.cjsonline.org/njg/documents/njg-framework.pdf.
315

Most offenders will perpetrate “crimes” only sporadically; the sporadic nature of crime is a

product of the motives for committing real-world “crime” and the logistics involved in doing so.
People commit real-world “crimes” for various reasons, including a desire for economic gain (e.g.,
theft, fraud), passion (e.g., spousal homicide, harassment) or compulsion (e.g., serial murder).
Since the consummation of a “crime” tends to extinguish one’s motivation, at least for a while, the
commission of real-world offenses is sporadic, even as to “career” offenders. The intermittent
nature of real-world criminality is also a function of the logistical issues offenders must address if
they are to commit their “crimes” successfully and avoid prosecution. See supra § II(B)(1)(c).
316

This is not true of serial killers, but even they tend to offend sporadically. See, e.g., Richard H.

Doney, et al., Serial Murder: An Elusive Phenomenon 164 (1990).
317

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports establish that the overwhelming

majority of indexed crimes committed in the United States for the period 1982-2001 were nonviolent offenses. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports: Index of Crime –
United States, 1982-2001, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_01/xl/01tbl01.xls.
318

See supra notes 313 - 317 and accompanying text. This premise is similar to the others that

influence the conceptualization, but it differs in an important respect. This final premise is
concerned not with the amount of “crime” but with how it is distributed, geographically and
demographically, in a system. The amount of “crime” can affect the development of patterns,
especially at the extremes: If a system were so crime-riddled as to have become dysfunctional, it
is doubtful that its “crime” would fall into identifiable patterns; the same would be true of a system
in which the incidence of “crime” was essentially infinitesimal. But for most functional societies,
the incidence of real-world “crime” falls into what might be termed the “normal range,” for the
reasons given earlier. See supra § II(B)(1)(d).
319

See supra notes 315 - 317 and accompanying text.
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320

See supra notes 288 - 301 and accompanying text.

321

See, e.g., Increased Emphasis on Intelligence by Surrey Police, Surrey Police, United Kingdom

(December 14, 2001), http://www.surrey.police.uk/news_item.asp?artid=1088 (police department
allocating resources to “more effectively target the active criminals in Surrey. There are a
comparatively small number of these who are responsible for a surprisingly large proportion of
crime. By dealing effectively with those individuals we will reduce crime”).
322

See, e.g., J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction :

The Evolution of the Police Function in Society 14-23 (1994).
323

See supra § II(A)(2)(b).

324

See supra § II(A)(2)(b).

325

See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5(a)(1)-(2), 1.5(a)(4) (2003).

326

See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5(a)(4) (2003)

327

See, e.g., Code of Hammurabi, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School,

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hamframe.htm (“the lord of Heaven and earth . . .
called . . . me, Hammurabi, the exalted prince, who feared God, to bring about the rule of
righteousness in the land, to destroy the wicked and the evil-doers”). See also Wayne R.
LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5(a)(6) (2003).
328

See, e.g., Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The Role of Police in American Society: A Documentary

History xxv (1999) (“Serious crimes were rare in the earliest American colonies, and there was
little need for formal law enforcement”). See also Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard
Scaglion, Police in Contradiction, supra, at 15-16.
329

See supra § II(B)(1)(c).

330

See supra § II(B)(1)(c).

331

See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Some Thoughts about Police and Crime in The Crime Conundrum,

Essays on Criminal Justice 121-122 (George Fisher & Lawrence M. Friedman, eds. 1997) (“ the
American public . . . and political leaders all assume that police . . . deter crime.”).
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332

See, e.g., Dennis Jay Kenney & Robert P. McNamara, Police and Policing: Contemporary

Issues 178-179 (1999) (proactive efforts are “very expensive). See also Susan M. Hartnett &
Wesley G. Skogan, Community Policing: Chicago Style 13 (1997).
333

See infra notes 431 & 437 & accompanying text.

334

J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 65.

See, e.g., id. at 59-64.
335

See id. at 65-71.

336

See id. at 15. The Greek system seems to have involved private retribution. See id. The

Roman Emperor Augustus organized citizens “into a semimilitary force known as the `Vigiles’”;
while their “responsibilities included fire protection and street patrol”, their “main purpose was
apparently to protect the ruling class from the threat of rebellion.” Id.
337

Id at 19 (quoting T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales 1-3 (2d ed.1972) &

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society 3 (1967)) (notes omitted). See also Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The
Role of Police in American Society, supra, at 3 (“In England, the active involvement of civilians in
law enforcement began in about the tenth century. Each citizen was made responsible for aiding
neighbors who were victimized by outlaws”).
338

J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 19.

See also L.F. Salzman, English Life in the Middle Ages 215-220 (1926).
339

See id. at 20.

340

Id. at 20 (notes omitted). See also Douglas G. Browne, The Rise of Scotland Yard: A History

of the Metropolitan Police 11-18
341

David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165 , 1197 (1999)

342

See, e.g., Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The Role of Police in American Society, supra, at 2-3

(American colonists “variants of the law enforcement and protection procedures that long had
been in place in their European homelands, such as the night watch, constabulary, and sheriff”).
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343

J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 20.

See also Douglas G. Browne, The Rise of Scotland Yard: A History of the Metropolitan Police
11-24 (1956).
344

J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 21.

See also Cynthia Morris & Brian Vila, The Role of Police in American Society, supra, at 4 (similar
problems with the American colonial version of the night watch-constable system).
345

J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 21.

See also Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe 149-150 (1999)
(nineteenth century Italy used the sbirri, “armed thugs who performed some policing functions”).
346

J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 21.

347

Id.

348

Id.

349

Id. at 22.

350

David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, supra,, 46 UCLA L. Rev. at 1202-1203 (notes omitted).

See also Douglas G. Browne, The Rise of Scotland Yard, supra, at 73-112.
351

J. Michael Olivero, Cyril D. Robinson & Richard Scaglion, Police in Contradiction,supra, at 22.
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Another problem with the alternative discussed above is that since cybercrime disregards
territorial boundaries, simply hiring more officers in no way guarantees that officers will be able to
react effectively to particular cybercrimes. See supra § III(A).

The ultimate futility in this alternative is the fact that there simply are not enough
resources available to fund hiring even a colorably adequate number of new officers to deal with
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2003 WL 5473318 (lieutenant colonel said state police agency “is vastly underfunded,
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While it is generally thought to be illegal to strike back, the rationale is usually
based on the practicality of pinpointing the perpetrator, and killing the wrong
machine or code. But . . . the accurate targeting of a perpetrator’s machine itself
presents serious legal issues: A host of statutes . . . make it illegal to attack or
disable computers, including those connected to the Internet. . . .
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Canadian J. Criminology 485, 487 (1991).
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460

See supra § III.
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See supra notes 453 - 455 & accompanying text.
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See supra § II(B)(2)(b).
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Best, 74 Policy Rev. 1 (1995):
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See supra notes 454 - 456 & accompanying text.

467

See supra note 456.

468

See supra notes 458 - 459 & accompanying text.

469

See supra § II(B)(2)(b).

470

See supra § II(B)(2)(b). As explained above, there are compelling legal and practical reasons

why citizens should not react to cybercrime. See supra notes 450 - 451 & accompanying text.
471
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attacks on computer systems, can provide the predicate for threats to a system’s ability to
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system itself (“terrorism”). It is true that acts which are encompassed by definitions of terrorism
also represent “crimes”’; Timothy McVeigh, for example, engaged in a terrorist act and, in so
doing, committed murder and large-scale property damage and destruction. The critical
difference between cybercrime-as-terrorism and “crimes”-as-terrorism is that “crimes” have to be
executed within the physical boundaries of the system, whereas cybercrimes do not. See
generally Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of Cyberterrorism: An Argument fo
Anticipating Cyber-attacks, 2 J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 1(2002).
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As used in this discussion, “citizens” denotes both individual and artificial members of a social

system. Corporate and other artificial entities, like individuals, can be lax about cybersecurity,
thereby providing an opportunity for a cybercriminal to exploit. See, e.g., Office of the President,
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at x-xiii, 5-11.
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certain circumstances, such as where a landlord assumes a duty to protect residents from
victimization. See, e.g., Peter Everett, Establishing a Duty: Reaching the Promised Land, 36
APR Trial 33 (2000).
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See infra § IV(B)(2).
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Trask, 2003 WL 21500018 *5 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (seat belt violation as pretext for vehicle stop).
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find the perpetrator and recover the lost goods. And if they succeed in doing so, the criminal
justice system will have to expend resources in prosecuting and, presumably, punishing the
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have burglarized some other home had I not made mine such an inviting target, either because
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See, e.g., Bob Sullivan, Could Your Computer Be a Crimnal?, MSNBC (July 15, 2003),
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spam machines. Hundreds of other home computers loaded with secret software
used to process stolen credit cards. If your biggest computer crime fear was lost
or stolen files, think again: Someone may be using your PC to commit crimes.

See also Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at 39. See
also Mo Krochmal, Distributed Denial of Service Threat Grows, TechWeb (February 8, 2000),
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20000208S0016.
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See, e.g., Xianjun Geng & Andrew B. Whinston, Defeating Distributed Denial of Service

Attacks, http://cism.bus.utexas.edu/works/articles/defeating_ddos.pdf.
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law enforcement personnel. See supra § III(B)(2). The use of use of zombie computers also
makes law enforcement’s task that much more difficult; it is harder to trace an attack back along
the path of the zombies to find the person ultimately responsible for the attack. See, e.g., D. Ian
Hopper, Denial of Service Hackers Take on New Targets, CNN.com (February 9, 2000),
http://www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/02/09/denial.of.service.03/.
482

See supra note 471 & accompanying text.

483

See supra § II(B)(1)(c).

484

See supra §§ III(A)-(C).

485

See supra § II(B)(2)(b).
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See supra notes 213 - 217 and accompanying text. See also H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law

6-7 (1975).
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See supra notes 213 - 217 and accompanying text.
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The approach sketched out above would be functionally analogous to the “safe sex”

campaigns that seek to reduce the spread of AIDS. See, e.g., Medecins sans Frontieres
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Launches Safe Sex Campaign in Mongolia, Medecins sans Frontiers (December 1, 1999),
http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=EFD71826-E65D-11D4-B2010060084A6370.
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1401 (1999). See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 4 (1990).
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See generally Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmussen, Creating and Enforcing Norms with

Special Reference to Sanctions, supra, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. at 377-380. It can also be difficult
to succeed in creating norms. See, e.g., Cindy Patton, Fatal Advice: How Safe-Sex Education
Went Wrong 118-126 (1996). See also supra note 489.
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See, e.g., Robyn Israel, Guarding the Fort, Palo Alto Weekly (September 18, 1998),

http://www.paweekly.com/PAW/morgue/real_estate/1998_Sep_18.HOME18.html.
494

One reason for the relative lack of concern about cybersecurity is no doubt the fact that the

risks of individual physical injury associated with cybercrime are, so far, very minor. One can be
injured by a person they met online and had a physical encounter with in the real-world, but the
direct infliction of one-to-one physical injury is simply not possible.
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See supra § II(B)(2)(b).

496

The President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the final version of which issued in

2003, has been strongly criticized for relying upon a purely voluntary approach. See, e.g., James
A. Harvey, An Early Look at the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Giga.Law.com,
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2003-all/harvey-2003-04-all.html (‘`cybersecurity is too tough a
problem for a solely voluntary approach to fix.... Companies will only change their behavior when
there are both market forces and legislation that cover security failures”) (quoting James Lewis,
Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Council on Technology and Public
Policy). See also Robert Lemos & Declan McCullagh, Cybersecurity Plan Lacks Muscle, CNET
News.com (September 19, 2002), http://news.com.com/2100-1023-958545.html?tag=rn (“`It has
no teeth,’ said Steven Kirschbaum, CEO of Secure Information Systems. . . . `The first rule of . . .
any security policy is you have to have enforcement. Without it, it's just a nice press release’”).
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It is perhaps also worth noting that prior systems which depended on citizen participation
to maintain internal order were predicated on obligatory, rather than voluntary, compliance. See
supra § II(B)(2).
497

See supra notes 487 - 488 & accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules, supra, at 7. See also H.L.A. Hart, The

Concept of Law 28 (1975).
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See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2 (2003).
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See id. (“Most crimes are committed by affirmative action. . . . But there are . . . crimes which . .
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See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314A & 322 (1965); Model Penal Code § 2.01(3)
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503

See supra notes 501 - 502 & accompanying text,

504

See infra § IV(B).
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Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 683, 730. Imposing duties supported by
criminal liability can be an effective way to create a norm. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How
Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool
Lanes, 75 Ind. L.J. 1231, 1278-1279 (2000).
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See infra § IV(B).
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For individuals, an obligation of this type could include the following installing firewalls and

other security measures on computers, installing, updating and using anti-virus software and
keeping software updated. See, e.g., Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace, supra, at 39. For artificial entities, it could include the activities noted above and
working to address insider threats and sharing information about known threats. See id. at 39-41.
For individuals and artificial entities alike, the obligation could also include educating themselves
about tactics such as “social engineering” and “phishing,” since much cybercrime is the product of
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human, not machine, error. See, e.g., Social Engineering Attacks via IRC and Instant Messaging,
CERT Incident Note IN-2002-03 (March 19, 2002), http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-200203.html;Jeordon Legon, “Phishing Scams Reel in Your Identity,” CNN.com (July 22, 2003),
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/07/21/phishing.scam/.
508

The sanction would almost certainly be a fine, perhaps coupled with restrictions on computer

use for intransigent violators. Laws of this type would presumably be structured to alleviate or
eliminate liability for attacks that could not reasonably be prevented by the measures available to
average citizens. See infra § IV(B)(1).
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512

See, e.g., Barry L. Huntington, Comment, Welcome To The Mount Rushmore State! Keep Your

Arms And Legs Inside The Vehicle At All Times And Buckle Up . . . Not For Safety, But To Protect
Your Constitutional Rights, 47 S.D. L. Rev. 99, 104 (2002).
513

See, e.g., David A. Mobley, Revisiting Alabama's Seat Belt Defense, supra, 53 Ala. L. Rev. at

996 (citing 23 C.F.R. § 255.21 (1968)).
514

See supra note 507.

515
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knowing transportation of liquor on his train for his failure to take steps to prevent the offense”).
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cybercrimes against others. See supra § IV(B).
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See supra notes 543 - 544 & accompanying text.
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564

Other scenarios would involve instances in which A knew that he might be subject to an attack

from X or in which A exercised some control over X, perhaps as X’s employer, whom he know to
have a predilection for cyber-misconduct.
565

Civil liability can be imposed for selling statutorily-controlled products, such as weapons and

ammunition, to minors. See, Robert M. Howard, Note, The Negligent Commercial Transaction
Tort: Imposing Common Law Liability On Merchants For Sales And Leases To 'Defective'
Customers, 1988 Duke L.J. 755, 758. The only avenue for imposing criminal liability is complicity
which, as noted above, is not available unless the clerk acted with the purpose of aiding the
commission of the customer’s subsequent “crimes” or with the knowledge that she was doing so.
566

As to the standard A must meet, see supra notes 552 - 553 & accompanying text.

567

An imperfect source of analogy, perhaps, are the laws that impose liability upon a parent for

the parent’s failure to prevent a child from obtaining access to a weapon and using it to commit a
“crime.” In State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 700 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1997), for example, a father
was charged with criminally negligent storage of a firearm after his son found his handgun and
used it to kill another child. See 242 Conn. At 214, 700 A.2d at 4. See also Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 531-217a(a) (“A person is guilty of criminally negligent storage of a firearm when he
violates the provisions of section 29-37i and a minor obtains the firearm and causes the injury or
death of himself or any other person”). The father claimed that the criminally negligent storage
statute impermissibly held gun owners liable “for the acts of another without requiring the state to
prove that the owner was an accessory” under the state’s complicity statute, which predicates
accomplice liability only upon affirmative acts taken to facilitate the commission of a “crime.” See
242 Conn. at 232, 700 A.2d at 12. The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed: “Although criminal
liability under § 531-217a does not attach . . . until a minor injures or kills himself or another
person, the offense . . . is not the resulting injury or death but, rather, is the improper storage of
the weapon that led to the tragedy.” 242 Conn. at 232-233, 700 A.2d at 12.
568

See Model Penal Code § 2.06(1).

569

See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.2(d) (2003).

570

See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.2(d) (2003).

571

See N.Y. Penal Law § 115.08 (2003).
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572

See N.Y. Penal Law § 115.05 (2003).

573

See N.Y. Penal Law § 115.01 (2003).

574

See N.Y. Penal Law § 115.00 (2003). For the distinctions responsible for the different

offenses, see, e.g., 35 N.Y. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 3652 (2003).
575

Since some codes use criminal facilitation to reach complicitous conduct that is predicated on

knowledge, but not purpose, other, more serious types of activity could provide the basis for a
criminal facilitation of cybercrime charge. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 13.2(d) (2003).
576

th

See generally United States v. Ristine, ___ F.3d ___, 2003 WL 21507205 *3 (8 Cir. 2003)

(sentence included restrictions on use of computer and access to Internet). New York’s criminal
facilitation offenses are not sources of guidance on this issue because they require “intentional”
conduct. See supra notes 571 - 574.
577

See, e.g., Malaysia Computer Crimes Act 1997 § 7(1) (“abetments . . . punishable as

offenses”), http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/9239/comcrime.html.
578

A more detailed treatment of this alternative can be found in Susan W. Brenner,Toward A

Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model of Law Enforcement?, __ Rutgers Computer &
Technology Law Journal ___ (2003).
579

See supra § IV(A)(1).

580

See, e.g., Restatement of Torts (Second) §§ 496B & 496C.

581

See, e.g., Chris Zimmerman, Prosecutorial Discretion, 89 Geo. L.J. 1229, 1229 (2001).

582

See supra § III.

583

See, e.g., Restatement of Torts (Second) § 496C(1).

584

See, e.g., Restatement of Torts (Second) § 496D, Comment b.

585

See supra § IV(B)(1).
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586

See supra § IV(B)(1).

587

See, e.g., Bidding in an Online Auction? Beware of Scams, BusinessWeek (November 3,

1998), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct1998/sr81103b.htm (woman paid $1,800
for a fake Beanie Baby).
588

Norman F. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages 200 (1994).

589

As noted earlier, it is still necessary to retain a reactive apparatus to deal with real-world

“crime,” which continues to be territorially based. See supra note 437. A reactive apparatus is
also necessary to apprehend perpetrators of cybercrime whenever they are successfully
identified.
590

See generally Drew Clark, House Passes Law Enforcement Information-Sharing Bill,

GovExec.com (June 26, 2002), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0602/062602td2.htm.
591

See supra § II(A).

592

See generally § II(A).

593

See supra § II(B)(2). To maintain external order, nation-states create analogous organizations

(“military”) and assign them the task of resisting threats from “outside” the system, i.e., threats
emanating from outside the nation-state’s territorial boundaries. Until recently, the external
threats nation-states faced were each other (war); that has changed with the permeability of
cyberspace. Nation-states now find themselves confronting an additional type of external threat:
the non-state actor. Either type of external threat – the alien nation-state threat and the nonstate actor threat – can be delivered via cyberspace. The distributed security approach proposed
above as a means for dealing with threats to internal order (“crimes”) can also help nation-states
to resist these new external threats.
594

See supra § II(B)(2). Removing offenders also contributes to the maintenance of internal order

by incapacitating them from committing further offenses.
595

See supra § III.

596

See supra § III. See also supra § II(A).
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597

See supra § III.

598

See supra § III.

599

See supra note 437.

600

See generally Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at

57-58.
601

See, e.g., Cyber Security – How Can We Protect American Computer Networks from Attack?:
th

Hearing Before the House Committee on Science, 107 Cong. 45 (2001) (Statement of Dr.
William A. Wulf, President, National Academy of Engineering), supra, at 48-49.

[T]he basic model . . . is based is flawed. I call it the Maginot line model. It is a
perimeter defense model. . . . It is a notion that there is bad stuff out there and
good stuff in here and we want to protect what is in here against the bad guys out
there. That model doesn't work.

Id. at 44. See generally Vivian Rowe, The Great Wall of France: The Triumph of the Maginot
Line (1961).
602

See, e.g., Cyber Security – How Can We Protect American Computer Networks from Attack?:
th

Hearing Before the House Committee on Science, 107 Cong. 45 (2001) (Statement of Dr.
William A. Wulf, President, National Academy of Engineering), supra, at 52 (noting that “[m]uch
better models: are available, “especially models like the immune system response that distribute
the responsibility for protection and defense rather than concentrating it at the Maginot Line”).
603

See supra § IV(B).

604

See supra § III(D).

605

See supra § IV(B)(2).

606

“Scale” would presumably be defined in terms of the number of victims, the cumulative extent

of the loss attributable to a series of cybercrimes and/or the geographical scale of victimization.
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607

As noted earlier, the obligation placed on citizens to avoid becoming victims of cybercrime

would not impose strict liability; it would require that they take all reasonable, state-of-the-art
measures to avoid being victimized. See supra § IV(B)(2). It follows that those who have taken
such measures will still be victimized, since average citizens cannot be expected to defeat
emerging tactics utilized by ambitious, technologically-adept cybercriminals. One of the virtues of
implementing the assumption of risk doctrines set out in § IV(B)(2), supra, is that they in effect
create a triage system; that is, the state can focus its efforts on reacting to and otherwise dealing
with cybercrimes committed against those who did not assume the risk of their commission, since
these clearly represent the most dangerous threats to a social system.
608

See supra § IV(B)(2)(b).

609

See generally Office of the President, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra, at

57-58.
610

See id.

611

See, e.g., Norman F. Cantor. The Civilization of the Middle Ages 185-204 (1994).

612

See generally Highly Secure Web Based Collaboration Portal Used to Coordinate TOPOFF 2,

The National Terrorism Response Exercise in Seattle, Chicago and Washington, FindLaw (May
21, 2003), http://news.findlaw.com/prnewswire/20030521/21may2003105912.html.
613

At a minimum, the portals would only have to offer the reasonable level of security needed to

protect users from victim assumption of risk and victim-facilitator liability. See supra § IV(B)(2).
Portals could certainly offer higher levels of security and, indeed, might find financial incentives to
do so. Subscription portals could develop which offered superior levels of online security for
subscription fees.
614

The benefit for the employer could be protecting its employees from personal victimization and

personal criminal liability. Maybe also minimize the risk that the employee’s (or family’s)
victimization could implicate the employer?
615

See supra note 507.

616

David H. Bayley & Clifford D. Shearing, The New Structure of Policing 1, U.S. Department of

Justice – National Institute of Justice (2001), http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/187083.pdf.
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